> Many [counterfeits] have been seized, but any that remain in use pose the risk of causing “components to melt, burst, rupture, catch fire or explode, resulting in property damage, personal injury and death,”
You might think this is different, but controlling the supply chain limits these kinds of attacks.
One way to do it is to control the chain of custody so there's a paper trail on who had access to the parts and when. The other way the pentagon is doing it is putting "dielets" into the chips so they can be verified later.
> In the end it all comes down to controlling the supply chain.
And yet people got all up in arms about that guy who got convictted for counterfeiting freely downloadable Windows restoration disks by outsourcing the job to some random shop in China and making them look like official disks.
If anything, he got off easy. The world does not need more factory-backdoored OS installations.
> Many [counterfeits] have been seized, but any that remain in use pose the risk of causing “components to melt, burst, rupture, catch fire or explode, resulting in property damage, personal injury and death,”
[1]: https://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/11/07/7323/counterfeit-...
Edited to add:
You might think this is different, but controlling the supply chain limits these kinds of attacks.
One way to do it is to control the chain of custody so there's a paper trail on who had access to the parts and when. The other way the pentagon is doing it is putting "dielets" into the chips so they can be verified later.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-pentagon-rsqu...
In the end it all comes down to controlling the supply chain.