But it is possible to distribute trust across multiple VPN services, such that none of them alone can compromise you. You just nest one VPN inside another. It's easy using VMs. Most simply, connect to one VPN provider in the host machine, and to another in a VM. Using pfSense VMs as VPN gateways, you can chain more deeply. It's the same idea that's behind Tor using three-relay circuits. But less anonymous, because routes are static.
Do you realise that this kind of behaviour will make you automatically a suspect? Remember, is not the data that you transfer, but the metadata of it which is always visible.
Maintain appearance of normal, but block just what is doing really harm, like advertising and certain cookies. And don't post anything personal online. Use firefox on private window.
Which "you"? Mirimir, for sure. But being a suspect is unavoidable for that persona. However, to my ISP and its friends, I'm just a VPN user. Who torrents, which is pretty common where I'm located. I've never connected directly to Tor, even.
And what metadata? All Mirimir metadata points to the final VPN service. I'm sure that resourceful TLAs could use traffic analysis, and walk either way through the VPN chain. But I can't imagine that I'm that interesting. And indeed, I doubt that they'd find much to prosecute. I mean, all that Mirimir does is write about this stuff, mainly here and on Wilders Security Forums. And occasional stuff that's published by IVPN.
Other personas do more iffy stuff, such as seeing how well Freenet nodes worked as Tor onion services. Freenet being sadly loaded with CP. But those personas used different nested VPN chains, and then Whonix for Tor. So they're not related to either Mirimir or my meatspace identity.
Also, there are no overlaps in interests or Internet activity between Mirimir and my meatspace identity. In communications as my meatspace identity, I rarely use English. Not with family, friends or clients. Occasionally in work-related stuff, but never in social media. So there's not much basis for stylometry.
Finally, I must say the the setup is extremely easy to use. I have VPN client in the host machine, plus several pfSense VMsxas VPN gateways, which can easily be arranged and rearrabged in nested chains. I introduce new middle VMs occasionally, but generally don't change the entry and exit very often. Just update VBox and the VMs periodically.
But it is possible to distribute trust across multiple VPN services, such that none of them alone can compromise you. You just nest one VPN inside another. It's easy using VMs. Most simply, connect to one VPN provider in the host machine, and to another in a VM. Using pfSense VMs as VPN gateways, you can chain more deeply. It's the same idea that's behind Tor using three-relay circuits. But less anonymous, because routes are static.