Hacker Newsnew | past | comments | ask | show | jobs | submitlogin

I recently bought a few Titan products (the security key) - I was pretty bummed to find out that it had none of the features claimed by the Titan family.

No Side Channel Attack resistance.

No fuses to attest supply chain provenance or lifecycle.

No direct connections for FIDO hardening.

Apprantly the Titan keys given to Google employees were different than the Titan keys sold to the public. Themselves different from the Titan M used in Servers and Phones and now Chromebooks. None of this would matter so much other than the fact that products sole purpose is to establish a secure chain of trust and starts out the gate broken with ambiguous or misleading claims.

This is frustrating because the Titan M is an absolutely brilliant device, with some real advancements to normalize embedded security, including an SPI interposer to monitor communications (a real leap forward) - and should not at all be conflated with a generic, whitelabeled, non-hsm product that makes no claims whatsoever.



>fact that products sole purpose is to establish a secure chain of trust

I think the right way to explain it is that "Titan" is the project to establish a secure chain of trust from user to server and back, making sure that every piece of hardware and software (and every human in the chain) is what it says it is and is doing what its supposed to be doing.

From that perspective, the Titan M, titan key, and serverside titan chip[1] are all pieces of the same project.

[1]: https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/titan-in-depth-se...




Consider applying for YC's Winter 2026 batch! Applications are open till Nov 10

Guidelines | FAQ | Lists | API | Security | Legal | Apply to YC | Contact

Search: