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If the security of your military operations are vulnerable to "random nobodys running bots that post on Twitter," your operations aren't secure in the slightest, because any slightly competent adversary can do exactly the same thing - and they probably already were.

If you're on a sensitive military operation and are broadcasting anything - not just ADS-B, but any sort of radio emissions - someone will notice you. Radio blackouts have been a part of secret operations for a long, long while.

Either you're broadcasting and therefore don't care who knows you're there, or you care to not be detected and don't broadcast anything. Those are the options.

Twitter has nothing to do with it.



> If the security of your military operations are vulnerable to "random nobodys running bots that post on Twitter," your operations aren't secure in the slightest, because any slightly competent adversary can do exactly the same thing - and they probably already were.

Which is the exact message of the OP:

> Adversaries no longer need to rely on expensive radars to find U.S. military aircraft. The accessibility of this information demands a review of U.S. military operational security practices....

> Compromise Needed

> The information adversaries can derive from unsecured aviation data is far too revealing of mission-critical operations and movements. The Department of Defense (DoD), FAA, and other stakeholders need to reach a compromise that better balances aircraft safety and operational security. This agreement also should be coordinated with international air safety organizations such as the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and perhaps NATO as a standard operating procedure. A possible compromise could entail a peacetime mode in which ADS-B altitude and bearing data is transmitted but identifying information harmful to operational security is stripped out and a wartime mode in which DoD reserves the right to turn off ADS-B transponders in the vicinity of conflict zones.

There's tension between the needs of civilian air safety and military operational security. You don't want your military aircraft tracked, but you also don't want airliners colliding with them, either.

> Twitter has nothing to do with it.

Twitter demonstrates the problem in an eye-catching way.


Inventing a problem that doesn’t exist.

Military aircraft have controls on their dashboards for turning individual systems off as required. Turning off ADS-B would be the first thing on the checklist for sensitive flights, and one of the things that are turned on purposefully when entering friendly airspace.

It would surprise me if military transponders do not have the ability to broadcast “I am a Cessna at 3000ft” regardless whether the actual aircraft is a F35 or a Galaxy.

cf the usual copypasta about the SR-71 crew asking ATC for an altitude and speed reading. They use the broadcast radio systems because they want you to know they’re there.


> Military aircraft have controls on their dashboards for turning individual systems off as required. Turning off ADS-B would be the first thing on the checklist for sensitive flights, and one of the things that are turned on purposefully when entering friendly airspace.

Yeah, of course, but that doesn't mean there still isn't an issue. If you read the article, you'd see that it was talking about stuff like military aircraft having their transponders on in friendly airspace over countries like Germany.


> Twitter demonstrates the problem in an eye-catching way.

To the populace, sure it’s “visible” now. But adversaries are just doing what they’ve always done - why rely on Twitter, which could be censored by the USA.


I wonder how effective such tactics really are. Surely you know which airport the plane came from and where it went. And then can have estimation of speed, acceleration and climb rates. Giving somewhat a picture of type of craft used.


Assuming the data is from ADS-B, you have real-time location data. Of course, it's self-reported, so won't be always be available.


Ok but you don’t have to do the heavy lifting _for_ them. Make them do the hard work and we’ll probably “smoke some out” to recycle a line by one our colloquial yokel ex-presidents once said.


It's not heavy lifting. It's not hard work. It's turning on a radio receiver.


Heavy or light, let them do the work. Don't do it for them.


If military security can be defeated by someone with a $20 dongle and a raspberry pi, they should find a different strategy, not kindly ask people to protect them.


Or, given that there isn't any stealth to be had, you inject some noise into the system to deflate the value of the intelligence.


I always use the third option: broadcast fake data




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