So if tips or donations are prohibited, why is there a page on Stripe support detailing rules for donations, one of which is "for a good or service that has been provided?"
What part are you confused about? You can’t just have a tip on a profile page but you can accept tips in connection with goods or services provided. Everything makes sense to me.
Are you producing podcasts individually for each person, and some subset of those people who receive a custom podcast tip you?
Are you charging money for your podcast to all listeners, and some subset of those people who pay for your podcast tip you?
If either of those is true, then your podcast production is a goods or service, and you should present that evidence to Stripe as they may have overlooked it. If you're just broadcasting the podcast and asking for donations, that's not going to qualify as "a monetary transaction in exchange for goods or services delivered to the buyer", since your goods/services are delivered regardless of whether transactions exist.
From a selfish bank standpoint, ask "How would a chargeback be evaluated for validity?". How will the bank's processes handle someone charging back their tip jar donation because you unknowingly say something upsetting on the next episode about their favorite hobby? Whether or not they grant the chargeback, you will end up terminating services with that bank.
I suspect this is why Patreon is constantly rotating card processors every few months: the banking chargeback system often refuses to cope with "payment without promise", unless it's a 501(c)(3) non-profit in which case the bank is paid in the form of tax breaks to deal with all this.
This also suggests that "Who is your payment processor?" is probably a trade secret for all existing tipjar/donation platforms.
Paying you for podcasts is legitimate when it's connected. You'd be fine if you did something like "support me by getting a lossless FLAC download here" and use Stripe or by providing your Venmo for peer-to-peer money transfer. But Stripe won't work well if you want to take contributions disconnected from service. i.e. there has to be a transaction for them to accept you.
The reason for this is apparent if you flip roles. It's an anti-chargeback mechanism.
It's probably because the actual payment/donation is not directly connected to the podcast production, but rather you perform the work elsewhere, and then ask people to go tip you. Other than in your head(s), there's no actual connections between the work and the payment.
You can't reasonably expect Stripe to just take your word for it, at the scale that they operate.
Do people get access to these things without sending you money?
edit: You can request to get paid EXTRA for a good or service you provide (a tip). You cannot request to get paid (in any way) while not providing a specific good or service in return.
A resignation made under duress is invalid under Canon Law. Benedict was under a death threat and the SWIFT system had been shut down in Vatican City as an extra lever to exert pressure. The day after Benedict made an announcement about resignation the SWIFT system for the Vatican was turned back on. There is more than this but there is significant evidence that neither did Benedict resign of unencumbered free will nor did he intend to fully resign the office of the Vicar of Christ but that he intended to "enlarge the office" to be a two-person role having an active and a contemplative/passive member which isn't possible.
Apostolic succession or rather ordination as pope or as priest doesn't necessarily mean service until death. Pope Celestine V decreed in the 13th century popes are allowed to step down. Of course one is ordained priest and is in essence priest for life, just as people are baptised for life (in the view of the Church), but one can be 'in rest' or not active.
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/in-the-entire-hist...
The assertions that pope Benedict's decision is not a free decision is not true. A foreign hostile takeover is suggested without evidence. Bank payments were suspended briefly as the Vatican was not yet conforming to European standards that came into effect.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20903443
"After having repeatedly examined my conscience before God, I have come to the certainty that my strengths, due to an advanced age, are no longer suited to an adequate exercise of the Petrine ministry. I am well aware that this ministry, due to its essential spiritual nature, must be carried out not only with words and deeds, but no less with prayer and suffering. However, in today’s world, subject to so many rapid changes and shaken by questions of deep relevance for the life of faith, in order to govern the barque of Saint Peter and proclaim the Gospel, both strength of mind and body are necessary, strength which in the last few months, has deteriorated in me to the extent that I have had to recognize my incapacity to adequately fulfill the ministry entrusted to me. For this reason, and well aware of the seriousness of this act, with full freedom I declare that I renounce the ministry of Bishop of Rome, Successor of Saint Peter, entrusted to me by the Cardinals on 19 April 2005, in such a way, that as from 28 February 2013, at 20:00 hours, the See of Rome, the See of Saint Peter, will be vacant and a Conclave to elect the new Supreme Pontiff will have to be convoked by those whose competence it is."
There is no evidence that he has significant influence on the decisions pope Francis makes any other then that pope Francis tries to honor catholic tradition, including the views of previous popes, theologians and the past and current sensus fidei.
One of the criticisms I heard recently about YAML is that there's no way to know if you received a full document or just a fragment since there's no grammatical structure for indicating the document is complete. While JSON and XML are far more verbose at least it's obvious if you didn't get the full document on transmission. Perhaps a compromise could be to use YAML as a compositional tool to emit XML or another more formal configuration format?
I feel this is kind of a minor issue; the far bigger issue that this article talks about is that the declarative YAML format is used as a programming language, which it's clearly not.
