The FAA raised a huge stink recently because they weren’t ready for 5G rollout and were worried that the altimeter radar would give false readings on approach to landing.
Agencies — even when in the wrong — can throw their weight around and demand that the FCC ban things.
Consumers like you and me have no real representation in government so we have no political clout and can’t throw our weight around to demand simpler legislation.
> The FAA raised a huge stink recently because they weren’t ready for 5G rollout and were worried that the altimeter radar would give false readings on approach to landing.
If the FAA didn't do its job and certified altimeters that shouldn't have been, as the 5G rollout was announced and previsible, maybe they should start working instead of complaining that others help them do their job?
Also, if all it takes to mess with altimeters is a rogue 5G cell, the right approach is to harden the altimeters, instead of hoping no 5G cell ever will be misconfigured or pushed wrong configuation parameters by a enemy country or ransomware hacker group.
> Also, if all it takes to mess with altimeters is a rogue 5G cell, the right approach is to harden the altimeters, instead of hoping no 5G cell ever will be misconfigured or pushed wrong configuation parameters by a enemy country or ransomware hacker group.
Wow, that is a lot of misconception about the threat model and real issue at hand packed into a single sentence.
First of all, great, let's say you're right. How do you harden the existing altimeters out there, equipped on thousands of aircraft? These are sensitive, tightly controlled and life-critical instruments. Radar altimeters have been in use for decades, almost a century now, and so the FAA is for the most part talking about already installed altimeters which were designed far before 5G was ever a thing. Likely most of their designs will not readily accommodate hardening against new kinds of RF interference. If you managed to patch all the different kinds out there and get fixes pushed out, that'd be a great effort in labor, logistics, and certification. Of course, one could simply replace the old radar altimeters with new ones, at a much greater cost too.
Separately from the difficulty of actual hardening, there's the question to be asked of, why ask old technology to adapt to new one when we can adapt the new technology to suit the old? Especially because, again, these are safety critical instruments that you don't wanna mess with, whereas 5G towers are much better suited to new experiments or fixes, or just being designed correctly and safely from the get go when the technology hasn't even launched yet.
And then, why do you think this is a security issue, as in an attacker aiming to disrupt air travel? You must be aware that most all aviation radio comms are in the clear and extremely easy to jam and spoof, including critical instrument systems like ILS. That is not the threat model! The FAA is worried about interference from ordinary people trying to use their cellphones, rather than a specialized attacker targeting radar altimeters. Of course, because these are two very different situations!
You should do some reading on the altimeters in question. They were operating well outside their defined limits and parameters. If they had conformed to the specifications under which they were legally certified there would never have been a problem.
How do you harden the existing altimeters out there, equipped on thousands of aircraft?
What is the correct course of action when you discover thousands of pieces of vital equipment are badly defective? An immediate recall for all defective altimeters and, hopefully, fines for the vendors.
Agencies — even when in the wrong — can throw their weight around and demand that the FCC ban things.
Consumers like you and me have no real representation in government so we have no political clout and can’t throw our weight around to demand simpler legislation.