> Lockheed Skunk Works' legendary boss Kelly Johnson was so distraught over the accident, he initially refused to work on the program any further and offered to refund the money the U.S. government had already paid.
I need to track down some good books on this guy, he sounds interesting.
Yeah. The books isn’t about Kelly Johnson but he gets referred back to a lot in cases of “what would he do” or “he told me to go the other way” or “kelly knew better in that instance”. It’s almost like Ben Rich bouncing ideas of Kelly while he isn’t present.
I believe the earlier stuff is mentioned in passing when talking about Kelly Johnson's history but the more modern stuff Ben Rich worked on understandably gets more attention, with the bulk of it about the Blackbird and the F-117.
He spent some space talking about the U-2 and that material is the kind of thing I had in mind when talking about how the book gives an impression of Kelly Johnson. For example, prior to reading the book I didn't know that while the CIA people expected downed pilots to kill themselves, Kelly Johnson thought that was nuts, was sympathetic to Francis Gary Powers, and gave him a job as a test pilot when he returned from captivity.
I think the book is well written and accomplishes a lot with small anecdotes like that one. It was a lucky find for me. I pulled it off a bookshelf in an airport convenience store because it was the only book that didn't look insanely boring.
I've read it and came away wanting. It's a brief personal memoir, with very little technical detail. If it'd been written by anyone other than the man himself, it'd barely warrant a mention.
It's good for a peek into his life, his early years, stuff like that. Definitely does give you some sense of what sort of person would make a comment like the above.
Yikes, all that work and expense for a program that flew four missions. Two transferred all the tech to both USSR and China, and the other two suffered mysterious film recovery mishaps that prevented any intelligence gathering. It's no wonder they were so eager to get spy satellites figured out.
For the original reconnaissance platform version, the idea that something so expensive and complicated could be considered one-use disposable is amazing. But then again they were looking at it as an alternative to very low orbiting satellites with finite film canister supplies...
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.
This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some fifty miles of concrete pavement. We pay for a single fighter with a half-million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people. . . . This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.
I suppose I should take this comment with a grain of salt considering it came from Emma Goldman, but in the case of deterrence, then the weapons are indeed needed all throughout.
I agree but then the original statement makes no sense. Arms always have a deterrent effect, that's the point. There is no climactic moment in which they suddenly prove their worth, no 'until'.
Exactly. But when you are facing Communists who have taken over a very large chunk of the world, and who have starved tens of millions of people to death and shown very little regard for basic human rights, it kinda seems worth the cost.
Because, you aren't going to have any of those fine things if the Communists succeed with their plans.
I don't think anyone argues that the United States should have cut its military budget to zero. It is a question of degree.
Did the US chronically overstate the Soviet threat, inflating the defence budget well beyond what was necessary? One could make a good case that it did.
From the start the Soviet Union was on the defensive. Stalin reigned in the Red Army in the final months of the Second World War from taking West Germany, for fear of inflaming the US and UK. He refused to support the communists (mostly ex-resistance fighters) in the Greek Civil War for the same reason. Nor did he lend support to the Chinese Revolution.
The US was the far greater power from the beginning of the Cold War. The Soviet Union had only industrialised in the last generation and was wrecked by the Nazi invasion. While it showed impressive growth into the 1960s, under Brezhnev it began to stagnate.
Various US operations (e.g. Vietnam) and defence programmes (e.g. the Strategic Defence Initiative) were not only unnecessary, but detrimental to the US. Both of these examples were based on exaggerations of the Soviet threat: Vietnam on domino theory; SDI on the phantom 'missile gap'.
Soviet Union never was on defensive side. From the very beginning they've tried to conquer most of their neighbors, they've attacked Poland together with Hitler and Finland in 1940.
Even in 1945 they've tried to annex part of Persia and wrestle Bosfor Straight control from Turkey.
It has been the historical norm for great power's to exert control over a sphere of influence. That is exactly what the United States did in the 19th century in the Western hemisphere through the Monroe Doctrine. The cases you raise fall into that category.
