If it's so efficient and/or desirable, why only a fraction of NYC?
The answer is that those areas are a luxury good, with, as you put it, "high cost".
Note that the streets, which is the whole of "planning for autos", don't have any effect on what's in the streetfronts. And, since the high cost areas were also "planned for autos" ...
>If it's so efficient and/or desirable, why only a fraction of NYC?
You are misinformed. It is only part of NYC and rare in other cities across the US because of the planning which generally supports cars, including rules like the article, parking minimums. That makes it a luxury good. Build more walkable areas then it won't be a luxury anymore.
It's also a little insane to me that what Adept has been supposedly building for years with 300+ mil in funding can now be built in a day with Open AI APIs?
I think Adept pivoted along the way but original concept was very similar to this.
But its too expensive to become practical with the OpenAI API. Also, demo is cool until you see the real-world webpages, then you'll realize that this only works less than %50 of webpages.
GPT-4V may be surprisingly robust here. Set of mark prompting(which is accomplished here with Vim) improves grounding by a silly high amount.
https://som-gpt4v.github.io/
The effectiveness of a security program cannot solely be measured by penetration tests under controlled circumstances.
Aspects of deterrence and standardization required by the program fundamentally changes the threat actors’ calculus.
This is the very fundamentals of mixed strategy calculations in game theory.
While this is true, the method of 11 September 2001 worked for less than two hours. It is effectively impossible to hijack an airplane now, because the passengers will assume that they're dead either way and will do anything they can to stop you. You can still blow them up a la Lockerbie, but that's about it.
I really don't see a meaningful reason for most of "security screening" anymore. It just slows things down.
True, and even two hours maybe pushing it. The crash in PA on 9/11 was a direct result of passengers attacking the cockpit after they found out what happened to the other planes.
It might be worth doing some reading on the actual events of that day. For example, "being shot down by a fighter jet" wasn't an option; the fighters weren't armed when they were put up in the sky. The pilots in them went up knowing that if a plane needed to be taken out, they were going to be using themselves to do it. And none of that is to mention the passengers the parent comment was referring to, who made the conscious, heroic decision that their plane wasn't going to be used as a weapon like two previous ones had been, whatever the cost.
I don't mean to assume bad faith, but this was, at best, a throwaway comment that minimized the bravery and sacrifice of a lot of good people. Either way, I'd like to recommend you educate yourself a bit more. The Wikipedia page has some excellent detail, and if narrative structure is your thing, the book The Only Plane In The Sky is a masterpiece on the subject.
From the government itself? You can listen to unclassified / declassified 9/11-related communications (all over YouTube) and literally hear the conversations happening. The pilots have done interviews. There’s really no questioning it. It’s part of the US being woefully unprepared for 9/11 because it was so left of field. All evidence points to a lot of brave people doing their absolute best, working within a system that didn’t know how to handle the circumstance. That includes not being prepared to take down a commercial airliner at short notice, because why the hell would anyone ever need to do that!? (no sarcasm intended).
Truth, the primary impact was the ability to arbitrarily inflate the cost of soft goods dramatically inside the terminal.
It's such a good racket Hudson News...a little news stand company inside a few dozen terminals was able to go public on the NYSE...
The public perception that security is "doing it's job" is non-existent since everyone knows it's at best a jobs program and in practice another group of people measurably stealing travellers things.
I was going to suggest comparing it to other developed countries' practices vs their rate of high profile terrorist attacks, but then I realized it correlates the other way. Spain and Italy hustle you through an old-school metal detector, but going into Israel I thought I was about to be beaten down with a rubber truncheon when I forgot the piece of paper I had in my pocket.
China’s is surprisingly easy. Just a metal detector and an X ray of your carry on. Didn’t even take my shoes off.
Singapore’s is the best. The security is right at the gate so the timing is a lot more predictable and you don’t have to worry about missing your flight.
China’s is done as you’re transiting. My luggage was sniffed, my hands wiped for explosive residue, and I was x-rayed, all without having to stop for more than a few seconds.
Israel’s methods are incredibly interesting and something that you just wouldn’t get away with in the US. I say this as a non-American non-US-resident, which I think is important because my comment sounds like American exceptionalism.
A common analogy is to think about traffic lights.
If you run a penetration test, asking an individual to run a red light. You will achieve near 100% success.
However, when the traffic lights change actors’ behaviors to stop (at some probability such that it results in less collisions), most actors will stop according to the traffic lights.
That's not a good analogy at all. The incentives and motivations are completely different. Many drivers would at one point or another consider running a red light in order to save some time. I don't think you can say the same about passengers wanting to hijack a flight.
And on the opposite side of the stupid-examples spectrum: any tech company that hasn't had a computer security breach should fire their security team. All they're doing is spending a lot of money to make their developer's lives a lot harder.
Anyone with clean floors should fire their janitors.
Etc...
Those don't mean every security spend is worthwhile and justified; but Simpsons quotes also don't mean that no security spend has any effect.
Do you believe there aren’t people who wish to use air travel for nefarious purposes?
Do you believe that none of those people are factoring in the presence of identity checks, x-rays, backscatters, bomb dogs, and metal detectors into their risk/reward calculation or the techniques by which they’d commit nefarious acts?
They're probably factoring in strengthened cockpit doors and passengers' willingness to fight back, because those actually work. The rest is security theater.
Could it just be rotting infrastructure? I.e there is some logic on most visited domains to allow ease of moderation, that logic is read heavy and is now bucking under skew.
A few years ago I remember their URL shortener on android app directing somewhere that my hostfile adblocker would catch (like an analytics domain or something). This made it so first click on certain twitter links would fail, but if I clicked it again it would go successfully. Ultimately I never researched it deeply enough but my guess is they had some sort of handler that would log whether loading their analytics service failed and serve up the direct link on the second attempt.
Eh no? There’s increasing SEC enforcement discretion to require record keeping for all communications, including encrypted apps. To the tune of billions of dollars of fines…
WhatsApp was used by the Afghan Army to coordinate military communications and maneuvers. I wouldn't be surprised if other under-resourced military forces (i.e. Ukrainian) use it as a form of communications.
Afhanistan and the Ukraine both have a little less than 40M inhabitants. (Which is around half of germany, or like 20M less than France).
The Ukraine has/had a relevant IT-offshoring sector, from Wikipedia there's around 1/3 of the soviet military industry that was sitting there (including companies like Antonow)... and they had a few years of preparation since the krim was occupied where they knew that russian secret services would try to undermine any kind of communication infrastructure.
I doubt that they currently rely on WhatsApp for military communication...
The Redfin YoY price change he quotes is a median price change.
He then extrapolates a median price change on the entire market to calculate the “$260B” change in asset valuations. That is dubious at best for a monthly volume of ~500 sales…
Private equity owners often have less short term incentives because their funds are usually 10 years long.
On average, an investment from purchase to exit may take ~5 years.
Whereas a public company with large institutional owners will have to respond to market feedback in real-time, i.e they are more likely to follow the herd if institutions (pension funds) demand a shift in industry trends (ie ESG). Whereas, private equity have no such concerns.
