That shifts the argument from evidence to speculation. The original claim was about current operations, not hypothetical futures. If there is no proof that everyone on such a graph is now targeted, then the central accusation falls apart. Counterterrorism systems generate far more leads than they act on, and those leads are filtered by human review and corroborating intelligence.
Suggesting “who knows what the future may bring” is not an argument about present facts. Policy and oversight should be debated on actual documented use, not on imagined scenarios.
> Counterterrorism systems generate far more leads than they act on, and those leads are filtered by human review and corroborating intelligence.
From Wikipedia on Lavender:
> The Guardian quoted one source: "I would invest 20 seconds for each target at this stage, and do dozens of them every day. I had zero added-value as a human, apart from being a stamp of approval. It saved a lot of time."