In fact there is an obvious parallel between the USSR's attempt to gain access to the Turkish Straits and the United State's repeated interventions to build and control the Panama Canal. The only difference is that while the United States was able to dominate its sphere of influence, the Soviet Union's attempt to intimidate Turkey failed. Instead of gaining access to a vital strategic waterway, it led to the Truman Doctrine. Don't forget that one of the pivotal events of the Cold War - the Cuban missile crisis - was based on the same asymmetry. The United States had Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey, but would not accept Soviet missiles in Cuba, a country that it had tried and failed to invade.
Before the end of the Second World War the United States had set its sights on something far more ambitious than a regional sphere of interest: global primacy. The Soviet Union never had the capability to do that, or considered it a realistic goal. It was bunkered in a traditional land empire.
When I say that the Soviet Union was on the 'defensive', I mean that in the context of its bipolar confrontation with the United States, not that it never engaged in aggression. Obviously it did, often brutally.
I think that's a very unhelpful way of putting the matter.
There is no direct confrontation standing at the origin of the conflict. Hence it being a 'Cold' War. It emerged from an accumulation of strategic moves over time. Each power worked to advance its interests, while watching other powers (namely Germany, Japan, and the British Empire) fade. At some point, they recognised that they were in direct geopolitical competition. When they did, it was clear that the Soviet Union was the lesser power. Its actions reflected that reality.
If you did want to identify an 'originary' moment to the conflict - which again, I think is an unhelpful way of approaching the subject - then it would have to be the US intervention in the Russian Civil War against the Bolsheviks.
Communists? Really? You should watch The Power of Nightmares by Adam Curtis. The USSR was not really a threat in the way it came across. The empire was in decline going into the Cold War. The threat was a noble lie used to unify Americans to create a sense of nationalism.
Gosh, if only there had been a respected military man who was also a popular and successful politician who had also been well-placed at the right time to prevent the nascent military-industrial complex from permanently instituting the political and industrial arrangements it had cynically used the Korean War to establish... what could have been?
You certainly do. A global nuclear war wouldn't even remotely come close to ending warfare. Immediately after the nukes stopped flying, traditional military conflict would follow/continue, including intense territorial landgrabs. Whatever is left of Russia, as one example, would be attempting territorial annexation of any parts of nearby Eastern Europe that hadn't been destroyed, as a desperate move to grab resources (including food). The US could hit Russia with all of its nukes and Russia would still have 100+ million people and vast military resources that dwarf its neighbors.
You could simultaneously detonate every functional nuclear weapon on earth inside of the borders of Texas and still not manage to kill everyone in the state. The notion that global nuclear war would end all of civilization, has always been a good form of propaganda aimed at preventing nations from doing something so stupid. The earth is really, really big.
I thought the problem was more the nuclear winter that would follow nuclear war? If a volcano explosion can cause a mini-ice-age, I don't see why burning every major city on earth wouldn't cause enough of an ice age to cause a civilization-killing famine. Not to mention, the poisoning of substantial amounts of water, and food sources would mean that a lot of what was left over would be carcinogenic.
Makes you wonder what they're testing at Groom Lake these days which ISN'T public.
What they've been spending money out there for the last 30 years is a really good question. The USAF has a big "black budget". We're not seeing, 20 years later, impressive results from it comparable to the SR-71.
There's the F-35, which is a demonstration of the power of money. A VTOL stealth air superiority fighter/bomber. $100 million each. With enough money, you can build a real Transformer.[1]
How about an ICBM based on the Falcon 9 and Dragon capsule that's designed to land gently in enemy territory, so the pilot can step outside in a silver suit and say "klaatu barda nikto!"
> the idea that something so expensive and complicated could be considered one-use disposable is amazing
So much about the Cold War era makes more sense if you keep in mind that a big part of the US strategy was to turn it into a cash-burning contest in which the Soviets would go broke first. The waste was the point!
Nobody except NASA. We'd be on Mars by now if the US govt didn't realize that von Braun & team's work on nuclear engines would mean further extending the space race.
I saw one of these over at March Air Museum in southern California. They also have a cool display of the SR-71. Probably the coolest place in southern California to visit if you are interested in military aviation.
I need to track down some good books on this guy, he sounds interesting.