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This is gross


Respectfully, it's not. Choosing a bank is an aspect of risk management, the act of throwing all your money into whatever thing that calls itself a bank and is most convenient is not risk management, it's risky behavior.

Risk management would be asking the question "should I be putting all my eggs in a basket that seems very tied to the tech economy / northern California real estate market / low interest rates?". Diversification would be trying to get the money you use to pay your tech workers invested in something as far away from tech as possible.


Putting money in a bank is a form of risk management. A startup can choose to:

* Buy expensive office equipment or put it in a bank

* Go on a hiring spree or put it in a bank

* Acquire another company or put it in a bank

* Put money in crypto or put it in a bank

Shopping for a bank might mitigate a bit more of your risk. Putting it inside of a bank is low risk compared to the many things you can do with money.

Hundreds of thousands of businesses store more than $250k in a bank and for most of them, the largest risk to their business is not their bank.


I think based on the parent posts choice to go with the "who is your customer" definition and the fact that we intuitively think of RabbitMQ as some sort of systems program, it probably fits the modern definition of systems program that we all kind of agree with but do not necessarily put into words.

I don't think RabbitMQ being written in a "non systems language" is relevant. Its a systems program even if it was written in shell (if it was it might be a bad systems program, but a systems program nonetheless because of it's intended customers and use case).

Which brings us to browsers, which are not systems programs (and I think we tend to not think of them as such) almost entirely due to their primary customers not being programmers. This is despite the fact that they fit the "complexity/size and close to the metal" definitions a lot better than many other programs that are commonly considered to be systems level.


The problem isn't insuring the losses, that they can do. The problem is will you even be able to buy anything after the chaos if a systemically important financial institution goes under? The banks that hold the most ordinary customer deposits aren't like Lehman Brothers and the fallout from one of them going under would be catastrophic on a level far beyond something like 2008.

FDIC was invented for the great depression when banks were not as large or concentrated, nor were they as globally connected and intertwined with day to day business. The reality is that FDIC is far from being sufficient insurance to calm down a collapsing market, that's why we had to do bailouts in 2008, because of what was coming down the road in that regard if the contagion were to spread further.


FDIC insurance is similar in the sense that if the feds ever have to say "don't worry that JP Morgan or <other large consumer facing bank> is going under, most of you will be covered within the FDIC limit", then we're fucked in so many other ways it doesn't matter. That is after all why we invented the term "systemically important".


Your acting as if the FDIC only exists to cover a massive systemic failure. In the event of something like that additional intervention may be need sure.

However, the FDIC covers all banks, and is generally involved with smaller banks fail and they are they to insure whatever balance the bank could not cover with its remaining assets when it failed.

I’m not actually aware though what the last incident they actually had to pay out was though. Looking through their historical data on bank failures every one I’ve seen says the insured accounts were assumed by another bank purchasing up the failing bank.


One of the largest recent FDIC payouts was IndyMac. I'm not sure if this was the most recent one, but certainly one of the most recent big ones. They were so bad that no one wanted to take them over! And the other banks were in such a bad way at the time, the FDIC couldn't force through a shotgun wedding with a semi-willing suitor. So the FDIC got stuck with them.

But worse, thousands of the individual depositors and businesses who banked at IndyMac were over the FDIC limits and they lost, collectively, hundreds of millions of dollars. The FDIC insurance limit at that time was $100k per separately-named account per bank; it is now $250k. And the $250k raise was, in a surprisingly kind move, purposely made retroactive to help cover some of the losses that people had suffered during the GFC under the previous lower limit.

And still, despite all that, lots of people lost lots of money when the bank went under:

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-may-31-la-fi-in...


I absolutely agree not to get into security and try to stick a little closer to programming, with the same caveat that if you are doing some programming for a security company then maybe it would be a little better.


Right, the thing about root causes is that you can always keep digging. For instance why was an incomplete snapshot shared? And then the why for that why, and on and on until you reach the singularity at the beginning of the universe, which can logically be the only real root cause of anything. Root cause just means whatever is enough to make your boss satisfied.


That isn't really how production networks work in my uneducated opinion. If they are connected to the production network then they are the production network, and the level of isolation required to make that not the case would be so extreme as to make things potentially more unreliable.

Others can correct me if I'm wrong about this. All I know is that the production network where I work is not air gapped in the way that would be required to truthfully consider testing networks a non production environment, so non prod changes typically wind up in front of the change review board anyway.

Ask your own sites network engineers and see if they have similar constraints because I would be interested to hear more perspectives on that.

One other thing I will say is that the abstractions of "config plane" and "data plane" and "control plane" don't really exist on real physical systems. That is mostly an abstraction created for applications people, those systems are not going to be totally blocked from interacting with eachother, they kind of have to. So if any of your "planes" are shared with production it is a production environment.


Data plane and control plane are definitely a thing in real physical systems- look at a classical router, where the packet processor works independently of, and is occasionally programmed by, or assisted by, a message passing from the data plane to the control plane. That control plane is typical elsewhere on the main board, talking to the data plane through a well-specific protocol.

Google's network is complicated, making many assumptions about "what is prod" etc hard to reason about.


That would mean that all networks which peer with the Internet would necessarily be considered Production. This isn't that reasonable outside certain niches (i.e., national government networks).

Instead, what's commonly done is to provide a Controlled Interface (to borrow a term from those national government networks) that gates which things are at which level of trust. This is where security boundaries are enforced -- and if they are sound security boundaries things on either side can't reasonably damage the other side.


That's super interesting, and you're definitely right about the internet thing. I suppose our network guys must have some way to see if a change will propagate beyond a particular interface?


> One other thing I will say is that the abstractions of "config plane" and "data plane" and "control plane" don't really exist on real physical systems

If you use any sort of virtualization: the control plane (infra) vs data plane (apps) will naturally evolve from the architecture. The config plane and control plane can get squashed into the same thing though, but it can also be disparate for at both infra- and application level.


The other point of view is that the industry would have been entirely off shored. I think this is particularly a concern in tech, where US workers are notably spoiled even in comparison to the rest of the US. That wasn't the case with the auto workers to the same extent and so people were more sympathetic.

I'd imagine everybody in tech gets told to fuck off pretty rudely if it ever gets to the point of bailouts, so the good news is that your concern is unfounded.


>The other point of view is that the industry would have been entirely off shored.

No, it wouldn't have. The ownership might have, but that's ok. Lots of great cars are built in the USA, by American workers, by companies like BMW and Honda and Toyota. If GM had been allowed to die, that would have simply meant more foreign-brand-owned factories in the US.

Why do you care so much about the nationality of the top execs?


Atlassian is competing with GitHub and you can't understand why they would ban it?


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