I've been looking at the photo, and I think the description is incorrect. I don't think it's a cellphone. It looks to me like a 2-way radio.

I can't see any keypad, and it has what looks like a very small display, stubby antenna, and PTT switch on the side. It looks very much like the cheap Chinese FRS or GPRS radios you see in some import stores here in the 'States.

Some of those radios can be set up with squelch codes (similar to PL tones or CTCSS) so that a receiver won't break squelch unless a transmitter set to the same code uses the channel. That would be a fairly reliable short-range detonation mechanism, and it would explain why the Coalition jammers work without setting them off.

At any rate, it sure doesn't look like a cell phone to me.

I was thinking the same thing when I was looking at the photo. Glad to see someone else thought the same...

I think you are right, but that picture is pretty blurry.

A very interesting read on IEDS here: http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/007046.html

it's one of the older models - I used to live in Afghanistan and you could get the very old models of cellphones still in mint condition (case in point, I still have one with me) - I remember being in a hotel when all my signal went away - it turned out that President Karzai was having a meeting next door! :)

I've never been to Iraq and I don't know very many veterans that can confirm this, but I do know from my PhD research that this problem is not an easy one to solve.

As was mentioned in another post, these explosive devices are improvised, so once our deployed forces come up with a solution to a problem, the terrorists are quick to try another method. They have infra-red triggers, trip wires, pressure plates, RF triggers, and possibly using other forms of wavelengths. Some wavelengths are particularly hard to jam because they interfere with our troops' own communication systems. Plus these jamming systems are expensive and high powered which is not easily scalable.

The Washington Post ran an excellent series in which they talked about the difficulty of this problem [1]. As for me, I'm doing my PhD research on trying to stop these acts of violence prematurely. So even though this technology isn't immediately deployable, we're looking at other types of sensing technologies that can "see" explosives devices from a stand-off distance, particularly > 50meters.

[1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/leftofbo...

Hi, I've been there, and seen more than one up close.

You're right - there are a number of triggering methods in use, to include IR, GPRS/"family band" radio, and cell. More sophisticated devices use a combination, like cell arming and IR/pressure plate/trip cord detonation. Simple command-wire detonation begat command-wire with a stand-off cell phone arming unit. This was so we couldn't follow wires to the bomber. For a time fake command wires were set up and boobytrapped. When we stopped following wires, they'd do it again. Or use something really simple like a washing machine timer for a regularly scheduled convoy.

In Afghanistan (at least 5 years ago), "long range cordless" was a popular option in remote areas without cell grids. These are Chinese-made cordless phones operating in the 20-40mhz frequencies with ranges of 10 miles or more. These are also popular in areas of Iraq without cell infrastructure.

It is a cat and mouse game of trigger mechanisms versus detection/deterrent. New detonation methods would show up all the time, with various techniques being popular in different regions at any given time (in both Iraq and Afghanistan). New methods are analyzed, equipment is designed to counter, companies bid on devices, and the countermeasures are pushed into the warzone as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, in my experience, these devices are always behind the curve.

It wouldn't be a good idea for me to go into detail about what these detection and deterrence methods do specifically. Sufficed to say I browsed this article's responses and didn't run into any suggestions or techniques that I hadn't personally used or seen implemented.

There's a wide variety of communications equipment insurgents have access to, because there aren't Iraqi or Afghan equivalents of the FCC. There is access to consumer radios and devices of all frequencies and outputs in these countries. The entire spectrum is game. I don't think there's a magic deterrent or detection method here.

Our best bet was always to schedule movements and map routes as erratically and randomly as possible. If we could, we would mix vehicle movements with foot and air movement. Keeping a good relationship with locals and randomizing movement as much as possible proved much more valuable than using the hottest new gizmo. Pulling over and buying a soda from a street vendor and chatting with the local police generally yielded better information about the road ahead than sitting sealed in an armored vehicle staring at computer displays.

Thanks for your confirmation. I feel like lots of science and engineering projects could benefit a great deal from having a veteran on their team. Your insight is truly valuable.

As for the rest of the hacker community, I can see no better example of the importance of the "release-early-release-often" motto. It's frustrating for me as a scientist sometimes working on technology that has years of development time, when people's lives are immediately at stake.

I sincerely hope the military is getting more of a hacker-mindset.

IED - The I stands for improvised.

It would be pretty stupid to only have one method of detonating a bomb now wouldn't it?

For every cell-phone detonator, there are hundreds of less sophisticated weapons. Simple mines, pressure switches, springs, tripwires, etc etc.

It is near impossible to defend against a booby trap. It's far more effective to ensure survivability. This of course has the unfortunate side effect of encouraging larger bombs.

