Because Zillow is ultimately right here and her use of the images without Zillow's permission is against their terms of use (which contrary to the hand-wavy analysis in EFF's letter, is absolutely enforceable). However, Zillow doesnt have a lot of damages to recover from her use and definitely wants to avoid another big PR stink, so they get to back off gracefully, she agrees to stop saying she gets the pictures from Zillow (which is what they really wanted), and everything goes back to normal.
The EFF letter cites a bunch of cases where an arbitration clause was unenforceable because of the way the terms of service were presented, which has nothing to do with the current situation (whether a restriction on using images from Zillow is enforceable). I know it's not fashionable to express support for a big bad corporate machine over the little guy/gal, but I'm trying to share some actual information instead of just gush.
You're contradicting statements made with sources cited without citing any of your own, or explaining how they would nullify the other points made on why this use is acceptable.
When lawyers write letters, they will throw everything they can possibly think of and the kitchen sink, even if it's not relevant. Many of the cites in the letter are not relevant to this situation (I'm not going through every one, but just as an example):
The letter says:
"But Wagner is not bound by your Terms of Use and, even if she were, the relevant provisions are unenforceable. Courts routinely decline to enforce “browsewrap” agreements like Zillow’s Terms of Use, which fail to present terms except via a hyperlink and without a checkbox to signal assent. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014); Meyer v. Kalanick, 199 F. Supp. 3d 752 (S.D. N.Y. 2016); Be In, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12-CV-03373-LHK, 2013 WL 5568706, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013); Kwan v. Clearwire Corp., No. C09-1392JLR, 2012 WL 32380 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2012)."
Do you see how the very first paragraph where they start citing has very little to do with the actual issue? Translation: "Hey Zillow, first of all your terms of service arent enforceable, see these 4 cases, all of which have to do with whether an arbitration clause could be applied and have nothing to do with the current situation."
2nd paragraph: "Even if an agreement were formed, paragraph 14 of the Terms of Use, asserting Zillow’s right to alter the contract without notice or justification, would render the agreement illusory and void for lack of consideration. See, e.g., Cheek v. United Healthcare of Mid-Atl., Inc., 378 Md. 139, 144, 835 A.2d 656, 659 (2003); Interchange Assocs. v. Interchange, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 359, 362, 557 P.2d 357, 359 (1976)."
Again, neither of these are really relevant to the situation. I'll stop here but I hope you get the gist of it. Here's what happened - some junior lawyer at EFF spend 4-5 researching all the cases they thought would be remotely relevant and threw them in there because hey it looks impressive, but if you spend some time digging into them the truth quickly becomes apparent.
The "Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc" decision is absolutely relevant. It's true that they were arguing about whether an arbitration clause applied, but what's important is the analysis the court used to determine that it did not. The distinction between clickwrap agreements (where you click a checkbox to say you agree) and browsewrap agreements (where you're expected to see some notice buried in the footer about the terms of service) was critical to the court's analysis in Nguyen. In the opinion, the court cites a long line of precedents to show that if a browesewrap agreement is sufficiently well-buried that it does not put a "reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract" then it does not apply.
You could try to draw a distinction by showing that this particular browsewrap agreement was more prominently featured than the one at issue in Nguyen, but you don't get to just hand-wave it away by saying that it was about an arbitration clause.
Flip it around - courts decide not to apply arbitration provisions because it involves giving up a key right (jury trial), so they find that there was no meeting of the minds in the TOS given the manner it was presented. Essentially, if a browsewrap TOS is not presently prominently enough to let you to make an educated decision on waiving your right to a jury trial, you get to keep your right to a jury trial.
You dont have this situation when the issue is whether you have the ability to use a provider's images for non-permitted purposes. Your right to use someone's images how you like is not nearly as important as your right to a jury trial. I'm not aware of any case where non-arbitration provisions of a TOS were not applied due to browsewrap reasons, if you are aware of any I'd love to see them.
EFF's argument would be totally valid if Zillow was trying to force McMansion into arbitration. That's not the issue here, and it's misleading to start off with "your TOS are unenforceable [because courts have declined to apply arbitration provisions in certain browsewrap TOS contexts]"
As for the character of the case law, that's primarily because people don't go to court over things like this, they just file DMCA notices which are rarely litigated very far. The cases are all arbitration clauses because the parties had something else they wanted to sue for and they had to overturn that clause first.
