Many failures of complex systems originate in fabrication / maintenance rather than in operation. Flights are doomed from the start due to such defects.
The Columbia disaster is a partial exception --- the proximate triggering factor occurred during (very early) flight, but a deeper-cause analysis would include factors that originated on the ground in design, operations, and assessments of earlier incidents.
And also typically occurring on the ground / before the flight. Even where considerations such as crew resource management / cultures of deference (still a factor in recent air incidents, see Asiana 214 in 2013, for example).
Which itself encompasses a whole slew of factors: false beliefs, groupthink, politics, cultures of fear (or simply conformity), etc., etc.
What I find most interesting about discussions of all of these is that they are so broadly applicable, and are often the parts of incident post morta which are most generalisable to other domains and situations.
