Thanks for this great work-- I spend a lot of time thinking about this stuff and enjoy reading other people's takes on how to deal with the impossibility of finding the One True Metric to rule them all.
To keep myself sharp looking out for the perverse incentives, I have to remind myself: don't be a slave to the metrics. We're data-informed, not data-driven. Data informs; people drive.
That was a much better take on Goodhart's Law than the Wikipedia article. It's easy to give up and say "Measurement is impossible!" but really we have to balance different factors and measurements are more dangerous at some times than at others.
Reducing a situation to a single measurement hides the dimensionality. I think intuition accounts for more kinds of measurement albeit less accurate or describable.
Not OP but that should probably render as: s ∈ A if M(s) >= c
So: s (system state) is a member of A (permissible region) if M(s) (proxy measure of s since we can't directly observe it) is greater than or equal to c (threshold)
"You get what you measure" is the bane of KPIs everywhere. Measure deals closed, and you get deals with no regard for profitability. Measure profitability, and you will burn through your customer base by jacking prices and cutting quality. Etc etc.
When I interviewed for a data analyst position at a known startup, I was asked to define a target KPI for a controlled pseudo-A/B experiment, and I suggested total revenue. The interviewer replied "that's a dumb answer because revenue can be gamed; you should have said # of sales."
I was too taken aback to follow up asking why # of sales can't be gamed too.
Number of sales (or customers) is a vanity metric favored by startups looking to entice investment. Revenue is a metric useful for measuring actual business health.
Any chance the interviewer was overly exit eager ?
Why is that credit? Good interview questions don't have a right or wrong answer, they have a right or wrong process of coming up with an answer. Especially for a question like "Pick a metric," almost any relevant metric is defensible and has tradeoffs, and the question should be about how the interviewee analyzes engineering tradeoffs, gathers requirements, defends their initial proposal, and is open to counterarguments.
(If there's a correct answer, you can just give them a quiz. If there's a Googleable correct answer, you can just employ them and give them Google.)
But of course, "If you can't measure it, you can't manage it", said by Drucker, says EVERYONE. Hence the cherry picking of preferential KPIs or OKRs.
But, actually, Drucker didn't say it. In fact, W. Edwards Deming said it. And what he actually said was "It is wrong to suppose that if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it – a costly myth.". So, basically, the quote held up as the "reason" behind excessive over-tracking of the wrong thing... is wrong.
That’s why organisations need leaders who can change the direction having realised that the current state had degraded to being gamed.
Seek revenue, then seek new clients but not revenue, then go on R&D spree. People are not going to be happy, but the organisation is going to be healthy.
IMO there must be high-level metrics which define which low-level metrics are valuable today.
It's getting weirder when you factor in shareholder value: sacrificing the future of the company for looking good in all the fashionable metrics might be exactly the leaders job, depending on how the board is made up.
Doing so in a large software company would likely result in Sales & Marketing being empowered. Which in turn will likely lead to technical debt (as the company stretches to meet impractical promises), as well as stagnation in Engineering (S&M are delivering on the metrics, so they get promoted).
In general, large organizations are like an AI. In this case, making a goal that won't backfire when applied without thought is really difficult.
That's why the goal in so many large public companies becomes "Make the stock price go up." If the stock price goes up, the executives and everyone else in the company with stock can unload it, take the cash, and let the new shareholders deal with any long-term consequences of their actions.
That’s technically correct but it’s like saying we shouldn’t have an obesity crisis because anyone who eats less than they burn will reliably lose weight. We have too much evidence about human nature to treat something which happens so commonly as an edge case.
the problem with figuring out how the numbers are being achieved is that, without tracking everything totally and fully, you'll be reliant on some kind of estimate/measure. Which can also then be gamed.
Before the VW diesel cheating scandal, it was alleged that US manufacturers were taking advantage of the EPA's test cycle procedure to "tune" ECM values when the dome light was active.
More than that, CAFE standards have become the ceiling for fuel economy rather than the envisioned floor. Manufacturers game the system by classifying certain cars as SUVs, claiming extra credit for the ability to run E85, or practically giving away efficient but undesirable vehicle configurations in order to just meet the target and avoid the gas guzzler tax.