As a reminder, Zillow cannot, here, file a DMCA notice because they lack the copyrights with which to do so, and pretending to represent a copyright owner you do not in fact represent is contrary to the statement you sign under penalty of perjury when filing a (non-defective) DMCA notice.
And I'm really not clear why you think one's first amendment rights would have less weight than sixth amendment rights? You haven't really articulated a theory as to why one is important and the other is not.
If you're going to pick apart an argument why not Zillow's? Their claim under the CFAA is ridiculous and it was already shot down in US v. Nosal.
"The Ninth Circuit's first ruling (Nosal I) established that employees have not "exceeded authorization" for the purposes of the CFAA if they access a computer in a manner that violates the company's computer use policies—if they are authorized to access the computer and do not circumvent any protection mechanisms."
Meekro's point is compelling; to me it doesn't look like you read the Wikipedia page on that case beyond the "holding".
It's very clear (in everything but the Holding synopsis)) that court sees the ability for browserwrap to hold over a website visitor is contingent on affirmative action being required of a website visitor. That makes the citation more than just pertinent but a knockout if Zillow is arguing that McMansion Hell were bound by their ToS, and so ...
That said I can't see the court acceding that ToS overrule Fair Use for reporting/critique/parody/education as that would neuter Fair Use completely.
You (and most people in this thread, and discussing this on the Internet) are confusing 2 completely separate concepts.
Fair use is a COPYRIGHT doctrine. It is part of the US copyright law that says, creators of a copyright can enforce their rights against people who misuse their creations, except in certain cases, fair use being one of them. So if Zillow brings a claim under the US Copyright act, McMansion can assert a fair use defense. (https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html)
Zillow's terms of service is a CONTRACT. It is separate from whether Zillow can bring a copyright claim. They could sue for both breach of contract and copyright infringement. Fair use is a legitimate defense for the copyright infringement claim (and I agree would likely be successful). It is NOT a defense for the breach of contract claim. There is no such thing as "TOS overriding fair use" because they are on separate and distinct tracks. ("However, binding agreements such as contracts or licence agreements may take precedence over fair use rights.[21]" - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_use)
As for whether the arbitration cases show that restrictions on use of proprietary images on browsewrap TOS are enforceable, we'll agree to disagree - jury trials are a far more important right (as someone below pointed out) than whether you can use someone's proprietary images for your own purpose. I find it difficult to believe a judge or jury could (fairly) find that there is no 'meeting of the minds' on whether you can take and use any images, website content, code, etc. you feel like from someone's website or online product under a browsewrap license. It's a significantly different issue than whether an arbitration clause can be enforced. I would argue that most people know that 'taking things from other people is bad and not allowed' without requiring prominent notice on a website about it. But this case will be litigated, so we'll never know.
>There is no such thing as "TOS overriding fair use" because they are on separate and distinct tracks. //
I don't know it to be certainly true, if you can cite something solid on the point I'd be happy: however in general there is such a principle, that certain rights can't be disclaimed.
Taking a logical approach - and law is not always logical - Fair Use could be disclaimed, eg in a ToS, then all Media corps would say words to the effect "this work can't be used under USC's Fair Use legislation" and the democratic law would then be subverted entirely.
Per your final para, most people do know infringement (no one 'took' anything, it's a copy) is not allowed [tortuous]. But, Fair Use very rightly allows copying for parody, reporting, education and similar purposes. They also know that no matter what you try to claim about not using images of your product, news and review, parody and education _are still allowed_ (not in all jurisdictions, however).
The established precedent is n that a browsewrap license needs affirmative action - checkbox, click-thru/interstitial, etc. - this precedent means nothing written in the license is pertinent, the viewer isn't party to the contract.
The federal arbitration act and numerous Supreme Court cases interpreting it (many involving summary reversals) forbid discriminating against arbitration provisions in the manner you suggest. Neither state nor federal courts can apply a stricter rule to provisions involving agreements to arbitrate versus any other kind of contract provision.
See for but one of many examples Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. Clark from last month.
The EFF was clearly pushing for a broader ruling on browsewrap enforceability. In my view, if a court threw out a browsewrap arb clause, it would also throw out the terms that purport to override fair use and the first amendment.