I think a big chunk of that is power thermals -- Apple's ARM chips are only used currently in passively-cooled, handheld, power-restricted chassis (phones & tablets). Intel's chips are generally actively cooled and run on mains power, so they can run hotter and draw more power, so they can make up the difference by stuffing more hot cores onto the chip compared to what Apple has been doing.
Easy answer: Intel chips have more cores than Apple ARM chips.
But if they have the same number of cores it's generally a power tradeoff. A 12W chip can give 12W to one core or 3W to 4 cores. Transistors are optimized for a particular voltage & current, so when they run at a different power, performance scaling is not linear.
The funny thing is, the main selling point for intel processors for me was their better single thread performance over AMD chips and now Apple comes up with a faster single thread performance chip. I might get an ARM Macbook when they are in sale after all.
If the Supreme Court gets to redefine the meaning of one word, there's nothing to stop them from redefining any other word -- or all of them. As Cavanaugh pointed out in his dissent, it's not the role of the court to legislate, and Congress' recent attempts to amend the Civil Rights act proves they know the language is inadequate for protecting LGBT persons and that it's their job to fix it.
You're not wrong that congress should fix things too. But I don't think they're trying to redefine the word.
From the impression I got (and I only read the outline of the decision), the most important part seems to be:
> A statutory violation occurs if an employer intentionally relies in part on an individual employee’s sex when deciding to discharge the employee. Because discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex, an employer who intentionally penalizes an employee for being homosexual or transgender also violates Title VII.
I feel like that's more an interpretation of the law than redefinition of it
From the majority opinion: "The parties concede that the term 'sex' in 1964 referred to the biological distinctions between male and female."
I am not a lawyer but this sounds to me like the Supreme Court just admitted that while the text of the law doesn't include protection for gay or transgendered persons, they are going to retroactively "understand the term" as though it does.
How, then, can we assume any of the laws mean what the text says when a court can decide words mean something else? I have to agree with the dissent in this case; amending the Civil Rights to update, expand, or clarify the definition "sex" is the surest way to protect gay and transgender person from a future court taking a strict textual interpretation and annulling this ruling.
Too bad the court system can't create the equivalent of a bug report for legislation. If we had that then in this case the SCOTUS could have issued a legislative mandate to Congress requiring them to clarify or expand the definition of "sex" so that now-protected classes are protected from a further court ruling on what the actual text of the law says. It is the role of the court to interpret the laws, not make them.
> I am not a lawyer but this sounds to me like the Supreme Court just admitted that while the text of the law doesn't include protection for gay or transgendered persons, they are going to retroactively "understand the term" as though it does.
The rest of the argument makes it very clear why the conservative textualist justice who wrote the opinion considers that discrimination against homosexual or transgendered people is based in part upon the biological distinction between male and female: the assumption that the sexual preferences or identity of the individuals in these cases would be entirely unobjectionable to the employer if their biological sex was different. They're very clear on this and go on for several pages about it.
You may or may not agree with this argument or its applicability to these specific cases, but cherry picking something from the beginning of their actual argument and substituting a completely different 'retroactively "understand the term"' argument of your own invention is disingenuous at best
I suspect any employer who fired a white person for, say, dressing their hair like Rachel Dolezal whilst permitting their black employees to do so would already be in danger of the discrimination suit.
"Ultimately, the employers are forced to abandon the stat-utory text and precedent altogether and appeal to assump-tions and policy. Most pointedly, they contend that few in1964 would have expected Title VII to apply to discrimina-tion against homosexual and transgender persons. And whatever the text and our precedent indicate, they say, shouldn’t this fact cause us to pause before recognizing liability?
This Court has explained many times over many years that,when the meaning of the statute’s terms is plain, our job isat an end. The people are entitled to rely on the law as written, without fearing that courts might disregard its plain terms based on some extratextual consideration.
And as we have seen, no ambiguity exists about how Title VII’s terms apply to the facts before us. To be sure, the statute’s application in these cases reaches “beyond theprincipal evil” legislators may have intended or expected toaddress.
But “‘the fact that [astatute] has been applied in situations not expressly antic-ipated by Congress’” does not demonstrate ambiguity; in-stead, it simply “‘demonstrates [the] breadth’” of a legisla-tive command."
When reading the opinion, which I strongly recommend, you won't feel like they are somehow reinterpreting words to mean different things. The opinion goes to great lengths to define every single word in Title VII, what it means, its intent, and precedence to build on its reasoning, which is states multiple times is based on a plain reading of the law.
That seems like it has always (at least far enough for 1964 to be in scope) been a perfectly reasonable definition for sex. Can you write a different definition without trying to warp it for current political issues?
They aren't re-anything as far as I can read. They concede this to say that sex does not mean gender or sexual orientation, to make the point that then by extension, those two categories are protected from discrimination based on preconceived notions of sex. In the case of someone being gay and fired for this reason, the discrimination lies in the fact that if a gay man was a woman, the employer would not have fired this person based on them being attracted to men. It's an extension, not reinterpretation.
