I don't think it's a male fantasy. I also don't think it's biological. Just look at how women and men are socialized from a young age.
Example: up until recently, many young girls in the west grew up on Disney princesses. Rewatch the movies, and pay attention to the female protagonists in those movies being active vs passive agents. Most are passive -- they're simply dealt a series of events (which generally happen only because they are beautiful or otherwise intrinsically valuable, not because of how they act).
Being exposed to those narratives from a very young age surely has an effect on identity, personality formation, etc.
I was arguing that how societies got to that point, over the past few millennia, was an historical accident. Or a series of accidents. There have been matriarchal cultures, for sure. With modern military technology, there's arguably no reason why they couldn't become dominant. But just a few decades ago, there was.
Not only that, but her mother was brought up that way, and her mother, and her mother, etc. The Civil War in the US broke that mold without a doubt, as certainly did WWII, but the people who make the rules and make the propaganda love inertia and keep trying to push women back into that traditional role, even though it is unhealthy in today's knowledge economy.
As I say above, it depends what you are optimising for. Not that long ago, a typical single-income household could afford a house, a car, a couple of vacations a year and to send the kids to college and to save some. Now a typical dual-income household is struggling to make ends meet. I don't have any strong feelings either way on whether the man or the woman should be the breadwinner; that's up to each individual couple to decide between them. But it's unclear how making dual-income the norm is "healthy" for anyone.
>But it's unclear how making dual-income the norm is "healthy" for anyone.
It's already the norm and has been for quite a while now. I'm specifically speaking on women getting paid their value. I mean if both partners have to work 40s, then might as well maximize profit on that labor.
It may be the "norm," but their point was whether the dual earner approach is optimal. I.e., whether it "should" be the norm. Truth is dual earner started as a way to try and vastly increase the household income. Unfortunately all it did was double the supply of labor and drive down real wages. This isn't a gendered argument. We would all likely be better off if every couple chose one of them to work the 9 to 5, and the other one to manage the home and finances (and pursue side ventures). If this happened we'd hope to see real wages increase for those left in the labor market. To some degree we're already seeing this. Labor participation among males is at its lowest point in decades and still falling. Though it's still early days so real wages haven't yet increased to compensate. Unfortunately this may not happen because corporate America is used to plentiful cheap labor, and as the labor supply diminishes they're pursuing automation strategies. In other words, corporate America has options for adjusting to the ebbs and flows of labor supply which they used to lack.
Even now the dual earner household exists because many people believe it improves their lifestyle. But let's be honest, most people wouldn't want to work if they didn't have to. Sure, in the absence of the need to make a paycheck they'd likely still do productive, valuable activities, but very few like to work for corporate America. Most jobs suck. Most managers suck. Most of the time pay sucks. Having a job isn't (or shouldn't be) special for either gender, it's a necessity to whatever point it takes to keep a roof over your head.
Maybe when the robots take all our jobs we'll finally find a better way of living.
The next step up from those CPUs really is going to be dual xeon boxes, which is a huge jump.
Intel tried to do enough market segmentation that the curve from a Pentium all the way up to dual CPU workstations was fairly continuous in price, with zen it's not the case anymore.
Hw is regularly replaced, old kit being thrown at poor nations (obviously they’ll foot the energy bills). Its a regular intel shop, mostly with dell stickers. Truly run-of-the-mill current cots, what you would expect anywhere else.
> The only question that remains is: Stupidity or malevolence?
Stupidity. On your end. Let me address your claims one by one.
> the end of Bretton Woods
Ending Bretton Woods was voluntary. The gold standard leads to volatile inflation; look at the graph in [1]. Volatile inflation is bad because it makes transactions that take time to repay uncertain, see this video [2] for a layman explanation
> the early 80s recession, the 2000 and 2008 economic crisis
If economists at a central bank can foresee a crisis, the crisis doesn't happen. Full stop. What you are left, is, by definition, the ones people who work in regulation didn't see coming. Also note that those crises weren't foreseen by almost anyone, because of the nature of markets.
If you want to prevent crises, you need to put regulation up front that discourages the kind of short-sighted and reckless managerial and shareholder behavior that leads to those.
