Dire poverty by modern standards, sure. But the 19th century saw a spectacular rise in living standards even for average Britons. The literacy rate in Britain was ~60% for men and 40% for women in 1800, by the end of the century it was near universal for both genders. Life expectancy at birth rose from ~40 to 50. Median wages rose, too, climbing ~50% from 1800 to 1850 (https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Real-wages-during-the-pe...).
It is simultaneously true that the average Briton (arguably wealthy Britons, too) in 1900 lived in abject poverty compared to 2025, and the 19th century saw one of the fastest rises in living standards in Britain even among average Britons.
Some historians believe that once you account for the costs of subjugation and development, empire is not usually net profitable for the sovereign. Basically just a gigantic monument to the ruler's ego.
As Carl Sagan put it: Think of the rivers of blood spilled by all those generals and emperors so that in glory and in triumph they could become the momentary masters of a fraction of a dot.
How is that instructive? The British empire was mostly gone by the 1950s and a hell of a lot happened after that. It would be more instructive to look at Britain just before WW1 compared to the other countries.
At their peak, virtually all of the aforementioned empires brought enormous wealth to the homeland. It might not be profitable in the long run, but the long run can mean centuries before it becomes a net negative.
Also, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark were part of a Danish empire at one point.
The British East India Company didn't create "billionaires" with vast estates?
The Dutch East Indies weren't returning home with spices of greater value than gold?
Spain didn't plunder so much gold and silver it devalued to the floor?
Belgium went broke under the crushing cost of exploiting the Congo?
I'll go with all empires eventually fall - but many grow on the inflow of wealth from their colonies.
Perhaps you mean "true" accounting - no resources are created, they just move from those that have them to the seat of Empire which wanted them - no net gain, just added costs of transport and military forces.
Historically, though, that's never been how wealth was counted by those that ran ledgers on everything they wanted.
> Wealthiest countries in Europe: Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Ireland, Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, San Marino, Sweden.
Microstates and tax havens account for half that list, which grossly distorts wealth measurements. Such as Apple Europe being accounted for in Ireland.
The rest: (Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden); former kingdom of Denmark, also Hanseatic League? Apart from the brief period around 1700 at the height of the Swedish Empire, none of these count as imperial powers and did not have overseas empires.
Netherlands: had a substantial navy and overseas trading empire, although not as big area-wise as the UK. Probably more cost-effective as a result.
What happened here is that all the great empires spent all their money and a vast quantity of human lives fighting each other to the death. Twice. I suppose Spain and Portugal collapsed on their own to ineffective dictators.
(special "fuck Belgium" entry here for just how brutal the small Belgian empire was; Belgian occupation of the Congo cost more lives than the Holocaust)
Britain was much richer per capita than every other major European country and almost all smaller ones. Whether that was because of its much bigger industrial sector or its enpire is debatable.
You’ve rather missed my point. I’m not saying nothing improved. I’m saying the imperial profits didn’t go to the people doing the dying for empire.
50% wage growth over fifty years whilst Britain’s running the largest empire in history? Compare that to the United States over the same period. The US saw 60% real wage growth from 1860-1890 with no empire whatsoever. If imperial profits were trickling down, you’d expect Britain to outpace non-imperial industrialising nations. It didn’t, if anything it was worse.
The literacy and life expectancy gains you’re citing came from industrialisation and public health reforms, not imperial dividends. Meanwhile the landed gentry who actually controlled the imperial trade were getting obscenely wealthy.
Life expectancy of 50 in 1900 still meant working-class Londoners in overcrowded tenements with open sewers, whilst their supposed countrymen lived in townhouses with servants. The Victorian poor saw industrial revolution gains, not imperial ones.
I’ve done more digging now because even though its apples to oranges, the UK itself is now no longer an empire, and we have a 50 year window on when it wasn’t…
So just for additional context on how wage growth compares across different periods (I’ve average across decades):
Victorian Britain (with empire):
- 50% real wage growth over 50 years (1800-1850)
Modern Britain (post-empire):
- 1970s-1980s: 2.9% annual real wage growth
- 1990s: 1.5% annual growth
- 2000s: 1.2% annual growth
- 2010s-2020s: essentially zero growth
Real wages grew by roughly 33% per decade from 1970 to 2007, then completely stagnated. By 2020, median disposable income was only 1% higher than in 2007; less than 1% growth over 13 years.
The really depressing bit? Workers actually did far better in the post-imperial period (1970-2005) than they ever did during the height of empire.
Which tells you everything you need to know about who was actually pocketing the imperial profits.
And the post-2008 wage stagnation shows the same pattern's still alive and well, just without colonies to extract from. Capital finds new ways to capture the gains; financialisation, asset inflation, whatever: whilst labour still gets the scraps.
