So this was disclosed November 11 (edit: or maybe May 13 as per green text?) and became public yesterday November 30. Leaves little time for Android devices to get the new key no?
This isn't the kind of security issue where disclosing it allows new attackers to start exploiting it - because new attackers haven't compromised the keys.
So there's little reason to keep the compromise secret, except to let your partners save face.
>Leaves little time for Android devices to get the new key no?
It's not so simple, also rotating the keys could affect how devices get app updates, depending on whether or not an app has a V3 signature or not. V3 signature scheme supports key rotation, older schemes do not. OEMs are not required to sign system apps with V3 signatures. The minimum signature scheme version for apps targeting API level 30+ on the system partition is V2.
Affected OEMs can still rotate the cert used to sign their system apps that have V2 signatures and then push an OTA update to deliver the updated apps. Then they can push app updates with that new cert, but devices that haven't received OTAs won't receive those app updates.
I think for the industry as a whole there should be some penalty or disincentive for going "we're no longer providing updates" and then "we lost the key that gives full access to the system".