It really depends on what your threat model is and whether you intend to use the TPM to begin with. If not, you really don't care about the security of any cryptography as long as the output is valid enough to satisfy whatever application is using the TPM.
Creating an adversarial relationship between the user and vendor is a
debasement of security principles. Now, Windows is the threat model
and that's why "mandating" this was the wrong choice altogether.
Microsoft could even have sold this as a feature. The fact that they
chose instead to push it on users tells you everything you need to
know about the future of users' relationship with their products. The
perimeter of my security ends where Microsoft begins.
It really depends on what your threat model is and whether you intend to use the TPM to begin with. If not, you really don't care about the security of any cryptography as long as the output is valid enough to satisfy whatever application is using the TPM.