So there are information theoretic ways to certify that media is genuine, if you assume trust at least somewhere in the process. Basically just cryptographic signing.
For instance, a camera sensor could be designed such that every image that is captured on the sensor gets signed by the sensor at the hardware level, with a certificate that is embedded by the manufacturer. Then any video released could be verified against a certificate provided by the manufacturer. Of course, you have to trust the manufacturer, but that’s an easier pill to swallow (and better supported by our legal framework) than having to try and authenticate each video you watch independently.
There are issues that can arise (what if I put a screen in front of a real camera??, what if the CIA compromises the supply chain???), but at the end of the day it makes attacks much more challenging than just running some deepfake software. So there are things that can be done, we’re not destined for a post truth world where we can’t trust any media we see.
I'll probably get downvoted into oblivion for mentioning blockchain tech, but this might at least help, maybe not in its current form but... I did not follow that project, but there do exist some concepts in this direction, e.g. this: https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/12/numbers-protocols-blockcha...
The idea of having a public record that attests to when an event happened is interesting, although not sure it has to be blockchain for it to be useful.
That's helpful for the legal system, but it's not going to help for attacks designed to cause mass panic/unrest/revolts. If another US president wants to attempt a coup, it'll be much more successful if they're competent and determined enough to produce deepfakes that support their narrative.
The only way to prevent stuff like that is to educate the public and teach people how important it is to be skeptical of anything they see on the internet. Even then, human emotions are a hell of a drug so idk how much it'd help.
US Presidents have had the ability to make false claims based on video of something completely different, create material using actors and/or compromised communications, stage events or use testimony that information has been obtained via secret channels from appointees heading up agencies whose job it is to obtain information via secret channels for a long time now.
If anything, recent events suggests the opposite: deepfakes can't be that much of a game changer when an election candidate doesn't even have to try to manufacture evidence to get half the people who voted for him to believe his most outlandish claims.
For instance, a camera sensor could be designed such that every image that is captured on the sensor gets signed by the sensor at the hardware level, with a certificate that is embedded by the manufacturer. Then any video released could be verified against a certificate provided by the manufacturer. Of course, you have to trust the manufacturer, but that’s an easier pill to swallow (and better supported by our legal framework) than having to try and authenticate each video you watch independently.
There are issues that can arise (what if I put a screen in front of a real camera??, what if the CIA compromises the supply chain???), but at the end of the day it makes attacks much more challenging than just running some deepfake software. So there are things that can be done, we’re not destined for a post truth world where we can’t trust any media we see.