Those considerations notwithstanding, people are actually using crypto for criminal behavior. However great your arguments are against it, the reality is that it's happening.

Reasons it might be happening: You can say they're being shortsighted and taking on unnecessary risk, but then, people who make criminal livings tend to have a higher appetite for risk than e.g. I do.

> I strongly prefer there to be no record of the transaction.

Other than cash, this isn't viable. You'll have to launder your money no matter what, at some point. Crypto just makes transferring trivial, it's less regulated, you can't go to your bank and ask them for help, etc. It's good for criminals for these reasons.

There's radically more infrastructure for this sort of thing in existing systems. Crypto is far less regulated, you can transfer across countries easily, laundering becomes trivial, transfers via hacked accounts, etc.

This just isn't correct. Public ledger cryptocurrencies are able to be digitally transferred without any form of personal identification, unlike almost any other form of payment. Just because the ledger is public does not mean that one's identity is public, merely the addresses involved in the transaction are public. If there is nothing tying one's identity to an address or transaction, then the transaction being public is meaningless.

Further, this point is completely nullified by the fact that there are private ledger cryptocurrencies (e.g. Monero). Widely available public cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are useful for crime because they're (relatively) easily understandable, usable, and purchasable by laypeople. This results in a process that goes as such:

> Customer wants illicit good

> Customer goes on coin brokerage and buys Bitcoin

> Customer sends Bitcoin to illicit goods dealer in exchange for goods/services

> Dealer exchanges Bitcoin for Monero

> Dealer now has "clean" currency that could be used for anonymous cash drops, speculation, or even withdrawal from a public marketplace.

There are at least hundreds of people operating in the many millions of revenue using this model (with some additional safeguards) that have been successful for years and years. You are correct in saying that you are staking your freedom on the safety of something such as Monero, although you are free to analyze its safety and determine whether or not it is suitable for your threat model.

I agree with you. But I think there is nuance. When I hear “crypto is good for crime” I hear “crypto is good for all criminals” (where “criminal” is anyone conducting an illegal $$ transaction).

In your process, my statement was 100% talking about the “customer” steps. You’re right. But, at scale, it’s hard to conduct any crime that doesn’t leave a record. At the many millions of dollars of revenue scale, I could see crypto being a trade-off conversation.

> Public ledger cryptocurrencies are able to be digitally transferred without any form of personal identification, unlike almost any other form of payment.

Absolutely correct. But for any crime I’d likely commit, I’d be operating at a scale where anonymity would be hard to achieve. For example, I’d be hard pressed to acquire Bitcoin in a way that didn’t associate the wallet with my identity (if you have methods, please share!). For most transactional crimes I’d likely commit, I’d substitute “show up with cash for crime” with “show up with cash for Bitcoin, then use Bitcoin for crime.” It seems like an extra, unnecessary, step. Cash is already a record-less value transfer system.

> Further, this point is completely nullified by the fact that there are private ledger cryptocurrencies

I’m not sure if we are arguing semantics on this one. But my understanding of tech like Monero and ZK-snarks is that the ledger IS public, but it’s a bunch of locked boxes. Without the keys you can’t see the contents of the ledger. But now you’re in a race against time between implementation bugs (or broken crypto) and the statute of limitations. It’s not enough to audit it yourself. You’re not betting that _you_ couldn’t break it _today_, but that _no one_ will _ever_ break it. The incentive model seems broken. My crime may not be of interest, but I’m committing the transaction to the same ledger where nation states may have interest in decrypting other transactions. I can’t “uncommit” my transaction if the crypto falls to a nation state; my private business becoming public will just be collateral damage.

At a small scale, I’d much prefer taking a one time risk of conducting a no name cash transaction.

Hiya, sorry for a little bit of a late response!

I think there are a couple fundamental misunderstandings here regarding cash. Answering this question may fix that a little bit:

> I’d be hard pressed to acquire Bitcoin in a way that didn’t associate the wallet with my identity (if you have methods, please share!)

If one purchases BTC on Coinbase, trades it for XMR, and then trades the XMR for BTC back to a separate BTC wallet, it is currently unfeasible to determine that the final BTC is linked to the initial BTC. Also, cash is not completely private- bills have serial numbers that are tracked in a similar way as to how one might track Bitcoin (unless you're dealing solely in coins). BTC and XMR are both able to be cashed out fairly easily as well. They could be legally sold, given that they're functionally untraceable. You can also fairly easily coordinate cash overnighted to a PO box set up with a fake identity.

Re: Private ledger cryptocurrencies

With Monero (for example), the sender, receiver, and transaction amount are all private. The quality of Monero's privacy is up for debate, but I see no reason why explicitly tracked cash bills are more secure than a private ledger cryptocurrency.

In conclusion, within the initial context of, "When I’m doing crime, I strongly prefer there to be no record of the transaction", I don't believe that there is an opsec-based reason for you to choose cash over cryptocurrencies. There is always going to be a risk when committing crimes- that is unavoidable. Maybe this is a big point for dealing in gold, haha?

The thing about Bitcoin right now is that it is being used for good AND nefarious purposes. So you get some level of "hiding in the noise".

Add in the ability to move it around the world easily, its liquidity and transaction volume and you have just about the perfect grey / black activity currency.

I would argue that many criminals don’t care if you know who they are. Plus cash doesn’t “scale”. Try ransomwaring millions of computers and cashing out with untraceable money.

Criminals don’t care if there’s a record of their transactions because trans-national law enforcement is basically non existent. You got ransomwared from Ukraine? Nobody cares. Until, apparently, you cause havoc across the eastern seaboard by infecting a few corporate machines associated with a gas pipeline.

> When I’m doing crime, I strongly prefer there to be no record of the transaction. The closer I can get to an assurance there is no permanent record of the transaction, the safer I feel in deviating from the law.

You're exactly right about this, which is why it's important to remember that a plurality (majority?) of those who speculate in cryptocurrencies don't seem to be especially aware of the whole "immutable, irrefutable public ledger" aspect.