> Is the veracrypt drive, and therefore the HVM, linked to my specific instance of tails or can it be accessed by anyone with a tails usb and my veracrypt authentication details?
If someone has your VeraCrypt volume password, the volume can be unlocked by them using via any Tails stick but potentially any other operating system. What HiddenVM does is reduce digital forensic evidence of using that volume quite fundamentally.
> Also, is it possible to have tails on one usb and a veracrypt drive on a seperate USB drive?
Yes. It may be faster if you make your computer's internal SSD to be one entire partitionless hidden VeraCrypt volume.
> How would that effect deniability at, say, a border?
We want to be careful about making claims about deniability, and it's still a field we have a lot to learn about at HiddenVM. Someone more knowledgeable might dare to answer this. We already give two examples on the github page. Your situation is unique and only you can know what deniability strategy works best.
If someone has your VeraCrypt volume password, the volume can be unlocked by them using via any Tails stick but potentially any other operating system. What HiddenVM does is reduce digital forensic evidence of using that volume quite fundamentally.
> Also, is it possible to have tails on one usb and a veracrypt drive on a seperate USB drive?
Yes. It may be faster if you make your computer's internal SSD to be one entire partitionless hidden VeraCrypt volume.
> How would that effect deniability at, say, a border?
We want to be careful about making claims about deniability, and it's still a field we have a lot to learn about at HiddenVM. Someone more knowledgeable might dare to answer this. We already give two examples on the github page. Your situation is unique and only you can know what deniability strategy works best.