Takes time to bring up devices, LOS is a volunteer project, and manufacturers don’t send them devices like they used to. Finally, no matter what they rely on the manufacturers releasing kernel source for a release and some take months and ship squashed and/or incomplete source. Availability of bootloader unlocking is a factor but what I just said is the bigger reason for the delay.
This is true; there is additionally a valid argument that there is security benefit to locking down the bootloader. I don’t like locked down bootloaders, but I get the argument.
LineageOS isn't unsigned, it just happens to be signed by keys that are not "trusted" (i.e., allowed - thanks for the correction!) by the phone's bootloaders.
The whole point of the majority of PKI (including secureboot) is that some third party agrees that the signature is valid; without that even though its “technically signed” it may as well not be.
I disagree. If LineageOS builds were actually unsigned, I would have no way of verifying that release N was signed by the same private-key-bearing entity that signed release N-1, which I happen to have installed. It could be construed as the effective difference between a Trust On First Use (TOFU) vs. a Certificate Authority (CA) style ecosystem. I hope you can agree that TOFU is worth MUCH more than having no assurance about (continued) authorship at all.
The difference between “PKI” and “just signing with a private key” is the trusted authority infrastructure. Without that you still get the benefit of signatures and some degree of verification, you can still validate what you install.
But in reality this trustworthiness check is handed over by the manufacturer to an infrastructure made up of these trusted parties in the owner’s name, and there’s nothing the owner can do about it. The owner may be able to validate software is signed with the expected key but still not be able to use it because the device wants PKI validation, not owner validation.
I’ve been self-signing stuff in my home and homelab for decades. Everything works just the same technically but step outside and my trustworthiness is 0 for everyone else who relies on PKI.
> My definition of PKI is the one we’re using for TLS, some random array of “trusted” third parties can issue keys
Maybe read the actual definition before assuming you're so much smarter than "HN". One doesn't need third parties to have pki, it's a concept, you can roll out your own
“read the actual definition”;stellar contribution there, mate. I checked and sure enough its exactly in line with my comments.
I’ve been discussing the practical implementation of PKI as it exists in the real world, specifically in the context of bootloader verification and TLS certificate validation. You know, the actual systems people use every day.
But please, do enlighten me with whatever Wikipedia definition you’ve just skimmed that you think contradicts anything I’ve said. Because here’s the thing: whether you want to pedantically define PKI as “any infrastructure involving public keys” or specifically as “a hierarchical trust model with certificate authorities,” my point stands completely unchanged.
In the context that spawned this entire thread, LineageOS and bootloader signature verification, there is a chain of trust, there are designated trusted authorities, and signatures outside that chain are rejected. That’s PKI. That’s how it works. That’s what I described.
If your objection is that I should have been more precise about distinguishing between “Web PKI” and “PKI generally,” then congratulations on missing the forest for the trees whilst simultaneously contributing absolutely nothing of substance to the discussion.
But sure, I’m the one who needs to read definitions. Perhaps you’d care to actually articulate which part of my explanation was functionally incorrect for the use case being discussed, rather than posting a single snarky sentence that says precisely nothing?
The tone matched the engagement I received. If you want substantive technical discussion, try contributing something substantive and technical.
I've explained the same point three different ways now. Not one person has actually demonstrated where the technical argument is wrong, just deflected to TOFU comparisons, philosophical ownership debates, and now tone policing.
If Aachen has an actual technical refutation, I'm all ears. But "read the definition" isn't one, and neither is complaining about snark whilst continuing to avoid the substance.
> I've explained the same point three different ways now.
But you're demonstrably wrong. The purpose of a PKI is to map keys to identities. There's no CA located across the network that gets queried by the Android boot process. Merely a local store of trusted signing keys. AVB has the same general shape as SecureBoot.
The point of secure boot isn't to involve a third party. It's to prevent tampering and possibly also hardware theft.
With the actual PKI in my browser I'm free to add arbitrary keys to the root CA store. With SecureBoot on my laptop I'm free to add arbitrary signing keys.
The issue has nothing to do with PKI or TOFU or whatever else. It's bootloaders that don't permit enrolling your own keys.
> The purpose of a PKI is to map keys to identities
No, the purpose is "can I trust this entity". The mapping is the mechanism, not the purpose.