Different methods, same fucking result.
The Victorian poor weren't sharing in empire's spoils, and modern workers aren't sharing in productivity gains either. I guess mechanisms change, but the outcome doesn't.
Asset inflation going into non-productive assets like land or monopoly privileges. Tech monopolies are famous example of this, which is why they're large percentage of the SP500.
Most loans are for land, which mean your banking system isn't directing loans toward productive assets which increase economic activity.
> the trials and tribulations of european settlers
Yet it was already the richest place per capita in the 1700s. At least in the Northeast the average British colonist was earned more money, was healthier, lived significantly longer and was even actually taller than the average person who remained in Britain.
All because they had more land per capita.
> active workforce and their accumulated generational assets
Yes, its just that per capita (across the entire empire) that workforce wasn’t very productive.
Yes, the poor European settlers out there raping and a pillaging, burning and a looting,destroying cultures and entire people's to build their shiny palace on the hill. Remove the beam from your eye septic
Did something happen after 1860 in the USA that suddenly caused a large proportion of the working population to start receiving wages, thus boosting "average wage growth" artificially?
Quite a different situation. An empire is when you go to a populated place and extract wealth from the people who live there. That’s not what manifest destiny was. America expanded into land that was sparsely populated by natives americans and mexico who had no wealth to extract.
That last sentence is doing all the work though. North American indians lived on the largest continuous region of agricultural land in the world, connected with perhaps the best river network, and never had above subsistence levels of wealth per capita.
It's hard to farm all that land when there are no horses to pull a plow, or pigs, cows, or sheep to raise for meat and milk and wool and manure. They didn't have all the crops that colonists crossed over with either: wheat, rice, and soybeans. The only crop of comparable productivity was corn, which was domesticated in South and Central America and had to be adapted to North America over many generations.
After they crossed the Bering Strait they also didn't receive any of the subsequent Old World advances in metallurgy, agriculture, chemistry, societal organization and so forth.
It's asking quite a lot of a relatively small population base to invent all those things independently while also lacking everything necessary to have comparable agricultural yields.
There was no Silk Road bringing gunpowder and paper and the Black Death to these societies. That means the native populations colonists encountered were the survivors of utterly cataclysmic epidemics. It's like if aliens brought a virus to Earth that killed 95% of the population and then they went "Hmm...these earthlings, they're not terribly productive are they?"
I'm not an anthropologist or an economist or a historian so there are many other factors I missed.
Were they poor? Is there evidence that Native Americans didn't have enough food, clothing, shelter, or handcrafted goods for everyone before colonists came? The land was rich and they were quite skilled at making a living off it.
If you're calling them poor because they didn't have as much as the colonists, and that was bad, then perhaps income and wealth inequality today is just as problematic.
Yes. America had no empire. Except for the giant land empire that was, and is, America. Or does invading and occupying thousands of square miles of land, annihilating entire nations, and enslaving and slaughtering the natives, a process that was still very much ongoing between 1860 and 1890 not count as empire building?
You’re absolutely correct. The UK built an empire because it industrialized early and had the money and technology to do so. But the empire isn’t what made it rich in the first place.
Wasn't the literacy rate in New England substantially higher than the literacy rate in Old England, both in 1800 and in the years prior to its declaration of independence?
New England had a male literacy rate of around 70% compared to Britain's 60% in 1800. But New England was one of the most literate regions in America around the time of the founding, including the other American regions into the literacy rate would bring the literacy rate down (even more so when if one includes the enslaved population). Comparing the literacy rate one specific region of one country, to the national average of another country is comparing apples to oranges.
But the important thing is, the 1900 Britain's male literacy rate was 97%. Illiteracy went from something that was fairly common to exceptionally rare.
And what was the storage requirement? I just ran those parameters myself with China's 2.9 TW of constant electricity demand, and the storage requirement was over 70,000 GWh of battery storage.
By comparison, global battery production is around 1,000 GWh per year.
Battery production capacity grows by 10x every five years. In 2021 there was ~100 GWh of batteries produced a year. In 2031, it's going to be 20-30TWh per year. Current batteries have 10+ year warranties, and last 20-25 years. We're likely to see 30 years+ for the newer sodium ion batteries.
For something like 20 years, people have been looking at the exponential growth in the annual solar deployments and saying "well that's it, starting next year we're only going to deploy exactly as much as last year, plus 5%-30%". And every year these predictions are proven wrong. And every year they do the same dumb thing again:
It was around 14 hours of battery storage. Seems reasonable.
Realize that replacing all ICE road vehicles in the US with 70 kWh BEVs would require storage equal to ~40 hours of our average grid usage. The future is going to need large numbers of batteries, which is why China has been all in on this.
