I think you are exaggerating Russian problems quite a bit. It’s certainly more stable than in 1990s or early 2000s. The peace deal will very likely force Ukraine and consequently its allies to recognize acquisitions at least de facto (Crimea may get formal recognition). Even if they won’t, there’s no plausible scenario in which Russia will lose this territory. Demographics — yes, but immigration may solve it for a while. 1 million people „brain drain“ wasn’t the right number anyway and there’s ongoing correction: many continued to work for Russian companies, some are returning back now disillusioned by the West,
> Even if they won’t, there’s no plausible scenario in which Russia will lose this territory.
Didn't the brightest minds in the Kremlin believe that the last time too?
There are many plausible scenarios, such as the worsening of socio-economic conditions, to the point where local governments stop following the central government and begin implementing their own policies shaped by local grassroots movements, leading to the total loss of control by Moscow. A repeat of 1989-1991. In that turmoil, nobody will care about Donbas or Crimea, as long as they can have food on their table.
We seem to be seeing the same recipe in action: extremely costly war for no clear purpose, economic stagnation, de facto bankruptcies of entire large sectors like mining and metallurgy.
Missing ingredients: low oil prices over extended time periods (6 years in the 1980s).
I'm not sure all of the previous posters points were thought out.
The 1,000,000 casualties thing keeps popping up, but nobody can confirm this. We have to take Ukrainian sources at their word. Regardless of who you support, during a conflict you have to take BOTH sides claims with a pinch of salt. They are both producing fanatical numbers right now, because those numbers have the dual purpose of inspiring morale amongst those still fighting.
The brain drain caused by the mass exodus of Russians fearing conscription isn't permanent. Already many of these people have returned.
The Wagner Coup didn't amount to much. It got half way before they worked out they didn't have the means, stopped, and the leader was killed and the group restructured within the Russian military.
They lost influence with neighbours, but honestly did they ever really have much in Europe anyway?
In my view Europe loses, because it's completely beholden to Russian energy interests. Now that those are gone, they are paying higher back-marked rates for the same oil and gas (via other routes), or more expensive American energy. This is exacerbating cost of living crises continent wide and is boosting fringe political parties who will cascade the damage (and who are also, in many cases, Russian influenced and funded).
I don't have any stake or real investment in this (although I don't think invading forces should get what they want), but I feel the other poster does.
Agree on most of that. However, I do not think energy is the European problem. It's painful, for sure, but migration is something bigger politically (and see recent Economist on that). Russia did play a role in that, but it's the flawed system with which nobody is happy that drives the fringe parties to success.
As for housing crisis, that's something that is defined by how markets work currently - where political influence buys squeeze in building permits and good profits from speculating on this market buy political influence. And of course, there's dual market structure in many cities with subsidized housing that reduces pressure for reform for significant number of voters. We need a big political reboot to overcome that and transition from old party structure practically everywhere, it is already happening, it is uncomfortable to see due to uncertainties in this process, but it is good. The war may have some effect on that, accelerating the process.
There will be one at some point. There is no plausible scenario in which it will be favorable for Ukraine: the West missed the moment to build up military production to match and surpass Russian capacity, so there is zero chance that there will be any military wins. And sanctions don’t work, that should have been pretty clear by now to anyone who sees the numbers. It is all about damage control and how many Ukrainians will have to die before Western politicians will accept inevitable.
Even if that's true, the content you assume will be in it (even before considering the probability of your predicted content being wrong) may have as much bearing for Russia (or any othe nation’s) near term prospects as the eventual content of the peace deals ending the Israeli-Palestinian war or the US-North Korea war have on any nation’s near-term prospects.
Russia can sustain this war for 4 years more politically (they probably have to finish by 2029, a year before elections), maybe 2-3 years more militarily and economically. I won’t be so sure that Ukraine can last that long, because Ukraine does have people problem and Russia does not. Ukraine even with Western supplies gets a fraction of what Russia currently produces in ammo, missiles, tanks etc. So there is no reason for Russia to accept shitty terms. They may pay 200-300B from the frozen money in „reconstruction support“, but that’s it.
If there was any significant difference in their combination of industrial supply and battlefield effectiveness, the front line wouldn't be so slow-moving.
> There is no plausible scenario in which it will be favorable for Ukraine
If this is true, we're doomed. Everyone will want to have nuclear weapons in order not to end up like Ukraine. After that point it's just a matter of time until something goes wrong.
It is unlikely that we will see new nuclear powers. It's not an easy job. We can be sure that Israel or North Korea won't give up, but that does not mean they are going to use the weapons or there will be a full-blown intercontinental war. Looking at current progress in space tech, in 30-40 years the ultimate WMD will be kinetic space weapons anyway.
North Korea and South Africa* getting nukes are both independent proofs that it's not hard for a nation to get nukes. I've seen credible commentators suggesting Ukraine itself is only months away, if it chooses that path.
Less credibly, because the Russian government says a lot that isn't really true, Medvedev has been quoted saying "a number of countries are ready to directly supply Iran with their own nuclear warheads".
Once you've got a fission bomb, by all accounts it's not that hard to use it as a primary to power a fusion bomb.
A single 1 MT bomb detonating at low orbital altitude above central USA would likely cause enough physical damage to the power grid to kill 60-90% of the population within a year, even with no shockwave getting anywhere near the ground.
> North Korea and South Africa* getting nukes are both independent proofs that it's not hard for a nation to get nukes
Define „hard“ then. Both started early in 1960s, both had access to uranium (North Korea is actually mining it - not every country can do that), both used foreign support for their nuclear programs. Neither achieved ICBM range to deliver nuclear warheads to any location on this planet or had submarine component. Ukraine may have theoretical ability to design and produce nuclear weapons, but it is a technologically advanced nation far ahead of many developing countries and it is not going to have resources for a nuclear program any time soon being heavily dependent on foreign aid.
There was no military coup 2 years ago, just a failed mercenary raid in which the army was not even involved. Leaders of that raid are now dead. It was an interesting moment in history, but it actually demonstrated resilience of the regime.
>the regime can collapse at any moment
How exactly? What evidence do you have for it? All even marginally visible opposition is pushed out of the country and became irrelevant, some are dead, many convicted in absentia to decade-long prison sentences. Mass protests are rare and practically never challenge the order, mainly aiming at some local problems. From economic perspective there are some problems, but as a matter of fact inequality is now lower than before the war thanks to generous payouts to veterans and their families, who may have never seen that money in their life.