The breaking of this law when one uses profit as the measure of a successful company or business is why I think that a well set up market system actually works. People and companies can set up making a profit as their target and it is still a good measure of success, because it is actually what you want.
The key for a good society is regulating the places where making max profits can induce bad behavior and leaving alone where it does not. A hard thing to get right but forcing people to inform you of the ingredients of food for sale, is an example of a good regulation I think.
Even disregarding the potential for negative externalities etc., profit alone can still be a terrible KPI.
I worked for a large engineering consultancy that was very profit motivated. They figured out a brilliant way to maximise profit: get rid of business development! Only pay for work when clients are paying you to do it. This was GREAT for quarterly profit margins, at the expense of the project pipeline.
As the pipeline dried up, they figured out a new way to maximize profit: get rid of engineers! The customers are big, stupid organisations, and it'll take them a long time to notice. You can totally maximise quarterly profit margins until they do.
And that's how you can simultaneously be highly profitable and in a corporate death spiral.
Moral of the story: reality is a fundamentally complex place. You need multiple KPIs to get a handle on it -- and ideally those KPIs should be mutually contradictory enough to force you to engage with that complexity head-on, rather than boiling things down to game-able metrics which ultimately will defeat themselves because they are such a poor proxy for reality.
I would say the complexity is in balancing profit over time. Here is your contradictory force. In the end that large engineering consultancy was making zero profit and was worth nothing. Whether running a business into the ground will give you more overall profit than just selling it and putting the money into government bonds is something one can consider, but in your case was the consultancy owned by the people making these short-term profit maximizing decisions? The agent/principal problem for companies has not been solved.
It is probably not a coincidence that the top 6 US companies by market cap (Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft, Facebook, Berkshire Hathaway) are still run by their founders or were run by their founders for most of the companies existence before a recent step-down (Microsoft) or death (Apple). Most public companies aren't and they struggle to grow or even survive over time.
> in your case was the consultancy owned by the people making these short-term profit maximizing decisions[?]
It was a publicly-listed company, so that'd be a yes.
Profit is obviously over time a necessary condition for making a sustainable business. But it's definitely not a sufficient condition. I think there are a huge number of people who don't understand this.
Eg.: when I see people clambering for TSLA to make a profit... I think they're wrong. Or, at least, mostly wrong. TSLA has been unprofitable in the service of dramatically (and rather effectively) expanding both capacity and market share. Those are excellent reasons to be unprofitable. And TSLA still obviously has a lot more room to grow in both respects, so in this situation, trading profitability for growth is a good decision. (exhibit A: Amazon)
>> in your case was the consultancy owned by the people making these short-term profit maximizing decisions[?]
>It was a publicly-listed company, so that'd be a yes.
I'm a bit confused. I stated that public companies are not often owned by the people who mange them and that is a real problem. You are asserting that all publicly-listed companies are managed by their owners. That is just wrong. I own both TSLA and AMZN and of course there are hundreds of things that need to be done to make a sustainable business. Just talking past each other at this point, I think.
Ah, sorry, you're correct. The company was owned by people who wanted short-term profit maximising decisions (its shareholders). The people actually making the decisions also owned shares, but nowhere near a controlling interest.
Anyhow, I agree with your point about companies that are controlled by founders (whether public or not). A (sufficiently pragmatic) visionary with a controlling interest can achieve things that no amount shareholder-focused governance can. Of course they can also drive a company into the ground faster than anyone -- but the heights are reserved for them.
Correct. "The key for a good society is regulating the places where making max profits can induce bad behavior and leaving alone where it does not." Start of the second paragraph.
The implication behind Goodhart's Law is that people are good at gaming performance measures. You can game profit measures too[1], but it's difficult and there are strong incentives not to. Another counter-example that doesn't involve fraud is Amazon, which was unprofitable for a long time.
The first thing anyone smart does when they make a metric is think about what rules or other measures have to be in place to prevent obvious gaming of the metric to the detriment of the real goal.
