The complicating factor here is not that he not only refused a Full Body Scan, but that he refused to be frisked as well:
On the other side I was stopped by another agent and informed that because I had “opted out” of AIT screening, I would have to go through secondary screening. I asked for clarification to be sure he was talking about frisking me, which he confirmed, and I declined.
Congratulations. You've just introduced a single point of failure to the system: anyone with a badge forged well enough to fool a security guard now has carte blanche.
Not really - make all pilots have their badge authenticated at the security point with a computer fetching the image from a database and comparing it with:
You don't search pilots, they're gonna be getting into the cockpit to fly the plane! They are uniformed, they carry clear identification badges that can be verified easily, and they probably know half the people working in the airport. You can't expect them to be groped several times a day for no good reason just to do their jobs.
So what do you do about a deadheading pilot in uniform with ID who's decided to crash the plane? Sorry, you should search everyone (or search totally randomly).
From the Wikipedia article you linked to (twice) but apparently did not care to read:
"The scheduled three-man flight crew consisted of 49-year-old Captain David Sanders, 42-year-old First Officer James Tucker, and 39-year-old Flight Engineer Andrew Peterson."
"About twenty minutes after takeoff, as the flight crew carried on a casual conversation, Calloway entered the flight deck and commenced his attack."
This incident is therefore entirely irrelevant to the conversation.
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It's interesting, though, to find (articulate) American people who actually approve of the TSA methods, because I thought it was the TSA vs. the rest of the public (cf. "Ask the Pilot" Salon column for instance).
It's interesting, but disheartening, because it means the TSA and its gropers and thugs are really here to stay.
Yes, that's the meaning of the word deadheading. Before you complain someone didn't read an article, you might want to make sure that you understand what they did say.
You're right! I didn't know this word and assumed, wrongly, that it meant something like "deadbeat". I should have checked first; got caught up in the heat of the discussion.
However, that makes the reference to this incident even more incomprehensible. Who said anything about off-duty pilots?
Being a qualified pilot (or dressed as one) is not the point; the point, as has been stated many times now in this discussion, is that:
1. whoever is flying the plane today does not need to go through security, because they'll end up in the cockpit anyway
2. whatever piece of ID is enough to get someone at the commands of a commercial airliner today should also be enough to get past ordinary security procedures designed for passengers
That's the thing. Deadheading pilots are not off duty. A duty segment for a pilot can include, flying (as pilot) from LA to Dallas, deadheading to Chicago, flying to NY, then deadheading to Miami and finally flying back to LA. Not a very efficient use of the pilot's time, but still possible and they're paid by the airline for the whole thing and are on duty.
If pilots didn't have to go through security, we'd presumably see a lot more of this.
Security checks on the pilots are not attempting to prevent pilots from causing harm-- they are attempting to close a loophole which would allow people impersonating pilots to do harm.
> Security checks on the pilots are not attempting to prevent pilots from causing harm-- they are attempting to close a loophole which would allow people impersonating pilots to do harm.
Wouldn't fingerprints be enough to avoid identity theft?
"Prior to the departure of this flight on April 7, 1994, Mr. Calloway presented himself at the plane in full flight gear and with carry-on items. Although he was not a member of the flight crew, he entered the cockpit and began adjusting instruments and controls as if he were."
Yes, he did stuff he was not supposed to do, but on that flight he was a passenger. That he knew his way around the aircraft and that he knew exactly how to misbehave is exactly what I meant when I wrote that you are going to have to put trust in people at some point.
Pilots are - for the most part - the most stable people that I have ever met and in general will not get up to stuff like this nearly as often as 'regular' folks do.
If they did there would be suicide induced plane crashes every other day with the number of pilots in active service.
Incidents will always happen, the question is if you think that it is worth draconian safety measures to get the incident level down an unmeasurable fraction.
Again, all it would take for a major accident is for one guy to lift his foot for 2 seconds while taxiing.
I don't think you're an idiot, so stop pretending like you don't realize that he used his special privileges as a pilot to get concealed weapons onto the plane.
And stop advocating for lifting security requirements off pilots with ridiculous arguments like "pilots are - for the most part - the most stable people that I have ever met" and "he already has full control of the plane, so heck, he should be allowed to bring whatever the fuck he wants onboard anyway".
Did you read at least some of the most prominent articles from Schneier on security? Do it, it's worth it. The basic tenet is this : filtering potential threats at the bottom of the plane is almost useless, but makes a nice "security theater". Investigating the menace is harder, doesn't show off as well as nice big machines in airports, but it's efficient.
Scanning people shoes is useless. Full body scanners are useless. As the pilot said, what will they do when someone try to blow up a plane with dynamite in his rectum? Rectal check for everyone? This is absurd, expensive and serves only one purpose : covering TSA officials' asses.
Security in airports is already much too high, too annoying and too costly. There must be a point when it stops getting tighter and tighter. It won't catch the next terrorist anyway. We need a better use of resources and people (better than taking away mineral water bottles, and full-body scanning everyone and his dog).
I absolutely agree that security measures have to achieve balance between security, comfort and civil liberties.
But I'm still not seeing him advocating not screening the crew. And how could he advocate something like that.
It would be like him saying "use strong encryption to protect your information, but make sure that passwords are written on post-its so it won't get lost".
On the other side I was stopped by another agent and informed that because I had “opted out” of AIT screening, I would have to go through secondary screening. I asked for clarification to be sure he was talking about frisking me, which he confirmed, and I declined.