> difference between predicting something and knowing something
In common speech, someone will say "I know this will happen" when they merely predict it with high confidence. So would you agree that we've reached the point where we need to be more meticulous about definitions?
If so, lets go back up the thread a bit:
/u/LoSboccacc said:
> the chances for Joe Random to understand the ramifications of his voting in direct democracy are slim
> the risk of unmitigated populism storming the masses into voting some real shit is ever present
To which you said:
> the overwhelming consensus opinion seems to be that It Is Known that it could not possibly work, full stop.
The distinction between "chances are slim" and "could not possibly" is as meaningful as the distinction you make between predicting and knowing. Its not the same type of distinction, but it is just as meaningful.
So if you actually think "I don't think it's 100% inevitable that DD would result in chaos", then sure. We agree on that.
But if you think "I don't think chances are slim of DD being stable and happier than our current system", then we inherently start to talk about probabilities of future events -- we start to talk about predictions.
>
So that is the path of how one might disagree: By pointing out that you're also making predictions and that I'm making different well-reasoned predictions.
--------
> does anyone actually care?
I think for this question to be meaningful, you have to resist the temptation to treat the verb "care" passively. To care about something is to direct attention to it... hopefully to direct action toward it. We eat, sleep, and care within finite time. So we can try to choose what to care about based on:
- What impact we predict the thing has on our lives.
- What impact we predict our care and its actions would have on the thing.
- How much time and effort we predict we would need to spend for our care to make that impact.
- How frequently that prediction of impact is re-enforced with evidence-of-success that we recognize.
And we strive to parcel out our attention well among all our responsibilities. Some are better at controlling their attention than others, but all have limited time.
Consequently, I think very few people direct a lot of their care to the question "what is the best approach to yielding the maximum benefit to all people on planet Earth?"
> So would you agree that we've reached the point where we need to be more meticulous about definitions?
Most definitely, ages ago.
> The distinction between "chances are slim" and "could not possibly" is as meaningful as the distinction you make between predicting and knowing. Its not the same type of distinction, but it is just as meaningful.
Maybe I misunderstand you, but people not realizing (so it seems) when they're making a speculative prediction (as opposed to stating a ~proven fact) seems like a rather big deal to me. The "chances are slim" and "could not possibly" comparison is from two different contexts. We must have our wires crossed somehow?
> But if you think "I don't think chances are slim of DD being stable and happier than our current system", then we inherently start to talk about probabilities of future events -- we start to talk about predictions. So that is the path of how one might disagree: By pointing out that you're also making predictions and that I'm making different well-reasoned predictions.
Had I made any predictions, I would obviously agree.
I guess my point is, I take a bit of offence to:
a) people strongly suggesting our options are limited, without evidence
b) people using speculative predictions as some sort of a proof of widespread racism: "Moreover the risk of unmitigated populism storming the masses into voting some real shit is ever present; while a populist leader still have to work within the framework of the houses it would be extremely easy to con the people into, say, voting xenophobic measures during circumscribed but substantial crisis like the Syrian war."
If similar negative generalizations were made about people based on skin colour or culture, I suspect the reaction would be far different.
> To care about something is to direct attention to it
100% agree. And I have noticed a pattern of people not being willing to direct attention to the possibility that their predictions of the future, and observations of reality, may be in part speculative.
> Consequently, I think very few people direct a lot of their care to the question "what is the best approach to yielding the maximum benefit to all people on planet Earth?"
100% agree, which is my complaint. However, there is simultaneously no shortage of people directing significant attention and effort into pointing out that certain groups are "the" underlying problem with the world, typically with no evidence other than popular opinion.
In common speech, someone will say "I know this will happen" when they merely predict it with high confidence. So would you agree that we've reached the point where we need to be more meticulous about definitions?
If so, lets go back up the thread a bit:
/u/LoSboccacc said:
> the chances for Joe Random to understand the ramifications of his voting in direct democracy are slim
> the risk of unmitigated populism storming the masses into voting some real shit is ever present
To which you said:
> the overwhelming consensus opinion seems to be that It Is Known that it could not possibly work, full stop.
The distinction between "chances are slim" and "could not possibly" is as meaningful as the distinction you make between predicting and knowing. Its not the same type of distinction, but it is just as meaningful.
So if you actually think "I don't think it's 100% inevitable that DD would result in chaos", then sure. We agree on that.
But if you think "I don't think chances are slim of DD being stable and happier than our current system", then we inherently start to talk about probabilities of future events -- we start to talk about predictions.
>
So that is the path of how one might disagree: By pointing out that you're also making predictions and that I'm making different well-reasoned predictions.
--------
> does anyone actually care?
I think for this question to be meaningful, you have to resist the temptation to treat the verb "care" passively. To care about something is to direct attention to it... hopefully to direct action toward it. We eat, sleep, and care within finite time. So we can try to choose what to care about based on:
- What impact we predict the thing has on our lives.
- What impact we predict our care and its actions would have on the thing.
- How much time and effort we predict we would need to spend for our care to make that impact.
- How frequently that prediction of impact is re-enforced with evidence-of-success that we recognize.
And we strive to parcel out our attention well among all our responsibilities. Some are better at controlling their attention than others, but all have limited time.
Consequently, I think very few people direct a lot of their care to the question "what is the best approach to yielding the maximum benefit to all people on planet Earth?"