When this is done at scale to markets it's called "regulations."
Indeed this is the whole idea behind OKR. The Objectives are _supposed_ to be grand, audacious, and only achievable under extreme stretching. Furthermore, they are _supposed_ to not be used as a KPI for performance reviews.
I wish more people knew and understood this concept.
It's important to know the impact that you have on a system, especially at large scale. Decades after Goodhart made this law, we still have shoddy credit risk measures that put tens of trillions of dollars at risk just in the US alone. Hell, the last recession alone was mostly caused by the government's choice of credit worthiness metrics.
I'm not sure why you think these things are mutually exclusive. And as far as Goodhart's Law is concerned in this case, they're intertwined concepts.
The government's choice to allow securities rated by S&P/Moody's to be treated as gospel allowed/encouraged banks, insurance companies, GSE's and pension funds to take far more risk than was systemically reasonable.
Aren't there are exceptions? For example, a measure of health might be life expectancy. If this becomes known, is it no longer a good measure? I think it's still a good measure. I mean, how can you get to a life expectancy of 100 without a healthy population?
That's easy, though. If you're going for life expectancy, then there's plenty of things you can do.
1) Exclude deaths that'd hurt your life expectancy. For instance, by under counting infant mortality. E.g. does a child who dies during birth count against your life expectancy? Arguments can go both ways, but if your hospital's funding depends on having good life expectancy numbers in your community... well, there you go. IIRC this is one factor that helps explain Cuba's surprisingly high life expectancy numbers, though it doesn't account for most of it.
2) Overtreat end of life issues. Instead of focusing on quality of life and general health throughout the lifespan, put all your funding into heroic interventions that let 90 year olds live on artificial respiration for months. This is what the United States does.
3) Systematically deceive. Have a significant homeless population? Rural population that's deeply unhealthy? Make sure you put a ton of resources into measuring outcomes for your urban population with relatively good health access, and the peasants you miss are just a sign of not getting enough grant money from the WHO. Governments that put resources into getting measurements of the most marginal populations are penalized, while those that deprioritize studies of those marginal populations would have better numbers for their marketing brochures. Even though we'd expect the former to have actual better outcomes than the latter!
You can get a life expectancy of 100 by putting all your senior citizens (who are much more susceptible to infections, broken bones, etc) on IV nutrition in iron lungs in an intensive care wing. That would be awful.
Better to measure quality-adjusted life-years, in a way that accounts for the fact that it's sometimes better to take a risk of death with a possibility of full recovery over a guarantee of lost function.
I can't possibly enumerate all possible metrics and their effects, but I bet we could do pretty well at imagining faults for anything that can be constructed.
Life expectancy is actually a really great example of the opposite. People routinely claim our health system is bad compared to europe because our average life expectancy is lower.
It turns out african americans skew our metrics because they have
1) high infant mortality
2) high murder rates of young men
The high infant mortality is irrespective of wealth and has a disproportionate impact on average life expectancy because the death of a 0 age person has a huge impact on the average. When you look at the rest of the population, our whites are on par with europe and our asians are on par with asian countries.
One way this is gamed is that some countries have different standards for reporting infant mortality.
<<The infant mortality rate is defined as the number of deaths of children under one year of age, expressed per 1 000 live births. Some of the international variation in infant mortality rates is due to variations among countries in registering practices for premature infants. The United States and Canada are two countries which register a much higher proportion of babies weighing less than 500g, with low odds of survival, resulting in higher reported infant mortality. In Europe, several countries apply a minimum gestational age of 22 weeks (or a birth weight threshold of 500g) for babies to be registered as live births. This indicator is measured in terms of deaths per 1 000 live births.>>
In the US it is gamed in reverse in the sense that the average hides the true problem is with subpopulations and not the entire US medical system as a whole. Our (gamed) poor performance in this statistic is used as a measure to support moving to a substantially different system.
It's not like Europe doesn't have marginalized populations. Your argument is basically "if you exclude the parts of the US population that are worst treated by our healthcare system, then ours is the best!" There is something meaningful in comparing the "median" or "modal" health experience in different countries, but "we treat black people badly compared to white people in the USA so you have to only look at white statistics" is a terrible defense of the system.