Hinging the stability of the economic system on the ability to catch an upcoming crisis in the making is doomed to fail, because you need a 100% accuracy (like making a system unhackable -- negative goals are much harder than positive goals).
> the currency race to the bottom
Do you mean low positive inflation, or are you buying into Donal Trump's talking points? Because if it's the former, it's intended, if it's the latter, I'm sorry to say you'll need sources to convince anyone that that's indeed something that exists.
All in all, what your post translates to is "I don't understand any of these things but I'm angry", which is not the right way to advise policy.
"You can't fire me, because I quit" - It's as voluntary as that, i.e., not. There were good reasons to have something close to a Gold standard in place but it just could not be maintained as the quantity of money in circulation increased continuously.
> If economists at a central bank can foresee a crisis, the crisis doesn't happen.
That does not address the fact that they didn't foresee it.
> If you want to prevent crises, you need to put regulation up
Or you just don't finance crises by having a naturally determined interest rate (instead of one determined by the central bank).
> the currency race to the bottom
I mean the fact that every major central bank inflates its balance sheet in order to decrease the value of its currency and "stay competitive".
Just so you know, there are really powerful "classical statistics" classifier models! Like ordered or multinomial logit/probit which you can incorporate latent classes into, etc. Reference book for those is here[1]
In multiplayer zero sum game, it still works to Nash.
Intuitively, in a zero sum game, running CFR on one player will find him best responses for the strategies he's playing against. Doing this for multiple players finds corresponding best responses, which is the definition of a Nash Equilibrium.
In non-zero sum game CFR only converges to correlated equilibrium, which is a much weaker equilibrium than a Nash equilibrium.
Not quite: it really does only go to Nash in a 2p zero sum game.
In a multiplayer zero-sum game, there's no theoretical proof that it should go to Nash. In the tiny 3p game of 3p Kuhn poker (3 players, 4 card deck, enough chips for one bet) we found that it does go to Nash (here's the paper: https://webdocs.cs.ualberta.ca/~games/poker/publications/AAM...). But in a slightly larger toy game, 3p Leduc poker, we empirically found that it does not. Like you suggested, we did this with best response calculations. If you take the strategy profile CFR produces and then compute a best response in each position, those best responses each improve over the strategy profile. If you plot that loss over time while CFR is running, it becomes clear that it does not converge to Nash: it eventually bottoms out and does not improve further.
However - in practice, the strategies produced by CFR for multiplayer games still appear to be quite strong, even if not Nash. This was the approach used by the University of Alberta for years in the Annual Computer Poker Competition, and it crushed the competition there. In 3p Limit Hold'em, the CFR strategies also held up well against human pros in informal testing by the U of A.
Nash equilibrium isn't a compelling goal in a multiplayer game anyways. In a 2p game it theoretically guarantees that you earn at least the game value (i.e., do no worse than tie if you rotate seats every game). In a multiplayer game, even if you could compute one, there's no such theoretical guarantee, when all other players at the table are independently choosing strategies. Even if everyone at the table uses an independently computed Nash equilibrium, that set of strategies is not necessarily itself a Nash equilibrium (in 2p zero sum games, it is).
To summarize - for multiplayer, it doesn't necessarily go to Nash. But you might not care if it does or not, and it works great in practice even though it doesn't go to Nash.
In a non-zero-sum game, you're right that CFR converges to a correlated equilibrium. But we can also theoretically bound how close it gets to a Nash for the non-zero-sum game, and empirically measure how close it gets by using best response analysis. The answer is - if it's only slightly non-zeo-sum (e.g., subtracting the rake in a poker game for negative sum, or pretending to add money to the pot to encourage aggressive play) then CFR still gets very close to Nash.
Example: up until recently, many young girls in the west grew up on Disney princesses. Rewatch the movies, and pay attention to the female protagonists in those movies being active vs passive agents. Most are passive -- they're simply dealt a series of events (which generally happen only because they are beautiful or otherwise intrinsically valuable, not because of how they act).
Being exposed to those narratives from a very young age surely has an effect on identity, personality formation, etc.