Reminds me of a first responder briefing I heard at an air show. The first job if a fighter was on the ground with a pilot aboard, after opening the canopy, the first two guys on the scene were to hold the pilots arms down. Nothing else mattered. Should he wake up and reach for those ejection handles ... bad things.
I suppose that it would be theoretically easy to disable the ejection handles when the plane had the canopy open, was not moving, and/or was on the ground. But if the plane was damaged and the sensors or circuits that managed that decision were destroyed, the pilot couldn't eject.
They decided to err on the side of allowing the pilot to eject, possibily in a state of panic or confusion, under conditions that could be fatal. They did this instead of preventing this death caused by human error but opening the remote possibility that the best redundant system they could devise would fail and leave the pilot unable to eject. That says something interesting about their safety philosophy.
There are times when a pilot may want to eject from a stationary plane on the ground, fire being the big one. Of course this is only true of modern "zero-zero" ejection powerful enough to get the pilot under parachute without any altitude/speed. But if the plane has already crashed, the pilot probably has a damaged neck/spine already and ejecting might be lethal.