Your point about infant mortality statistics being gamed is on point, though (and I pointed it out in a sibling commment).
Yes; the real problem is when a proxy is substituted for what is really wanted - for example, when lines of code written is taken for a measure of how much usefulness has been created, or the percentage graduated is taken as a measure of the effectiveness of education.
Proxies are not intrinsically bad, either, but they have to be difficult to achieve without also achieving what you really want - when this is not the case, making the proxy measurement a target motivates people to seek workarounds.
Life expectancy might be a proxy, but it is a pretty good one.
Another article on the front page decries Harvard’s holistic approach to admission - with arguments that admission should be based on a single measure of academic performance (like standardized test scores, GPA, etc.).
Yes, but holistic approaches have -also- become a target. Think of the over-achieving high schoolers doing as many extra-curriculars as possible just for their college application.
The most interesting approach I have seen as an alternative to current ones is the one that suggests emphasizing the student body of the school - leading parents to self integrate their K-12 schools on racial and socioeconomic factors. This would be unassailable under the current legal attacks used to fight against affirmative action.
That seems to happen in all wars. Aircraft downed and tanks destroyed in WWII, for example.
There were occasions in the Vietnam War where regions were declared to be free fire zones, and everyone within was to be killed, down to the last child and granny.
I'm sorry but this is a serious (and arguably offensive) falsehood.
A 'free fire' zone is an area wherein there is no requirement for soldiers to coordinate heavy arms fire with other units via HQ etc.. This is a very reasonable policy in jungle fights where units can come under ambush at any time, i.e. "We're in an ambush and we're about to die, can you ring up HQ to see if we can shoot back?"
But the notion that US forces would just designate an area where everyone including civilians are to be killed is an outright and offensive lie.
Though there are some situations in which Army Units did actively and knowingly fire on citizens, these are known and well documented tragedies of soldiers acting with fury in the moment agains villagers who were supporting insurgent forces - this was not and never was any kind of US policy, and the perpetrators faced Court Martial.
The Vietnam war is so completely misinterpreted in pop culture; even to this day, it's disturbing.
I'm sorry but this is a serious (and arguably offensive) falsehood.
I'm sorry, but I will show you to be mistaken below.
But the notion that US forces would just designate an area where everyone including civilians are to be killed is an outright and offensive lie.
Then you should have an issue with the Ken Burns documentary. I think I got the terminology wrong; "free fire zone" means something else. However, the practice I am referring -- that of designating everyone in a certain place as an enemy, then killing everyone within -- did happen.
From Ken Burn's "The Vietnam War" Part 5 narration: (00:44:43,393 --> 00:44:47,428)
In the summer of 1967, Tiger Force was sent to the fertile Song Ve Valley. The entire population had already been herded from their homes and crowded into a refugee camp. But some had come back to resume the farming they had always done. The valley had officially been declared a free-fire zone, and Tiger Force's officers took that literally. "There are no friendlies," one lieutenant told his men. "Shoot anything that moves." Over a seven-month period, they killed scores of unarmed civilians. Among their victims were two blind brothers; an elderly Buddhist monk; women, children, and old people hiding in underground shelters; and three farmers trying to plant rice. All were reported as "enemy... killed in action."
The US does not declare that US forces should just go and kill anyone, rather, 'anyone' can be considered a target, which is perfectly reasonable policy while fighting an insurgency.
In normal rules of engagement, the women and children running out of the village are obviously out of bounds. They are civilians. You can't fire at them for any reason.
In a 'free fire' zone, anyone can be considered an enemy combatant if the situation indicates as such. The woman running out of the village with an AK-47 - is 'in bounds' as an enemy combatant in an area where villagers are considered on the side of the insurgents. Obviously, random civilians are not.
The misinterpretation of 'free fire' or the 'loose application' of it are considered 'war crimes' by the US and it was absolutely never intended that the policy be used by soldiers to just shoot up people - your implication that it was used this way is completely false.