14 hours of battery (~40 TWh for China) with the hydrogen storage or without? Because the calculator was reporting ~78,000 GWh battery storage with China's weather selected, and 2030 technology assumptions. I changed the spatial capacity factor from 1 to 2 and the battery storage requirement dropped down to 68 TWh, but still well above 40 TWH.
Regardless, 14 hours of China's electricity demand is a whopping 40,600 GWh. By comparison, 2024's lithium ion battery production figure was 1.5 TWh [1]. Even assuming 100% of this went to EV's we're still talking about roughly 25 years worth of global battery production to fulfill only China's demand for storage in this model. As you point out, we still have loads of battery demand for EV adoption, so nowhere near 100% of production will be able to be diverted to grid storage.
The scale of storage required to make intermittent sources viable without being backed by a dispatchable energy source really is tremendous, and this often gets overlooked in pushes for a fully renewable grid.
Battery production capacity grows by 10x every five years. It was four years ago when I first heard that, and we are exactly on track still. In 2031 we will be at 20-30 TWh/year production capacity.
There are few things that grow this fast when it comes to manufactured things, atoms are far harder to arrange and scale than bits. But it's happening at a tremendous scale. Natural gas turbine production capacity is tapped out with long order queues, and so is battery production well into 2026, but only battery production capacity is expanding at breakneck speed.
Understand that only ~6 TWh of lithium batteries have been produced to date. As in, every single year of production combined adds up to less than 6 Twh. Moore's law largely stemmed from the fact that making a processer faster also meant making transistors smaller. Reducing the width of a transistor to a half, a quarter, etc. increased compute per cm^2 by double, quadruple, etc. Chemistry doesn't obtain that kind of exponential growth - we have hard limits on the number of joules we can store per gram of anode and cathode, so scaling up production means digging up more anode and cathode material out of the ground. The nature of resource extraction is that the easiest-to-exploit reserves are exhausted first, and continued production is contingent on accessing the progressively more and more inconvenient reserves.
Maybe in 2030 annual global production will be 30 TWh - we'll know in 4 years. But there's a lot of people who probably don't want to make trillion-dollar investments gambling on that possibility panning out.
Regardless of your confidence in battery production's continued growth, I think you'd agree that if someone is making a calculation about the required amount of overproduction required to maintain a stable grid, they should at least mention that their calculation is contingent on provisioning tens of terawatt hours worth of grid storage.
Getting to 10x production capacity doesn't require improving battery tech, it just requires building more factories. The equivalent here isn't Moore's Law, it's fab capacity. If battery tech stalled out today at the same pricing (it won't), we could still 10x the battery production capacity every 5 years just on this pace.
The learning rate for batteries has not been as steep as Moore's Law for ICs. But the value of being able to store mass quantities of electricity at low cost is so incredibly valuable that it's going to blow up into a huuuuge number of factories.
You look at the 6TWh of all time and see that as a limitation. I haven't seen that stat before but I trust you, because with the growth rate of battery production it has to be a tiny number, because it's exponential growth. In 2024, 1.2 TWh of batteries were produced, 20% of all storage capacity ever. That was a single year! What if, in 2024, we produced 20% of all CPU capacity every produced? That's obviously a hugely growing market.
> The nature of resource extraction is that the easiest-to-exploit reserves are exhausted first, and continued production is contingent on accessing the progressively more and more inconvenient reserves. Maybe in 2030 annual global production will be 30 TWh - we'll know in 4 years. But there's a lot of people who probably don't want to make trillion-dollar investments gambling on that possibility panning out.
If you spend a small amount of time diving into the industry, you'll see that there's a massive number of very smart people solving all these resource constraint problems, securing supply chains years in advance, and building like fucking mad. Sure, there's a lot of people that don't want to get involved, but they will be left in the dust.
We are witnessing a massive energy interchange. This is like when the PC came along, but much bigger in terms of quantity and speed. Sure, there are those who are still skeptical of energy storage, 5-10 years after it became blazingly obvious that batteries are cheap and getting cheaper and will take over the enery world. But they are the same people who saw the iPhone and said "it will never catch up to my BlackBerry."
Electricity storage in batteries is a swiss-army knife for the grid that never existed until recently. We couldn't do time arbitrage, always had to match supply and demand instantaneously, across grids spanning hundreds and thousands of miles. No more, that's all gone. We can do tiny microgrids, we can do single houses, we can do 10 TWh installs across grids, because batteries scale small, scale big, are cheap, getting cheaper, and are being produced on a growing scale that most people do not understand.
That was about the amount in both cases. Slightly more in the no-hydrogen case than otherwise. Hydrogen contributed only marginally.
