Modern readers seem to misinterpret writings by virtue ethicists as self help, perhaps because much of modern "philosophical" discourse is just disguised therapy books.
These are descriptive, not prescriptive, when Aquinas says what perseverence means he doesn't tell you what to do to be virtuous, but what the virtue in itself is.
Although there are some prescriptions in the Summa (see Ia IIae Q38 as a prime example), Aquinas mostly left the study of the building of virtue to other writers, as it is a secondary matter.
Yes, as the aim is scientific (in the classical sense of the term), but he would be the first to reject the fact/value dichotomy. Meaning, the understanding of the good is understanding what is desirable.
There is a different way to think about it which is that the work could in principle be better structured to automatically be associated with more pleasure.
I'm reminded of the sunk cost fallacy.