As an addendum, also compare recent nationalism in Turkey and Kurdish nationalism:
Turkey is an established state. Nationalism in Turkey is a social movement for increased conformity (resulting in a rise of Islam, slowly converting it from merely a widespread religion into a state religion, and cultural homogeneity, rejecting e.g. Greek shared history and ethnic minorities). It has also fueled rhetoric strongly suggesting expansionism (though currently restricted to depopulating Northern Syria to create a "security buffer" and relocating a different, more trusted, ethnic group there).
Kurdish nationalism for decades was a struggle against Turkish nationalism (as well as Iraq, Syria and Iran), fighting for cultural and ethnic recognition of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. The stated goal was to create a separate Kurdish nation state to define and protect a shared Kurdish identity.
More recently, Kurdish politics have moved away from the idea of a nation state. Rojava, although predominantly Kurdish, was explicitly created as an autonomous territory rather than a state and as multi-ethnic, multi-religious and with all central power devolved to the lowest level (i.e. all power is granted directly and explicitly by households forming neighborhoods forming communities). They explicitly aimed to find common ground with Syria, aspiring to become a mere autonomous territory in Syria, rather than a separate state. They eschewed both nationalism (i.e. creating a homogeneous identity) and full statehood (i.e. full political sovereignty and independence).
In reverse order, these are an example of the absence of nationalism, nationalism to create a new nation state (empowering a minority in an existing state) and hypernationalism (refining an existing nation state through increased homogeneity and militaristic expansionism).
Turkey is an established state. Nationalism in Turkey is a social movement for increased conformity (resulting in a rise of Islam, slowly converting it from merely a widespread religion into a state religion, and cultural homogeneity, rejecting e.g. Greek shared history and ethnic minorities). It has also fueled rhetoric strongly suggesting expansionism (though currently restricted to depopulating Northern Syria to create a "security buffer" and relocating a different, more trusted, ethnic group there).
Kurdish nationalism for decades was a struggle against Turkish nationalism (as well as Iraq, Syria and Iran), fighting for cultural and ethnic recognition of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. The stated goal was to create a separate Kurdish nation state to define and protect a shared Kurdish identity.
More recently, Kurdish politics have moved away from the idea of a nation state. Rojava, although predominantly Kurdish, was explicitly created as an autonomous territory rather than a state and as multi-ethnic, multi-religious and with all central power devolved to the lowest level (i.e. all power is granted directly and explicitly by households forming neighborhoods forming communities). They explicitly aimed to find common ground with Syria, aspiring to become a mere autonomous territory in Syria, rather than a separate state. They eschewed both nationalism (i.e. creating a homogeneous identity) and full statehood (i.e. full political sovereignty and independence).
In reverse order, these are an example of the absence of nationalism, nationalism to create a new nation state (empowering a minority in an existing state) and hypernationalism (refining an existing nation state through increased homogeneity and militaristic expansionism).