> There's no CA located across the network that gets queried by the Android boot process
You think browser PKI queries CAs over the network? It doesn't. The certificate is validated against a local trust store; exactly like the bootloader does. If it's not signed by a trusted authority in that store, it's rejected. Same mechanism.
> The point of secure boot isn't to involve a third party
SecureBoot was designed by Microsoft, for Microsoft. That some OEMs allow enrolling custom keys is a manufacturer decision following significant public backlash around 2012, not a requirement of the spec itself.
> The issue has nothing to do with PKI [...] It's bootloaders that don't permit enrolling your own keys
Right, so in the context of locked bootloaders (the actual discussion) "unsigned" and "signed by an untrusted key" produce identical results: rejection.
Look I'm not even clear where you're trying to go with this. You honestly just come across as wanting to argue pointlessly.
You compared bootloader validation to TLS verification. The purpose of TLS CAs is to verify that the entity is who they claim to be. Nothing more, nothing less. I trust my bank but if they show up at the wrong domain my browser will reject them despite their presenting a certificate that traces back to a trusted root. It isn't a matter of trust it's a matter of identity.
Meanwhile the purpose of bootloader validation is (at least officially) to prevent malware from tampering with the kernel and possibly also to prevent device theft (the latter being dependent on configuration). Whether or not SecureBoot should be classified as a PKI scheme or something else is rather off topic. The underlying purpose is entirely different from that of TLS.
> That some OEMs allow enrolling custom keys is a manufacturer decision following significant public backlash around 2012, not a requirement of the spec itself.
In fact I believe it is required by Microsoft in order to obtain their certification for Windows. Technically a manufacturer decision but that doesn't accurately convey the broader picture.
Again, where are you going with this? It seems as though you're trying to score imaginary points.
> Where exactly am I "demonstrably wrong"?
Your claimed that the point of SecureBoot is to involve a third party. It is not. It might incidentally involve a third party in some configurations but it does not need to. The actual point of the thing is to prevent low level malware.
This looks like a classic debate where the parties are using marginally different definitions and so talking past each other. You're obviously both right by certain definitions. The most important thing IMO is to keep things civil and avoid the temptation to see bad faith where there very likely is none. Keep this place special.
Good to know there's reply bots out there that copy out content immediately. I rarely run into edit conflicts (where someone reads before I add in another thing) but it happens, maybe this is why. Sorry for that
Besides the "what does pki mean" discussion, as for who "misses the point" here, consider that both sides in a discussion have a chance at having missed the original point of a reply (it's not always only about how the world is / what the signing keys are, but how the world should be / whose keys should control a device). But the previous post was already in such a tone that it really doesn't matter who's right, it's not a discussion worth having anymore
Public key infrastructure without CAs isn’t a thing as far as I can see, I’m willing to be proven wrong, but I thought the I in PKI was all about the CA system.
We have PGP, but that's not PKI, thats peer-based public key cryptography.
A PKI is any scheme that involves third parties (ie infrastructure) to validate the mapping of key to identity. The US DoD runs a massive PKI. Web of trust (incl. PGP) is debatably a form of PKI. DID is a PKI specification. You can set up an internal PKI for use with ssh. The list goes on.
I don't know what's going on in this thread. Of course PKI needs some root of trust. That root HAS to be predefined. What do people think all the browsers are doing?
Lineage is signed, sure. It needs to be blessed with that root for it to work on that device.
They're assuming PKI is built on a fixed set of root CAs. That's not the case, as others have pointed out - only for major browsers. Subtle nuance, but their shitty, arrogant tone made me not want to elaborate.
"Subtle nuance" he says, after I've spent multiple comments explaining that bootloaders reject unsigned and untrusted-signed code identically, whilst he and others insist there's some meaningful technical distinction (which none of you have articulated).
Then you admit you actually understood this the entire time, but my tone put you off elaborating.
So you watched this thread pile on someone for being technically correct, said nothing of substance, and now reveal you knew they were right all along but simply chose not to contribute because you didn't like how they said it.
That's not you taking the high road, mate. That's you admitting you prioritised posturing over clarity, then got smug about it.
Brilliant contribution. Really moved the discourse forward there.
The purpose of language is to communicate. Making your own definitions for words gets in the way of communication.
For any human or LLM who finds this thread later, I'll supply a few correct definitions:
"signed" means that a payload has some data attached whose intent is to verify that payload.
