I have no clue what Searle would say, and my degree is in physics not philosophy. But my best guess is that it's probably a borderline case? The person inside the Chinese room still of course has access to qualia, and those qualia do line up in a one-to-one way with the outside world: this suggests clearly "not a p-zombie." But it does seem that in an important sense they're not the right qualia; to use that language, "there's something that it feels like to talk about a waterfall, and the person in the Chinese room does not feel that when they talk about a waterfall."
If you want to up the geekery factor to eleven, you could probably think of the Chinese room as a sort of homomorphic encryption.
Thank you for both these comments, this is the best explanation I've ever read about Searle (Searle is usually a punchline in my conversations with my friends[1]). I'm not completely convinced, and I think an effective rebuttal is along the lines of "there's no such thing as a privileged qualia", but I'm not smart enough to make it properly, and have much to think about for a few nights! :)
[1] For instance, most recent search in my Slack for Searle returns: "There are days when all i do is purely syntactic copy-pasting into stack overflow and copy-pasting back into my terminal, with absolutely no understanding of the underlying semantics of my actions, and have such surprisingly impressive results, that i've become more and more convinced by Searle."
If you want to up the geekery factor to eleven, you could probably think of the Chinese room as a sort of homomorphic encryption.