> Most experts concur that the manufacture of a lethal anthrax aerosol is beyond the capacity of individuals or groups without access to advanced biotechnology. However, autonomous groups with substantial funding and contacts may be able to acquire the required materials for a successful attack. One terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, responsible for the release of sarin in a Tokyo, Japan, subway station in 1995,6 dispersed aerosols of anthrax and botulism throughout Tokyo on at least 8 occasions. For unclear reasons, the attacks failed to produce illness.
> * the OP is arguing they wouldn't be able to create it in the first place.*
The point I'm responding to is this:-
>The only likely way such an attack could be carried out would be with massive support of some unfriendly government.
I disagree that "massive support of some unfriendly government" is needed; the example I give is Aum Shinrikyo weaponising anthrax spores (albeit the wrong anthrax spores.) AS successfully recruited undergraduates and graduates; getting access to suitably stocked labs wouldn't be that hard for them.
>Strain identification in Bacillus anthracis has been problematic due to a lack of distinguishing features, both phenotypic and molecular (1). With the identification of variable-number tandem repeats (VNTRs), identification of strains (unique genotypes) by multiple-locus VNTR analysis (MLVA) is now possible, and worldwide clone-based diversity patterns have been demonstrated (2). The VNTR loci are hypervariable and have multiple allelic states that provide high discrimination capacity for differentiating among strains and for identifying evolutionary relationships.
That's from 2001. Aum Shinrikyo incident was in 1993.
Bad idea because it requires a lot of effort (you need large qantities of tbe agent) and may call unwanted attention. It would be better to test the sample on a volunteer before. Then you weaponize the agent that best matches your needs.
They aerosolised the spores, and released them for over a week. That's not as simple as putting powder in an envelope and putting it in the mail.
(http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/281/18/1735.full)
> Most experts concur that the manufacture of a lethal anthrax aerosol is beyond the capacity of individuals or groups without access to advanced biotechnology. However, autonomous groups with substantial funding and contacts may be able to acquire the required materials for a successful attack. One terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, responsible for the release of sarin in a Tokyo, Japan, subway station in 1995,6 dispersed aerosols of anthrax and botulism throughout Tokyo on at least 8 occasions. For unclear reasons, the attacks failed to produce illness.
> * the OP is arguing they wouldn't be able to create it in the first place.*
The point I'm responding to is this:-
>The only likely way such an attack could be carried out would be with massive support of some unfriendly government.
I disagree that "massive support of some unfriendly government" is needed; the example I give is Aum Shinrikyo weaponising anthrax spores (albeit the wrong anthrax spores.) AS successfully recruited undergraduates and graduates; getting access to suitably stocked labs wouldn't be that hard for them.