Yes, it's a lot of batteries. So what? It's not like the current battery production is some firm limit. If anything, the very large future demand ensures batteries will be driven down their experience curve, so the cost will be even lower than assumed.
The world spends something like $10T per year on energy. Any replacement energy system is going to be a big thing.
You need to make an argument that is more than you expressing fear of large numbers.
For us, it looks like most services are still working (eastus and eastus2). Our AKS cluster is still running and taking requests. Failures seem limited to management portal.
This exists because otherwise someone could just create a bunch of alts and share folders with a main account to get infinite storage. If someone just wants to share content, they can share it as a downloadable folder. As in, users can download files or a Zip of the whole folder to their device. That does not count against quota.
This is a characterization of fraternities that reeks of stereotype. What can you offer to substantiate the list of negative claims you're making about Stanford fraternities? Eitan Weiner died due to fentanyl laced drugs. This death occurred in the new year, outside of the rush time frame so hazing is not a likely cause.
Furthermore, it also ignores that plenty of other theme houses outside of greek life were also eliminated.
To be clear, these are all things that I personally watched happen and had happen to friends in fraternities. Not technically any Stanford ones, so I guess you got me there - maybe they were all squeaky clean.
Google "hazing death" if you want to learn about the fun-time rituals of drinking, drugs, and abuse.
Google "fraternity sexual assault" to learn why girls I knew avoided the "handsy house" -- careful, your computer might not be able to handle that many search results.
As for institutionalized discrimination -- what exactly do you think goes on at rush deliberations? Why else would fraternities be so overwhelmingly white and rich?
And Greek houses aren't the only ones who do these things. See my other comments.
> To be clear, these are all things that I personally watched happen and had happen to friends in fraternities. Not technically any Stanford ones, so I guess you got me there - maybe they were all squeaky clean.
Not technically any Stanford ones? Can you elaborate on what you mean by "technically"?
Because it sounds like those statements you wrote are not based on any experience whatsoever with the fraternities and other group houses covered in the article. Just your own personal experiences with other fraternities, and an assumption that they're all the same.
"technically not Stanford" meaning I have heard horror stories from 15+ fraternities at 5+ schools -- but not Stanford.
So hopefully you'll forgive me if I generalize. Especially when one of the most widely-storied campus sexual assault cases in recent years happened at the Stanford Kappa Alpha house [1] -- the first fraternity house mentioned in the linked article.
Please read your sources, Turner did not carry out the assault at KA. He and the victims met at a part at KA and Turner assaulted after leaving the fraternity. The article writes that it was "just outside" but it was out of sight of the fraternity house, some ways away.
The fact that the rape didn't occur at the fraternity makes no difference? The previous commenter makes it sound like a rape was perpetrated inside the fraternity in clear view. In reality no one at the fraternity would have been able to observe the crime.
Imagine someone says, "a man was murdered at your house and you did nothing!" when in reality the murder took place a couple minutes walk away, where you had no ability to observe the crime. Seems like a very big distinction to me.
Turner allegedly tried to sexually assault other people AT the frat house party. It’s also where they both consumed large amounts of alcohol (isn’t turner under age in the Us?).
Also, you argue that didn’t take place at the frat house but as far as I can tell, it took place behind a dumpster RIGHT next to house, and maybe still on the house’s property (hardly a couple of minutes walk away)
And, in response to your last point (“no one at the frat would have been able to observe the crime ”), he was literally stopped by two grad students cycling by.
Regardless, I agree with the other commenter — distinction without difference.
It's a list of classes. At least the way it worked when I attended, CS students chose a particular track (Theory, AI, Systems, Graphics, HCI, etc.). The core curriculum was 3 theory classes and 3 coding classes. Each track has 2 or 3 mandatory classes (for systems it was operating systems, and either compilers or computer hardware). And on top of that there's general requirements.
Bear in mind this cuts both ways. Replacing a gas heater (which directly produces thermal energy from chemical reaction) with an electric heater now means this energy has to be produced, transmitted, and run through a heating element. If this heater is being run at night, it likely has to go through an energy storage system, too.
Overall quality of life is highly correlated with energy consumption. There's some nuance to it: higher population density countries often use less energy to deliver the same quality of life are more dispersed populations. But in general the better life is in a country, the more energy it consumes. Here's per-capita energy consumption plotted out on a map [1] and the correlation is crystal clear.
This part of why I think plans to decarbonize through the reduction of energy consumption are doomed to fail. People aren't going to reject a good standard of living, and countries that don't yet have a good standard of living aren't going to stop striving to achieve it.
It is simultaneously true that the average Briton (arguably wealthy Britons, too) in 1900 lived in abject poverty compared to 2025, and the 19th century saw one of the fastest rises in living standards in Britain even among average Britons.