Actually, the www was working. It's a cname to tp.47cf2c8c9-frontier.amazon.com, which should have been a cname to d3ag4hukkh62yn.cloudfront.net, but that record was broken for about 20 minutes.
Update: that frontier cname seems to be bouncing between Cloudfront and Akamai now, so I suspect they're fighting off either an attack or internal issues. I see issues to other route53 servers as well.
This isn't intended as a be-all-end-all guide to security, like the NSA aims for. Instead, view it as a quickstart guide for those first five minutes on a new server, or as a starting point for beginners that have no idea where to even look.
I've seen more compromised boxes than one can shake a stick at. There's all sorts of reasons that blocking egress is a great idea. Compromises are usually automated bots, and no, they're not smart enough to bring down iptables. Even if it's a human that's pwned you, it's frequently a stupid human, or a lazy human. It's just good practice to practice security in depth.
TJ Max,
UBS,
Knight Capital,
Heartland Payment Systems,
Visa,
Sony (already mentioned, but it's my fave),
Stanford,
Countless other hospitals, e-commerce vendors, banks, and other organizations that handle payment or personal information.
If you want to say "name a startup that's gone out of business because of a security problem" I'll let you away with that. There's still instances, and I'd love startups to pay more attention to security, but I know reality as well...
How exactly has Stanford had its business impacted due to a security breach? I'm only thinking in terms of people wanting to apply, and I can't imagine how that'd be a deterrent.
To go a little further - at a glance, it's not clear if they've been fined yet or not, but either way there's soft costs to all of this - being in the news in a negative light, some patients will go elsewhere, their insurance premiums are going to go up as a result of the breaches, etc etc.
Last year when KC shot themselves in the face, they were running trading algos that hadn't been well tested. When dropped into production, things blew up fairly quickly.
I probably should have left it off the list, it's more of a compliance/procedural issue than purely infosec.