This is really only true in combinatorial auctions when the set of items is small. In the divorce example (split n items between the two) from the other comment, VCG would require both partners to list their truthful valuation for all 2^n bundles of items.
Since this isn't really feasible in practice, VCG isn't used even in settings, where the complexity of the mechanism would be warranted. (Think cellular frequency auctions, where CCAs or SMRAs are used.)
Well, I've only known it used in the adtech space, but I'll really miss it. It made writing a bidder on the open rtb exchanges a doable things without too much tech.
With exchanges going back to first price, I think the barrier to entry will be a lot higher for new players. It's a sad state of affair that second price auction was ruined by fraudulent clearers, where the second price for your bid was always your bid minus 1 cent...
I attended a conference given by the ex scientific director of Criteo demonstrating that mathematically, if players clear bids honestly, second price auction is the only economically viable choice in the long term. It was quite convincing. But the hypothese didn't hold up I suppose.
Since this isn't really feasible in practice, VCG isn't used even in settings, where the complexity of the mechanism would be warranted. (Think cellular frequency auctions, where CCAs or SMRAs are used.)