>If you can be traced across the web, then your real name can now be attached to all your activity.
But that's not how tor works. It's not like a VPN where all your traffic comes out of one node. So if even if you logged into facebook using tor browser, it won't be able to correlate your other tor browsing activities. Even third party cookies won't work because tor browser has third party isolation enabled.
> >If you can be traced across the web, then your real name can now be attached to all your activity.
> But that's not how tor works. It's not like a VPN where all your traffic comes out of one node. So if even if you logged into facebook using tor browser, it won't be able to correlate your other tor browsing activities. Even third party cookies won't work because tor browser has third party isolation enabled.
Except that the OP discussed a technique that exposed an attribute of the user's setup that (when combined with other such techniques) allows unique (albeit pseudonymous) identification of the user across requests and sessions (this is called fingerprinting). Add in correlation of the pseud identifier with a real-world identity via use of FB, and the user would be totally hosed.
But that's not how tor works. It's not like a VPN where all your traffic comes out of one node. So if even if you logged into facebook using tor browser, it won't be able to correlate your other tor browsing activities. Even third party cookies won't work because tor browser has third party isolation enabled.