> It's a model not a fact. As a model, it can't really be correct only more or less accurate.
This is not true. Models of an external world may be only more or less accurate, but models of other models may be true or false. Mathematical proofs rely on this. Rationality itself is a model so models of rationality may be true or false.
Unless you have very peculiar and idiosyncratic definition of the world model, I am fairly confident that what you are saying doesn't make much sense.
In economy in a way that is not dissimilar to physics, model has a precise meaning. To quote Wikipedia, it is a simplified version of reality that allows us to observe, understand, and make predictions about economic behavior. You can't have a model of a model. That just doesn't really make sense.
> Mathematical proofs rely on this
I'm confused by what you want to say here. Mathematical proofs don't use models.
Every proved statements in mathematics can be built from axioms which are presupposed true applying logical rules which are themselves part of the axiomatic system. Saying that something is mathematically proved basically means that given this set of rules we can build up to that point.
> Rationality itself is a model
Once again I'm fairly lost by what you are trying to mean. I'm fairly certain that for most accepted meaning of the world model and the world rationality, rationality is in fact not a model in the same way that a dog is not a theory.
> Once again I'm fairly lost by what you are trying to mean.
You may want to look up the difference between formal models and informal models.
Since both rationality and the paper showing that it is bounded are based on formal models, it is reasonable to assume this is what we are talking about.
Sorry, I don't understand your argument. Are you actually talking about rational choice theory?
> Since both rationality and the paper showing that it is bounded are based on formal models
There is no paper showing that "rationality" is bounded. Models use to consider actors making purely rational choices in the sense that they are always optimizing their utility functions using all available information. Bounded rationility is a different way of modeling actors choice function. It's just a different model. There is no model of models.
Still I don't see what any of that has to do with the difference between formal and informal models. Informal model is a term I have never heard used outside of policy discussion. It's basically dress up for "because the expert said so".
It's a fact many people believe themselves rational and use models expecting rational actors. Proof lacks that it actually works that way. The opposite is often most probable since you rarely have perfect knowledge in practice. Exceptions can be games like tic-tac-toe and chess.
I mean everyone know it doesn't really work that way.
The actual question is: does viewing the average actor as trying to perfectly optimise their utility function using all the information available constitute a good estimation of how actors work in aggregate and does it yield accurate and interesting predictions?
The real insight of Simon in Models of Man is not that actors are not in fact perfectly rational. It's that you can actually model the limits of actors while keeping a fairly rigorous and manageable formalization.
I'll have to read Simon, but I'll be looking for some stable types of responses to uncertainty, not rational but adaptive: reversion to past/training, confusion, overreaction, etc. ie something prevalent enough that it can be reasoned about.
It's a model not a fact. As a model, it can't really be correct only more or less accurate.