The “except for math” part is doing a lot I think. There’s a huge amount of work needed to get rendered math to look as good as latex’s and I’m not sure CSS (as an example) is expressive enough to get this done
i would imagine that if taking of passports is common knowledge by now, they'd just have a fake passport to give away and hide the real one. Then they can leave when they got their money from their job, or sees a better opportunity and have the ability to move.
I wish discussions of such site didn't inevitably become discussions about software engineer interviews. It's a really nice site created by volunteers and I've often had it been the only decent resource online for a particular topic, if you want to use it as a reference their "terse but accurate" style for the prose and the compact working C++ code is really nice. And it covers some topics (e.g. treaps) which I've never seen appear in software engineer interviews.
Could you please define “strategy” such that those people you refer to aren’t “following a strategy” but someone who doesn’t eat breakfast is “following a strategy”?
I eat breakfast when I’m strength training and don’t when I’m not, I’m not obese (16% body fat by dexa scan), so is skipping breakfast a “strategy”?
The article gives one example - find out if a recipe has ingredient X. You could also imagine "find all recipes (from a cookbook) that are vegan", or "find all recipes I could follow given the contents of my fridge", etc.
> Which sure sounds like a decentralized process that is ultimately just centralized around the ETH foundation at the end of the day.
The validators need to be decentralized (i.e. prevent "harmful collusion"), but the slashers don't need to be in the same way (as long as the validators are).
Nope. That's very inaccurate. If only the ETH foundation is allowed to slash, then it's just a centralized system with extra steps. Because only the ETH foundation is allowed to decide what is bad behavior.
It is not the case that only the ETH foundation can slash, which was the crux of my original question.
The fundamental misunderstanding people seem to be having is that slashers show objective proof of bad events. That's accurate. But validators are still free to agree or disagree with that objective proof of bad events. If you can create a means to prevent consensus on slashing for your overtly malicious behavior, your stake is only at risk if the entire community agrees to fork, which is probable for huge malicious behaviors but I'm not convinced is true for smaller things or circumstances where large actors have a vested interest in preferring the original chain.
I agree with your 3rd, 4th, and 5th sentences, but not with your 1st and 2nd. Assuming a large number of independent validators, the Nash equilibrium is close to "there is no equivocation, hence no slashable evidence, hence no incentive to run a slasher node". (Remember that Nash equilibrium implicitly assumes that agents are not allowed to cooperate with each other). Suppose some fraction of the validators are deviating from this equilibrium by doing lots of equivocation, now there is an incentive to run a slasher node. So what this modelling suggests is that in the real world, we can have a small number of slashers and a large number of validators, and the security comes from the fact that anyone could be a slasher (it's OK that the number of people who actually are is small). But we cannot conclude that "it's OK to have a small number of validators, as long as anyone can be a validator".
I don't really agree but sure, however this counterpoint retracts the original premise, that the slashers are centralized. Something can be done with a small number of people and still be decentralized.
Depends on what you mean by "best". For e.g. comparison-based sorting will already cost O(n log n) time but the HashMap solution will run in O(n) HashMap operations.
