Well, it obviously happens when the resolver is down, but that's the situation that this logic is being proposed to smooth over. The normal day-to-day does not see a high percentage of resolvers failing to respond, or else people would be getting NX DOMAIN for high profile domains much more often.
All the attacks mentioned here seem to be of the following shape:
1. Let's somehow get a record that points at a host controlled by us into many resolvers (by compromising a host or by actually inserting a record).
2. Let's prolong the time this record is visible to many people by denying access to authoritative name servers of a domain.
(1) is unrelated to caching-past-end-of-ttl, so you need to be able to do (1) already. (2) just prolongs the time (1) is effective and required you to be able to deny access to the correct DNS server. Is it really that much easier to deny access to a DNS server than it is to redirect traffic to that DNS server and supply bogus reponses?
DNS cache poisoning is currently a very common sort of attack. The UDP-y nature of DNS makes it very easy. There are typically some severe limitations placed on the effectiveness of this attack by low TTLs. It does not require you to deny access to the authoritative server. This attack is also known as DNS spoofing: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_spoofing
Ignoring TTLs in favor of your own policy means poisoned DNS caches can persist much longer and be much more dangerous.
Right now, to keep a poisoned entry one must keep poisoning the cache.
In that world, one can still do that. One can also poison the entry once and then deny access to the real server. You seem to be arguing that this is easier than continuous poisoning. Do I understand you correctly?
You are correct in your assessment of the current dangers of DNS poisoning.
I am in no way arguing about ease of any given attack over any other. I am arguing that a proposed change results in an increased level of danger from known attacks.
I'm arguing that the proposed change at hand, keeping DNS records past their TTLs, makes DNS poisoning attacks more dangerous because access to origin servers can be denied. Right now TTLs are a real defense against DNS cache poisoning, and the idea at hand removes that in the name of user-friendliness.
The way I read your argument, it relies on denying access to be cheaper or simpler than spoofing (X == spoofing, Y == denying access to authoritative NS):
You are arguing that a kind of attacks is made more dangerous, because in the world with that change an attacker can not only (a) keep performing attack X, but can also (b) perform attack X and then keep performing Y. If Y is in no way simpler for the attacker why would an attacker choose (b)? S/he can get the same result using (a) in that world or in our world.
Am I misreading you or missing some other important property of these two attack variants?
I believe you may have failed to consider the important role played by reliability.
X cannot always be done reliably - it usually relies on timing. Y, as we've seen, can be done with some degree of reliability. Combining them, in the wished-for world, creates a more reliable exploit environment because the spoofed records will not expire. The result is more attacks that persist longer and are more likely to reach their targets.
Such a world is certain to not be better than this one and likely to be worse.
