It's him imaging things that he think couldn't be done on computers under one definition, based on vaguely defined terms. Dreyfus was open to another, more expansive definition that included things like 'holistic' and 'tacit' knowledge, which he believed were outside the scope of what computers of a certain sort could do. That distinction turns out to be moot because all the 'new' stuff: e.g. neural networks, GAN, GPT-3 etc are, while in some sense new and innovative, ultimately are running on foundation the same old of logic gates, zeros and ones, and ultimately are, really are, computable in the classical turing machine sense, which is exactly what he had spent his whole career denying. It was a limit of Dreyfus' imagination that he didn't understand that computation, even the kind he criticized, could model the higher order conceptual structures he thought were inaccessible to classical computers. He's not wrong to think that something called 'tacit' knowledge would be important, and would call for specialized approaches and new concepts. Where he went wrong was in veering to the insane, overconfident extreme of denying that these were computable.
It's him imaging things that he think couldn't be done on computers under one definition, based on vaguely defined terms. Dreyfus was open to another, more expansive definition that included things like 'holistic' and 'tacit' knowledge, which he believed were outside the scope of what computers of a certain sort could do. That distinction turns out to be moot because all the 'new' stuff: e.g. neural networks, GAN, GPT-3 etc are, while in some sense new and innovative, ultimately are running on foundation the same old of logic gates, zeros and ones, and ultimately are, really are, computable in the classical turing machine sense, which is exactly what he had spent his whole career denying. It was a limit of Dreyfus' imagination that he didn't understand that computation, even the kind he criticized, could model the higher order conceptual structures he thought were inaccessible to classical computers. He's not wrong to think that something called 'tacit' knowledge would be important, and would call for specialized approaches and new concepts. Where he went wrong was in veering to the insane, overconfident extreme of denying that these were computable.