The My Lai massacre was a war crime, not an intentional act sanctioned by US forces.
Also: war is dirty. There are no wars without war crimes. Once the bad genie comes out ... it spills all around, the best we can do is contain it.
FYI that's one of the hardest things to do, i.e. make those kinds of calls in the field - often it's not obvious.
Go and watch one of the documentaries that delve into US forces wrangling over a decision to drop munitions, and consider how tricky those decisions are ... so many factors.
> The US does not declare that US forces should just go and kill anyone, rather, 'anyone' can be considered a target
"There are no friendlies," one lieutenant told his men. "Shoot anything that moves." Over a seven-month period, they killed scores of unarmed civilians. Among their victims were two blind brothers; an elderly Buddhist monk; women, children, and old people hiding in underground shelters; and three farmers trying to plant rice. All were reported as "enemy... killed in action."
> In normal rules of engagement, the women and children running out of the village are obviously out of bounds. They are civilians. You can't fire at them for any reason.
During the Korean War, my grandmother had her life saved by a wad of cash (large, because of wartime inflation) hidden in a secret pocket in her skirt. It stopped a piece of shrapnel produced by strafing from a US Douglas A-1 Skyraider. Was she "in bounds?"
> The misinterpretation of 'free fire' or the 'loose application' of it are considered 'war crimes' by the US and it was absolutely never intended that the policy be used by soldiers to just shoot up people
Can you see how using Body Count as a metric would tend to produce "targeting" of the metric which would result in the targeting of people to turn into corpses? That is my whole point here.
"It stopped a piece of shrapnel produced by strafing from a US Douglas A-1 Skyraider. Was she "in bounds?""
Civilian casualties are generally avoided if possible. I'm happy that your grandmother was saved, but it's not relevant.
"Can you see how using Body Count as a metric would tend to produce "targeting" of the metric which would result in the targeting of people to turn into corpses?"
No. 'Body count' is used in every war and has been since the dawn of time, and we continue to use it today as one of many metrics.
Using this metric will not encourage professional soldiers to arbitrarily murder civilians.
in principle, you can verify every downed aircraft and destroyed tank with a photograph or a video. it's hard to move the wrecks of each. there are worse metrics.
When the enemy has limited personnel and equipment - targets such as body count, vehicles destroyed etc. are very good measures of progress.
And FYI the US handily and clearly won the Vietnam war; the South Vietnamese insurgency was defeated and the North Korean Army was obliterated.
Due to political pressure at home, the US withdrew after the war, and a short while later the North Vietnamese were able to rebuild their army and waltz in and topple the fragile S. Vietnamese government. The Communists then murdered 10's of thousands of people in the streets and imprisoned 100's of thousands and of course enforced totalitarian rule which kept millions in fear and poverty.
Were the Americans to have simply left a contingent of soldiers in the South, thereby keeping the legitimate threat of violence, it's unlikely the South would have fallen and might very well look like S. Korea today.
To your point, 'body count' is not a very good number to use when you're fighting an insurgency where there are a lot of irregular forces who can come in and out of fighting, or where soldiers can be replenished (i.e. North Vietnam can recruit willy nilly on their turf).
But it's still a valid measure and though you don't hear about it these days (for PR reasons) you can absolutely be assured that all NATO forces meticulously con't how many enemy forces are destroyed, and that it is a 'target' on many missions.
And FYI the US handily and clearly won the Vietnam war; the South Vietnamese insurgency was defeated and the North Korean Army was obliterated.
That’s a serious, if delusional claim that requires a loooooot of support. “Handily” in particular seems like a ridiculous way to state it, even if you only look at US casualties.
There's a quote to the extent of "the US never lost a battle in the Vietnam, but still lost the war" which is probably what they were getting at, which just honestly proves the point that America was really optimizing for the wrong measure in that war.
I very well understand there were challenges in the war - and that 'body count' and 'battles won' was not going to be a good metric.
This is a valid point: we though it was going great because hey - look at the 'battles won' and 'body' count, but really it wasn't.
But the US did not remotely lose the war.
