It still suffers the problem that it's highly lopsided in favor of simpler environments. Of course you're absolutely right that environments too complex to exist in our universe should get low weight. But it's hard to find the right "Goldilocks zone" where those ultra-complex environments are discounted sufficiently but medium-complexity environments aren't overly disenfranchised, and where ultra-simple environments aren't given overwhelming authority.
>There was me thinking I'd had an idea of my own one time!
I wouldn't give up. Although it's such a long paper, Legg and Hutter 2007 actually has very little solid content: they propose the definition, and the rest of the paper is mostly filler. There are approximately zero theorems or even formal conjectures. One area I think is ripe for contributions would be to better articulate what the desired properties of an intelligence measure should be. Legg and Hutter offered a measure using Kolmogorov weights, but WHY is that any better than just randomly assigning any gibberish numbers to agents in any haphazard way--what axioms does it satisfy that one might want an intelligence measure to satisfy?
It still suffers the problem that it's highly lopsided in favor of simpler environments. Of course you're absolutely right that environments too complex to exist in our universe should get low weight. But it's hard to find the right "Goldilocks zone" where those ultra-complex environments are discounted sufficiently but medium-complexity environments aren't overly disenfranchised, and where ultra-simple environments aren't given overwhelming authority.
>There was me thinking I'd had an idea of my own one time!
I wouldn't give up. Although it's such a long paper, Legg and Hutter 2007 actually has very little solid content: they propose the definition, and the rest of the paper is mostly filler. There are approximately zero theorems or even formal conjectures. One area I think is ripe for contributions would be to better articulate what the desired properties of an intelligence measure should be. Legg and Hutter offered a measure using Kolmogorov weights, but WHY is that any better than just randomly assigning any gibberish numbers to agents in any haphazard way--what axioms does it satisfy that one might want an intelligence measure to satisfy?