There is a strong legal argument to be made here. If one can simply identify as trans but the law doesn't provide a definition under which this would work, you're opening up ambiguity as to what the law even is and how it's to be used to protect someone claiming such an identification. This is a great case where a dissenting opinion is done for the protection of those seeking title as a protected class from those who will shoot the ambiguity loophole to deny the protection this decision purports to offer.
Except that the majority opinion doesn't rely on someone identifying as trans, only acting in a way not socially in accordance with their biological sex.
The majority opinion and dissents are rich sources of insight as to how the law in question will be applied as to how the decision could affect precedent in the future so I agree that the least the journalists could do is name the case so those of us who want to go to the source can look it up.
For example, the "legalization of gay marriage" case from a few years back contained phrases and platitudes about "love not being illegal" but the crux of the decision came down to the majority's opinion that a license issued in one state shouldn't be rejected in another. It didn't specify MARRIAGE license... which immediately made me comment to co-workers that in addition to requiring marriage licenses issued in any state had to be recognized in all 50 states, logically this ruling also stipulated that a concealed carry permit issued in any state would have to be recognized even in states that didn't issue concealed carry permits (Illinois at the time) as well as states in which it's very hard to get them (New York and California). To my knowledge, nobody has tested this by getting arrested in such a jurisdiction with such laws and challenging it citing Obergefell v. Hodges.
I'm sorry but this is a gross misunderstanding/misrepresentation of what Obergefell v. Hodges was.
First of all, Obergefell was a ruling that the Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment and Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment extended protections to same-sex couples. Nothing to do with licenses.
You're thinking of the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution, which was never ruled on with respect to gay marriage. We got close to it with US v. Windsor, but that ruling struck down the whole of DOMA under due process and equal protection, and did not create any kind of binding precedent with regards to the FF&C clause.
Secondly, the text of the FF&C clause is:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Your question is whether a concealed carry permit would be considered a "public Act, Record, or judicial Proceeding" of the issuing state, and I am telling you I don't think you could get a single court to agree with you that it was.
IF the resulting ruling was, indeed, based primarily on license eligibility cross-state line then wow, what a mislead but also what a possible challenge hole like you said.
I am not a lawyer™ but damn this would be a fascinating challenge. It almost implies state licenses exceed state lines to an almost federal level which seems pretty counterintuitive to me. I'd almost want to see a lawyer who has a state-level license to practice law challenge this in court to be eligible to use their state-level license in a different state.
If true, fascinating. This post represents only theory interest and no opinion of the top level topic other than this one:
> It almost implies state licenses exceed state lines to an almost federal level which seems pretty counterintuitive to me.
I think it's closer to stating that a license to $ACTIVITY/$STATUS in one state should be recognized by a different state that also licenses that activity or status.
I'm also not a lawyer but I know the law is complicated enough that if you don't have a law degree you can't just "reason" about it until it makes sense, because it rarely does. Having a license to carry a firearm in Indiana allows you to carry that firearm in Indiana. Illinois would probably agree that that license allows you to carry a firearm in Indiana, and still put you in prison for carrying it on the wrong side of the Illinois-Indiana border. Are there specifics to this argument that would apply to firearms and not marriages?
I could see there being a differentiation in some legalese between an activity (carrying a firearm, hunting, operating an emergency vehicle, etc) and a status (being married, being a felon, etc).
Would this further extend to fishing or hunting licenses?
I think I one could say that fishing or hunting licenses only apply to certain locations - you are only able to use methods X in location Y. This out of state the license is valid but not useful.
Then the question is whether gun license is more like a marriage licet or a hunting license.
Well a marriage license is not actually a document certifying that you are married, it is a document granting you the right to get married in the state that issued it. You can't get a marriage license in Indiana and use it to get married in Illinois.
Once you do get married, though, the marriage itself becomes a public record of the state that would be protected under the Full Faith & Credit clause. But as I mentioned in my previous comment, Obergefell v. Hodges had absolutely nothing to do with marriage licensing and states recognizing each other's licenses.
I believe that the state could argue a compelling interest in hunting/fishing licenses, since they affect resources spent by the state. It’s already legal for such licenses to be more expensive for out of state visitors, for a similar reason.
Gay rights leading to gun rights, that would be facinating if only just to see the political fallout. I've always wondered how people would react if gun rights were tied to abortion rights somehow, and if political alignments would change.
How can a service be bother end-to-end encrypted and have what is effectively a wire-tap that allows for services like real-time transcription? Even if we assume the transcription service is part of an e2e call the operation of the transcriber would still need to generate logs or allow for improvement over time. I don't see how privacy and real-time transcripts are both possible at the same time.
https://support.stripe.com/questions/requirements-for-accept...