Widespread instant communication is disruptive in a number of ways, that disruption is also a threat.
When I was in Boy Scouts and we visited a police station (which was trying to convince us that crime does not pay), they went to great lengths to explain how radio, and the ability for all of the officers to communicate, gave them a tremendous advantage over the criminal who was attempting to flee a crime scene.
Flash forward to Napster and complaints at how difficult it was for one law enforcement officer (or agency) to police a band of criminals with out-of-band communications infrastructure.
Then forward slightly further to Gulf War 1 where the key targets in the opening salvos were the communication hubs and infrastructure which enabled Iraqi forces to communicate both with headquarters and with each other. With communication out Iraqi units that were, on paper, 'stronger' than the coalition forces deployed against them in parts of the battlefield surrendering, in part because they weren't aware of supporting units nearby.
Finally Egypt, Libya, and Yemen are good examples of communication infrastructure favoring a disperse group in their efforts to overthrow an established presence.
It is no surprise that folks who have used communications superiority as an advantage against their adversaries are keenly aware of the disadvantage of not having the communication 'high ground.' Those folks will work tirelessly both in the open and underground to give themselves the advantage.
When I was in Boy Scouts and we visited a police station (which was trying to convince us that crime does not pay), they went to great lengths to explain how radio, and the ability for all of the officers to communicate, gave them a tremendous advantage over the criminal who was attempting to flee a crime scene.
Flash forward to Napster and complaints at how difficult it was for one law enforcement officer (or agency) to police a band of criminals with out-of-band communications infrastructure.
Then forward slightly further to Gulf War 1 where the key targets in the opening salvos were the communication hubs and infrastructure which enabled Iraqi forces to communicate both with headquarters and with each other. With communication out Iraqi units that were, on paper, 'stronger' than the coalition forces deployed against them in parts of the battlefield surrendering, in part because they weren't aware of supporting units nearby.
Finally Egypt, Libya, and Yemen are good examples of communication infrastructure favoring a disperse group in their efforts to overthrow an established presence.
It is no surprise that folks who have used communications superiority as an advantage against their adversaries are keenly aware of the disadvantage of not having the communication 'high ground.' Those folks will work tirelessly both in the open and underground to give themselves the advantage.