Ergo: the reason troops moved in Humvees early in the conflict; now use RG-31's (or equivalent) or when available, helicopters.

well it doesn't hurt to remove some of their options. + with the overflight, they'd probably catch a large number of these bomb makers

Those are resources that could be better used elsewhere, to be honest. Aircraft are always in short supply.

You can also realize that the problem is already solved: US vehicles already have jamming equipment.

The problem is hardly solved.

* Each jammer is different and caters to a specific type of detonator, or group of detonators.

* Effective ranges aren't large enough.

* Lack of proper training for soldiers means most have no idea if the jamming device is even working; many keep them off because they interfere with radios, etc.

* The lag time between new jammer tech and proper fielding is a year+ in many cases. I rarely road in a vehicle with the "latest and greatest".

Solved as in "That's good enough for now, we'll keep working on it."

Certainly more feasible that random flybys.

More feasible than flybys? Certainly. Good enough for now? It will be, when my friends stop getting blown up.

No offence intended, I'm ex-infantry myself.

But yeah, good enough for the time being, until something more practical can be implemented. Sucks that not being perfect means people die, but you will never win a chess match if you try not to lose a single piece.

I don't see this catching more than a tiny percentage of them. What would be the point in leaving a cellphone connected to the explosives while you were working on it? Even without specific safety precautions, it seems unlikely that most would do this -- it would take extra effort to be vulnerable to this tactic.

> "and might blow up a number of terrorists in the process."

... and civilians. Hearts and minds anyone?

The overflight followed by an explosion would even leave observers with the impression the US was dropping ordnance on civilian centers. All bad.

My guesss is - assuming terrorists aren't complete idiots - that they keep the phone off until the very last moment precisely for that reason, the 'wrong connection' incoming call that sets off their bomb. See below for an easy fix to that.

This is an awesome idea. But planes are not needed. Just get the cellphone company to ring all phones in the area at once, every one hour or so.

If you can get the cellphone companies to cooperate: develop a system that inhibits cellphones ringing in the vicinity of moving convoys. You can use a system that sends GPS coords to a computer, which then sends (encrypted challenge-response) inhibit messages to the towers close by the convoy.

Although this solution and the solutions mentioned in the above threads are technically sound, I am aghast at the sincerity with which they were suggested.

It is not appropriate to interfere with such a crucial piece of infrastructure. In developing countries especially, cell phones are the only link many people have. They run their small businesses, allow people to call family to see if they have been hurt, etc.

Would you tolerate something like this in your Country? Shut down the internet for a little while to prevent a terrorist threat?

In many cities, specialized police units either already have or are in the process of being issued cell phone jamming units.

They are being issued with these sorts of scenarios specifically in mind. If the police think there's a bomb somewhere, set to be triggered via cell phone, damn right I'd want them to block the cell phones in the local area to keep it from going off.

The problem with cell jamming technology isn't when it's being used to stop bombs from going off, the risk is that it'll be used for more trivial purposes.

Judging by most American's acquiescence to security demands since 2001, probably.

Note that the posts above are not advocating disabling the cell network, but they are instead advocating autodialing -- something that is regularly tolerated (although despised) in the U.S.

According to the article, the military is already jamming cell signals along caravan routes, but one has to wonder if it's even noticeable to the locals, given that cell phones are inherently unreliable, especially in mountainous regions. Cell phone jammers are in regular use in other countries, purely for the convenience of their owners: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_phone_jammer

I keep wondering how sophisticated the insurgents are. If they have some savvy equipment and know-how they can easily modify the software to reject calls from anyone but a hardcoded number.

Well, let me give you an idea how sophisticated they could easily be: Where I live (netherlands) we have a whole bunch of cell phone operators and they all cell their phones together with subscriptions based on sim-lock. These sim-locked phones are usually pretty expensive models sold at a great discount, so there is now a cottage industry of sim-locked phone unlockers.

These people are all at about the same level of tech as the satellite code crackers a couple of years ago, and it isn't rare to see top of the line scopes, all kinds of specialized soldering equipment (including vacuum smd soldering stations) and laptops full of software geared towards getting a cell phone to do something it really doesn't want to do.

This involves forced firmware upgrades, replacing chips on the board (usually eeproms or flashed chips with blank ones to be able to trick the firmware into thinking it is on a new, unused phone).

If any one of these guys gave a seminar for a week or so the 'bad guys' would be in the possession of all the knowledge and gear they would need to do just about anything they wanted, short of rewriting the phones OS completely. And they wouldn't need that because in their world simpler is better, and writing software is a complicated business.

It would be pretty dumb if all you had to do to set it off was ring the phone. One wrong number and you're done.

Surely the vast majority of IED's aren't remotely triggered. I would surmise that simple trip wires or pressure triggers would be the norm.