The phone has enough metadata to make that easy to expose, at least in the simple case. There's GPS location, time, and even your Face ID verification (on iPhone X) to prove that it was really you holding the camera.

If you make your fake video after the event, the location and time will be obviously off.

Which are all values written by the camera. My camera will believe it's whatever time, location, and face I tell it.

The point by clarkmoody was that Apple would be signing the photos with their key to ensure those values are correct.

It would be basically the macOS Developer ID software model applied to photos.

You can set the time on your phone, and GPS spoofing is a technology that already exists -- or you could disable location services.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoofing_attack#GPS_spoofing

Cryptographic timestamps are a thing

That's fine, if you publish that video it will be signed by ggg9990 and you will have to decide if you want to be associated with it. Watchers will then have to decide if ggg9990 is a trustworthy source.

It boils down to trust, not whether the original video was real or not.

To put it another way, reputable news organizations already go to great lengths to ensure that their stories are well sourced. At the end of the day, they are putting their reputation on the line.

Try it. Seriously, try and record a realistically looking recording off the screen. Movie pirates have been trying to perfect it for decades, and even their best attempts look obvious.

Unless you build DRM right into camera sensor (which is, admittedly, not that hard), you can use an FPGA chip to receive your source video in HDMI format, convert it to CSI interface and send it to the phone SoC over the camera flex cable.

If you can make a porn video of someone look like a porn video of someone else, I’m sure the technology to solve this problem is not far off.

What if all legally acceptable cameras have to use multiple sensors?

In other words, 2 main stereoscopic sensors, each recording their cryptostream to their storage. In addition to that, you have 2 UV sensors doing the same thing, and 2 IR sensors as well?

The idea being that it's much, much harder to fake something if you have to take IR and UV into account.

Isn't this also where something like a blockchain is useful? Where data is dumped into it realtime by this mythical secure camera, with all its associated metadata.

Then you can ask: "does the time the data was added agree with the time the camera says the data was recorded?" "Does the blockchain agree that the data hasn't been modified after it arrived?"

Add to that the possibility that there are multiple cameras all recording this incredibly detailed video from different angles, and the evil counterfeiters will (hopefully) have a dickens of a time faking all this.

Although with all this wonderful processing, networking and storage power to enable this secure camera, you can probably create a faking system too.

Maybe a second layer of AI that cleans up that video-of-video look?

Philosophically though, I think it's a good thing that many are learning not to trust information from self-proclaimed authorities :-)

So what do you propose? At some point a system of trust must be established or are you going to travel around the world, attend every event, see everything with your own very eyes, run the analysis, crunch the data etc... to be convinced of the information?

It's possible to simply believe less. Not only will you be less likely to get screwed over, you'll also be happier, when you no longer have a big handle on your nose that the bastards can use to lead you around.

Hasn't ios DRM continued to get more effective over time?

If there are no known exploits, a signed video, marked as having a network based timestamp, is at a minimum incrementally more reliable than a video without such metadata.