Everything you mentioned goes back to my point that it's an anonymity service, not a privacy service. Tor exit nodes don't know who sent traffic, but they do see all the traffic that passes through them.
HTTPS can mitigate some of that, just like it can for VPNs, but the site you're going to is still very much visible.
Don't get me wrong, Tor is a very useful service if anonymity is your goal, but it requires a solid understanding of what can go wrong, which torproject provides a decent list for: https://support.torproject.org/faq/staying-anonymous/
> HTTPS can mitigate some of that, just like it can for VPNs, but the site you're going to is still very much visible.
Not in a sense that defeats privacy, since the exit node doesn't know the sender.
With Tor and HTTPS, no Tor node sees the cleartext data, and no node can associate me with the server I'm contacting. That sounds very much private to me.
With Tor the site you are going to is visible, but not who you are (there actually are some quibbles with this, but those don't seem to be your better argument); that someone--somewhere out there--is accessing a specific site doesn't seem to be particularly secret information. I think Tor might tend to use a single circuit for all of your traffic, which allows for correlations, but that is trivially fixable (you can hash the websites you are accessing to multiple circuits that egress with separate exit nodes, so you don't provide the attacker that information).
HTTPS can mitigate some of that, just like it can for VPNs, but the site you're going to is still very much visible.
Don't get me wrong, Tor is a very useful service if anonymity is your goal, but it requires a solid understanding of what can go wrong, which torproject provides a decent list for: https://support.torproject.org/faq/staying-anonymous/