No, they've described a Bearer Token workflow. JWT is a specific method that also (most times) uses Bearer tokens, but it wasn't the first, nor does it have a monopoly on Bearer tokens.
I remember building a service when I was experimenting with web development that used randomly generated tokens in a custom HTTP header, and that is closer to Bearer Token (the standard) than Bearer Token is to JWT.
You're trying to be disingenuously pedantic. It's irrelevant if the workflow is specific to JWT or is shared by other bearer token schemes. The point is that JWT, which is a bearer token scheme, follows that workflow, thus it makes no sense to present that workflow as an alternative to the JWT workflow, as it's precisely the same.
If you believe JWT is "precisely" the same as mere presentation of a token, then you're woefully ignorant of JWT.
> ... it makes no sense to present that workflow as an alternative to the JWT workflow ...
But that's not what happened, is it? In fact, it's the opposite. As I read it, [1] suggests a bearer token workflow, to which [2] replies that the suggestion is "an awful lot like JWT", whereupon [3] clarifies that the original suggestion is just a normal bearer token scheme, which, I claim, shares nothing with "JWT" except the "T".
> ... JWT, which is a bearer token scheme ...
The "T" in "JWT" is the least interesting bit of JWT, and merely a necessity.
> It's irrelevant if the workflow is specific to JWT or is shared by other bearer token schemes
When not talking about any specific bearer token scheme, it is absolutely relevant. Only the generic point was under discussion, until JWT was introduced. JWT is not just another bearer token scheme. It comes with its own additional obligations, restrictions, and extra steps, not to mention the purpose-defeating pitfalls.
> JWT is not just another bearer token scheme. It comes with its own additional obligations, restrictions, and extra steps, not to mention the purpose-defeating pitfalls.
The big objection to JWT is that it's a bearer token with no revocation support. If you're going to implement a bearer token with no revocation support, or a custom revocation implementation, anyway, then the criticisms of JWT apply just as much to the system you're building and you might as well just use JWT.
> The big objection to JWT is that it's a bearer token with no revocation support.
That statement is not true. JWT do support revocation. In short, servers are free to reject any token, which triggers a token refresh on the client-side. Token revocation is even an intrinsic aspect of JWT as they suport issue and expiry timestamps, along with a nonce to avoid replay attacks.
It seems some users have an axe to grind regarding the idea of having to keep track of some tokens that were poorly designed (i.e., absurdly long expiry dates without a nonce) but the solution quite obviously is to not misuse the technology. In the very least, if a developer feels compelled to use a broken bearer token scheme that does not expire tokens based on issue date then quite obviously he needs to keep a scratchpad database of blacklisted tokens to compensate for that design mistake.
> In short, servers are free to reject any token, which triggers a token refresh on the client-side.
Servers can of course implement whatever custom behaviour they desire, but the protocol itself (and common implementing libraries) does not have any direct support for revocation.
Furthermore, any revocation implementation will inherently have to compromise the statelessness that is JWT's most prominent selling point.
> Token revocation is even an intrinsic aspect of JWT as they suport issue and expiry timestamps, along with a nonce to avoid replay attacks.
JWT does indeed support expiry and nonces. But these are not the same thing as revocation.
> It seems some users have an axe to grind regarding the idea of having to keep track of some tokens that were poorly designed (i.e., absurdly long expiry dates without a nonce) but the solution quite obviously is to not misuse the technology. In the very least, if a developer feels compelled to use a broken bearer token scheme that does not expire tokens based on issue date then quite obviously he needs to keep a scratchpad database of blacklisted tokens to compensate for that design mistake.
Insults and "obviously"s are not a good way to convince people of your point of view.
> Servers can of course implement whatever custom behaviour they desire, but the protocol itself (and common implementing libraries) does not have any direct support for revocation.
That's patently false. The protocol does support revocation. In fact, its basic usage specifically states that servers are free to force the client to refresh its tokens by simply rejecting it. If a JWT is expected to be ephemeral and servers are free to trigger token reissues, what lead you to believe that JWT didn't supported one of its basic use cases?
> Furthermore, any revocation implementation will inherently have to compromise the statelessness that is JWT's most prominent selling point.
That's false as well for a number of reasons, including the fact that JWT use nonces to avoid replay attacks. And additionally JWT's main selling point is that's a bearer token that's actually standardised, extendable, provided as a third party service, and is usable by both web and mobile apps.
> JWT does indeed support expiry and nonces. But these are not the same thing as revocation.
Expiration timestamps and nonces automatically invalidate tokens, which are supposed to be ephemeral, and nonces are a specific strategy to revoke single-use tokens. As it's easy to understand a bearer token implementation that supports revoking single-use tokens is also an implementation that supports revoking tokens, don't you agree?
> Insults and "obviously"s are not a good way to convince people of your point of view.
Perhaps educating yourself on the issues you're discussing is a more fruitful approach, particularly if you don't feel confortable with some basic aspects of the technology and some obvious properties.
Also, people make a big stink when authentication cookies aren’t marked as HTTPONLY. Storing tokens in localstorage (even sessionstorage) is just as bad but for some reason more accepted.
Stealing tokens from localstorage or cookies means the attacker can run code in the user's security context. Why would they limit themselves to stealing tokens? Using them outside of the browser would be stupid, anyway, as it would risk tripping reauthentication, IPS, or whatever.
HttpOnly is a joke, and people should stop claiming it helps with XSS. It does not help. It's security benefit is at most neutral. In fact, people often seem to think that it prevents XSS, and get lulled into a false sense of security. For that reason, HttpOnly seems to be worse than neutral.
Persistent access via an authentication token is a hell of a lot more reliable than relying on the user not navigating from/refreshing a specific page where XSS is present.