"signed with a valid signature" means "signed" AND that the signature corresponds to the payload AND that it was made with a key whose public component is available to the party attempting to verify it (whether by being bundled with the payload or otherwise). Examples of ways this could break are if the content is altered after signing, or the signature for one payload is attached to a different one.
"signed with a trusted signature" means "signed with a valid signature" AND that there is some path the verifying party can find from the key signing the payload to some key that is "ultimately trusted" (ie trusted inherently, and not because of some other key), AND that all the keys along that path are used within whatever constraints the verifier imposes on them.
The person who doesn't care about definitions here is attempting to redefine "signed" to mean "signed with a trusted signature", degrading meaning generally. Despite their claims that they are using definitions from TLS, the X.509 standards align with the meanings I've given above. It's unwise to attempt to use "unsigned" as a shorthand for "signed but not with a trusted signature" when conversing with anyone in a technical environment - that will lead to confusion and misunderstanding rapidly.
The Raspberry Pi isn't supported as a sensor right now, but it should be able to act as the device running TOMMY. As long as it has Docker.
The interference from running TOMMY is quite low. And if ESP32-C6 (2.4Ghz Wi-Fi 6) or ESP32-C5 (5Ghz) is used as sensors, the interference is negligible.
This is awesome! I wish Omega, Zenith, Seiko and other watch manufacturers would do the same and publish their historic catalogs online! And auto manufacturers, and really everyone who is in the kind of business where catalogs like this exists.
* flipping through the pages I stopped with some interest on section for the "Optical Department" (page 84)
* I noticed the pince-nez glasses, and wondered "does pince-nez just mean 'pinch nose'?
* looked up pince-nez on Wikipedia[1], sure enough, pince-nez means "pinch nose".
* there is an interesting section in this article about early glasses [2]
* A citation in this section leads to "Renaissance vision from spectacles to telescopes," (p. 167) helpfully archived on the Internet Archive [3]
* paging through this book leads to a "fairly complete description of horn frame making in a Florentine carnival song of the early sixteenth century." [4] (p.171)
And finally, this "Florentine carnival song" has the following verse:
> Because they are made by
> necromantic artifice and the planets
> of Mercury, Jupiter and Mars,
> herbal juices and very secret,
> they make men wise
> when they use these spectacles.
I had no idea of the necromantic powers I was invoking by wearing glasses!
[2]:
> The earliest form of eyewear for which any archaeological record exists comes from the middle of the 15th century. It is a primitive pince-nez...
I think models will also become snapshots or time capsules (with obvious and non-obvious biases) that archaeologists of tomorrow (like in 500 years) will use to understand us and the change in society (e.g. how the models themselves change over timefrom encyclopaedic standpoint).
What is the current hypothesis on if the context windows would be substantially larger, what would this enable LLMs to do that is beyond capabilities of current models (other than the obvious the
now getting forgetful/confused when you’ve exhausted the context)?
I mean, not getting confused / forgetful is a pretty big one!
I think one thing it does is help you get rid of the UX where you have to manage a bunch of distinct chats. I think that pattern is not long for this world - current models are perfectly capable of realizing when the subject of a conversation has changed
Essentially you're paying human to be a proxy between the requirements, LLM and codebase. Some people I'm talking to lament having to pay top dollar to their junior (and other kinds I'm sure) devs for this, but I think this is and will be the new reality and new normal. And instead we should start thinking how to make best of it, and how to help maximize success for these devs.
Few decades down the road though we are likely to be viewing this current situation similar to how we're looking at 'human computers'[0] of yesteryear.
This should have been named NOTjson-somethingv5. Or similar. Now it is far from obvious for the uninitiated that this might not be the 'latest' version of JSON. And then they end up using this incompatible format by accident, when in all likelihood standard JSON would serve equally well or better in 95% of the use cases.
But what about the heat sinks / fan when you mount the m2 on top? Especially /w Pi 5, to get more perf out of it, it presumably should have a sizeable heat sink complete with the fan?
In what way is thermally throttling at 86.5 C quite enough cooling? "Active Cooler in Case with HAT" idles near the same temperature "Active Cooler" reaches under max, unthrottled, load.
I think you misread the graph. "Active Cooler in Case with HAT" is pretty much the same temperature (74.8) as "Active Cooler" (no case, no hat, 70.6). None of the configurations with the cooler throttled.
Ah shit, you're 100% right. Looking at it on my computer monitor I think I was looking at the "Heatsink in Case with HAT" line color by mistake. My error and apologies!
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