There is no rational basis for suggesting this - it doesn't even make sense.
This is the weird delusional pop culture response that is the problem: misquotes, lies, exaggerations, political statements - all of this about this war specifically that lends reasonable people to think something happened ... that did not happen.
It got a little ugly but the US won on fairly hard terms: South Vietnamese insurgency was wiped out, and the North Vietnamese Army was in tatters. This only after a few short years of heavy fighting, with limited engagement by the US, an something like 10-1 casualty rates favouring the Americans.
It's ironic because the Americans actually did kind of 'lose' in a way in Korea and we don't look at it the same way due to the different political nature of the war.
Subject: Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Viet Nam
The US Objective: to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam and to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society.
The US had not achieved those objectives 12 years later. The communists won control over the whole country a few years after US withdrawal finished. Vietnam's government is still communist today.
This is basically what I learned browsing through encyclopedias when I was a kid. I did a quick fact-check just now in case I had been misled or misremembered. I can sort-of understand saying that the communists didn't achieve victory over the USA either (because they also didn't manage to install an allied government in the territory of the USA), but claiming that the US won is weird.
"The US had not achieved those objectives 12 years later."
Yes. They did.
The US did achieve those objectives in the early 1970s'.
The US vanquished the South Vietnamese forces, and did considerably damage to North Vietnamese forces using air power - to the point where North Vietnamese did not have a capable fighting force.
Communism was basically gone in the South, in the North, inoperable, at least militarily.
Then the US left.
A few years later, the North built up their armies and waltzed into the South.
It's really crazy, strategically that the US withdrew - all they had to do was leave about 50K soldiers, sitting 'behind the wire' not really fighting, maybe an aircraft carrier, i.e. 'the threat of violence' and S. Vietnam would be as free today as S. Korea. The Americans withdrew because of populist political pressure back home i.e teens protesting. I don't believe the US should have necessarily gone to war in Vietnam, but after they did, they should have stayed - it would have cost very little.
Anyhow - as per the article - 'points of measure' can be misleading, as it was with 'bodycount' in Vietnam, but they're not entirely misleading.
Number of enemy combatants, civilians, allies killed or wounded is a very important metric in every conflict. It's just not 'the' metric.
If the North didn't have a capable fighting force any more, and still overwhelmed the South shortly after the US withdrew, that means the US did not actually establish a "a viable and increasingly democratic society" during the time it had a military presence there. Societal viability includes, at a minimum, being able to survive one's enemies. Enemies that were already drastically weakened during the period of US involvement, by your own account.
France today is not the same as France in 1939 - the period from 1870-1940 is generally considered the French Third Republic, and they're on the Fifth Republic now. Poland today is not the same as Poland in 1939. Germany today is certainly not the same as Germany in 1939. Not only are the people in charge different, but the whole system of government is different, the cultural values are different, and many of the cities were rebuilt from the ground up.
Just because a society collapses doesn't mean the people disappear, or even that they start to think of themselves as a different nationality. Society is all of the organizational superstructure on top of that, and barring rare cases like governments-in-exile-that-can-pick-up-where-they-left-off-when-liberated, that usually doesn't survive being defeated in warfare.
I respect your charitable interpretation, but it turns out to be overly charitable based on subsequent posts. I’m going to take a page out of the “know when to back away slowly” handbook, and back away slowly from this train wreck.
What's delusional and troubling is the degree to which this war is completely misunderstood in pop culture.
The US handily won the Vietnam war, full stop.
In classical terms is was a clear and unambiguous outright victory.
Think of Korea for example: a stalemate, whereas the US obliterated their oppponents in Vietnam.
The US hardly lost a single battle and losses in the war are consistent with the losses forces have in a 'regular war' - it's just that they seem large today's because the US hasn't fought against capable forces. Losses were consistent with Korean war, just a decade previous.
The Vietnam experience is often misunderstood because the US technically did spend a very long time there, they had trouble initially with the South Vietnamese insurgency, because the US eventually resorted to heavy bombing campaigns with too many civilian casualties, and because of complex political issues such as North Vietnamese forces hiding out in Cambodia etc..
