The actual content of the report does not support the conclusion in the headline and description. The entire extent of the supposed "plan" is the obvious suggestion, in passing, that finding people who leak sensitive information would deter others from leaking sensitive information.
So what's the story here? That U.S. military intelligence knew, in March 2008, that Wikileaks was posting classified information that presumably had inside sources, and that this might be threat to OPSEC/INFOSEC, and that shockingly someone who works in "cyber counterintelligence assessment", wrote a report about it. Utterly mundane.
I agree except the utterly mundane. It's mildly interesting to see how the government does threat analysis.
The wikileaks summary on the first page implies that the government actually tried to carry out a contingency plan to get rid of wikileaks (and that it "appears the plan was ineffective"), which is beyond silly. Surely wikileaks of all organizations would understand that these sorts of _analysis_ documents, enumerating even the mildest threats and then pinpointing potential weaknesses and then basically trying to get permission to investigate further (probably unsuccessfully but who knows) are a dime a dozen (not implying you should ever pay for one if offered).
The word "planned" in the phrase "planned to destroy..." has a very different meaning in the context of government contingency planning than common usage suggests. In most contexts a plan to do xyz implies a course of action the organization intends to take. The US government, at least, generates layers and layers of "plans" that it never intends to act on, or knows that the probability that they'll need to be acted on are very remote. For the most part then the actual dispatch of some combination of plans are left up to non military elected officials.
Fascinating. The document states that "Several foreign countries including China, Israel, North Kora, Russia, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe have denounced or blocked access to the Wikileaks.org website."
Whoever wants to put the US on that list is no patriot.
Working fine from Israel at the moment. Of course, they may have meant denounced. The "or blocked" is extremely unlikely here.
There is a censor here, meaning you often here news reports like "a missile has landed somewhere, no one hurt, but the military censor is currently preventing us from telling where." And then the details get delayed for a few hours. It seems to require a fair amount of cooperation, though, that works because most people agree with the temporary censorship. Longer term censorship would be likely to be relatively ineffective because it's a small enough country that everyone knows everyone through maybe two degrees of separation.
The document is, as might be expected, fairly uninteresting. The main take home messages are:
a) The US DoD classifies Wikileaks as a "threat", or potential threat.
b) This seems to be primarily because troop sizes/equipment/movements might be or have already been leaked. Such information may give the upper hand to potential enemies.
c) There are some complains about material on Wikileaks being inaccurate, or edited in such a way as to give a misleading impression of events (a fairly standard complaint).
d) They propose trying to out/scapegoat/make an example of anyone who is identified as a wikileaker in the hope that that this will deter openness in government, although so far it seems that they have been unsuccessful in this endeavor.
e) Wikileakers seem to be a fairly competent bunch, adhering to security best practices in the handling, anonymising and release of documents, but may still be vulnerable to cyber attacks of various kinds.
Anyone know if there could be legal repercussions for a US citizen reading this, should they have a way to track the IPs of the readers?
(I'm absolutely clueless when it comes to anything related to security clearances, but considering some of the stuff that is illegal in various parts of the USA, I wouldn't be surprised if simply reading a classified document is considered illegal.)
Maybe a better response by the government to Wikileaks would be to ignore it as a specific source of leaks, and instead:
a) Ensure that what the government does is legal and moral, and if the government cannot always be forthcoming with the public it is at least not lying.
b) Assuming a), tighten up control of classified information.
c) Be a strong enough government that it can withstand the occasional leak.
d) Stay the heck out of my internets.
Edit: added "by the government" in intro to bullet list.
Weighing in after 21 previous comments just to add that the one other conclusion I'm willing to at least move toward here is that Julian Assange is prone to dramatization.
The summary is grossly misleading. For instance, it characterizes the mention that China, et al. block or could disrupt Wikileaks as "justification" for a "plan", but it is in fact listed as background information about Wikileaks.
That very observation is included in the "Key Judgements" section.
"The Wikileaks.org Web site could be used to post fabricated information, misinformation, disinformation, or propaganda and could be used in perception management and influence operations to convey a positive or negative message to specific target audiences that view or retrieve information from the Web site."
In context, that appears to be more of a concern that such tactics could be used against the US. In the "Intelligence Gaps" section, for instance:
"Will the Wikileaks.org Web site be used by FISS, foreign military services, or foreign terrorist groups to spread propaganda, misinformation, or disinformation or to conduct perception or influence operations to discredit the US Army?"
Similarly, although there is mention that Wikileaks could potentially be hacked to find information about the identity of the leakers, in the context of this report they seem more concerned that others will do this to identify potential sources:
"Will foreign entities attempt to conduct CNE or CNA to obtain information on the posters of information or block content on the Wikileaks.org Web site?"
There are enough channels for that already, I guess. It doesn't mean that WikiLeaks doesn't get disinformation though, in fact this whole topic might be a cover for exactly that.
Disinformation channels also need to be highly controlled and centralized (i.e. US media companies like News Corp, GE or Twitter :P), which WikiLeaks is not.
So what's the story here? That U.S. military intelligence knew, in March 2008, that Wikileaks was posting classified information that presumably had inside sources, and that this might be threat to OPSEC/INFOSEC, and that shockingly someone who works in "cyber counterintelligence assessment", wrote a report about it. Utterly mundane.