If MCAS is required for the plane to be airworthy, then it is not airworthy when the pilot disables it via stabilizer trim cutoff. And if the behavior of the plane is not subtly different in approach to stall, stall, or stall recovery, then the pilot might also not be type certified for the airplane with MCAS disabled.
I'm really suspicious, in a variety of ways, of cutoff switches effectively decertifying a plane in flight. And then how it's OK for pilots to not at least be made aware of that potential situation in advance?
An airplane suddenly rendered not airworthy, and pilot suddenly rendered without a proper type rating. It's absurd. I don't know how a software update gets them out of this predicament, if it's true.
Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft have numerous layers of safeguards (laws) in place. Each can be removed or degraded depending on the circumstances. But pilots are expected to know all of them, and know the consequences of each safeguard being removed, including the ensuing natural flight behavior of the airplane.
I'm really suspicious, in a variety of ways, of cutoff switches effectively decertifying a plane in flight. And then how it's OK for pilots to not at least be made aware of that potential situation in advance?
An airplane suddenly rendered not airworthy, and pilot suddenly rendered without a proper type rating. It's absurd. I don't know how a software update gets them out of this predicament, if it's true.
Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft have numerous layers of safeguards (laws) in place. Each can be removed or degraded depending on the circumstances. But pilots are expected to know all of them, and know the consequences of each safeguard being removed, including the ensuing natural flight behavior of the airplane.
Anyway the story still isn't fully out yet.