But really the 'hard war' was not very long - you can see the troop buildup and then withdrawal here [1]
The US 'under committed' to the effort early on, and then did a slower build up to defeat the insurgency, and relatively handily defeated them after the buildup and then withdrew after a major air campaign.
The length of direct engagement by US forces in Vietnam is shorter than for Iraq and Afghanistan, and roughly on par with Korea. The number of US casualties was roughly on par with Korea as well.
The Vietnam war is understood by most people via Hollywood films and very poorly conceived documentaries. It was a turning point in some ways because it's the first time that American citizens were given insight into how horrible war actually is (i.e. reporters on the front lines etc.).
>The US handily won the Vietnam war, full stop.
>In classical terms is was a clear and unambiguous outright victory.
The only measure of success is whether or not you accomplish your objectives. The US did not accomplish its objectives in Vietnam of keeping a US-friendly government in power. Regardless of tactical measures of success, the US failed in its strategic objectives. I agree that popular culture has not accurately portrayed the Vietnam conflict, but saying that the US won in Vietnam is completely untrue.
" The US did not accomplish its objectives in Vietnam of keeping a US-friendly government in power"
Yes. They did. While there was conflict.
Then they left, and effectively abandoned those objectives.
When the North Vietnamese rebuilt it's army and re-invaded the South - propping up the S. Vietnamese government was obviously no longer a military objective, and barely a political one.
So the US won a war, withdrew, and then abandoned their ally.
The US failed to achieve a South Vietnamese gov't that had reasonable support from the general populace, which was nominally on the list of US policy goals since the beginning, but was gamed at every step of the way.
Until such was achieved, we had _always_ lost the war. Winning battles, paid for with American blood, was only a means of temporarily staving off the likely collapse for another year or two.
As for "abandoned", what does that even mean? The South had: large material advantages in artillery, vehicles, and AFVs; a significant air force (2000 craft), plus >10 years of a huge US training effort.
So the US won a war, withdrew, and then abandoned their ally.
Which is crazy.
Sounds an awful lot like our government was gaming their "target" just to say they achieved it, even though hitting the target wasn't in everyone's best interests.
"If “progress” means murdering civilians by the thousand as part of a vain attempt to maintain a vestige of colonialism, count me out."
Progress was defeating a ruthless and murderous North Korean Communist regime who, upon victory, mass murdered 10's of thousands of their own citizens, put 100's of thousands in concentration camps and ruthless oppressed their population for decades.
My homework partner in high school was a child of Vietnamese immigrants - literally 'boat people'. Also my first boss in the Valley was Vietnamese from that era. They have some stories.
Maybe if the natives hadn’t had to spend decades struggling for independence against various colonial powers, they would have been nicer after they won.
I’d like to point out that our allies in that war did all that stuff too, and there’s no reason to think they would have been much nicer if they had won. Part of why they lost is that they alientated much of the population by being oppressive and murderous.
Maybe if the natives hadn’t had to spend decades struggling for independence against various colonial powers, they would have been nicer after they won.
The way it was portrayed in Ken Burns' "The Vietnam War," Ho Chi Minh was an admirer of the US, and would have become an ally, if the US hadn't decided to wholly back France in preserving its colonial interest.
You might want to know that the South Korean regime, under the blessing (or indifference) of USA, had no problem mass murdering 100k~200k of its own people for being communists.[1] Another ~60k people were murdered in the island of Jeju to "put down" communist insurgents, where entire towns were wiped out.[2] And during the Korean war they managed to kill another +100k by letting conscripts starve or freeze through corruption.[3]
History is never about "good guys killing bad guys".
“Progress was defeating a ruthless and murderous North Korean Communist regime...”
“Who, upon victory, mass murdered 10's of thousands of their own citizens...”
Proofread! Or at the very least, try not to include outright contradictions in your outlandish claims. Claiming that the US won in one sentence, and in the very next declaring the opposite is baffling.
