> Rents are not interstate commerce - they're local.

Existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence gives the feds authority to act to control things which indirectly touch on interstate commerce, which pretty expressly includes the interstate movement of humans and the impacts therefrom.

Its not a big stretch to get acting to control communicable disease from that. It is well-established that if it is acting to manage something it is authorized to manage, the feds don't separately need independent positive authority for the mechanism (in this case, the eviction moratorium), just the absence of a negative regulation. So, I don't think (other than the risk of current courts seeing the Commerce Clause more narrowly than existing precedent, a real risk given the rightward movement of the courts) the Commerce Clause is insufficient for federal authority.

I do think that the nondelegation doctrine may be a problem for the broad interpretation of the statute necessary to read it as putting this federal legislative authority in the hands of the CDC through the existing statute (whether that would mean the statute itself is read more narrowly or facially invalid is another question.)

Ah, I was thinking of using the Commerce Clause to justify controlling rental property, not to justify controlling disease prevention. Yes, that might pass muster - depending on which side of the bed the Supreme Court woke up on that morning...