I think Goodhart's law gives us a good insight. If the actual goal was to ensure the long term viability of a democratic South Vietnam, the endeavor failed. So what happened, is that the US government "gamed" it by targeting "Body Count" and "winning all the battles." In doing so, it failed to achieve the actual goal in its long term interest.
Ahhh - thanks for getting to the crux of the matter:
The military objectives were 'gamed' by using 'body count' which mislead us in terms of progress.(Actually, they were not 'gamed' so much as the old metric of 'body count' was not useful in this type of insurgency - so more a matter of 'lack of insight').
BUT - the strategic objectives did not fail for this reason.
The military objectives of defeating the VC and North Vietnamese were still outright successful. Despite all the challenges, it was a definitive military victory for the US: VC wiped out, North Vietnamese totally neutralized. The North Vietnamese basically surrendered their objectives and a 'peace treaty' was signed.
The 'failure' in Vietnam was a geopolitical one - once the US withdrew, the North Vietnamese rebuilt their army and waltzed into the South.
My point is - the two are separate issues.
The now accepted view of 'body count was misleading' actually did not fundamentally affect military outcomes. It was a bad measure, but the US still one. It affected some things, maybe a 'shock' to public opinion, but it was not existential in terms of changing the military outcomes.
The 'failed objectives' were simply due to (arguably premature) US withdrawal. You can see from US casualties [1] during the war that the war was 'won' (about mid 1970) several years before US withdrawal and even longer before a resurgent North Vietnamese invasion after US withdrawal.
Hence the confusion.
There were so many civilian casualties, so many geopolitical bits of ugliness, the US casualty rate was high enough, the terrible massacres on both sides - that all of this leaves us with a clouded view of the events.
The now accepted view of 'body count was misleading' actually did not fundamentally affect military outcomes. It was a bad measure, but the US still [won]. It affected some things, maybe a 'shock' to public opinion, but it was not existential in terms of changing the military outcomes.
No, it was existential, because that shock to public opinion was a large part of the reason that the strategic goal was abandoned. The draft may have been a larger part, but the point remains: tolerating and perhaps even encouraging excessive civilian casualties was a military failure that played a role in the geopolitical failure. They are not separate issues at all.
BUT - the strategic objectives did not fail for this reason.
It's hard to quantify the cost of the bad PR that comes from killing children and grannies.
The military objectives of defeating the VC and North Vietnamese were still outright successful...The 'failure' in Vietnam was a geopolitical one
The programming objectives were successful...the startup's failure was an economic one. Right here, we go up one level of abstraction, and we see the more fundamental failure. Does it really matter how good the code was, if your company goes bankrupt?
My point is - the two are separate issues.
No. One is a means. It's a form of implementation. I should sincerely hope you aren't all about "art for art's sake" when the "art" in question is military action and deadly force. As for the 2nd thing -- the actual goal, living up to values -- that gets to the crux of the true failure.
The now accepted view of 'body count was misleading' actually did not fundamentally affect military outcomes. It was a bad measure, but the US still one. It affected some things, maybe a 'shock' to public opinion, but it was not existential in terms of changing the military outcomes.
I went to a military academy for a boarding school. I had a 1903 Springfield rifle (disabled) locked to a rack in my room. I was taught by Vietnam vets. I think the majority of them would agree with many parts of your assessment, but I suspect at least some of them would be aghast at how you're missing the point. Does it matter how a military or a government achieves it's objectives? Unless you think the ends justify the means, yes it does. Does it matter if the actions align with your values? Yes it does.
You, yourself, have noted how the repercussions have reverberated down the years, but I'm not sure you're correctly interpreting what that means.
In a way, it's the same sort of mistake made by the worst of the authoritarian SJWs. Let's say you use technically legal force, bureaucratic pressure, and bad PR tactics to frighten and coerce people into doing what you want, but in doing so you convince nobody while violating a bunch of values, principles, and feelings -- what does that actually get you? It gets you further from the underlying goal. By the same token, let's say you use military force and kill or frighten everyone opposed to your client state, what does that really get you? If you've turned enough of the populace against you, it gets you less than what you had before.
In 2018, winning is through convincing, not coercing.
This seems similar to declaring that Germany won the war against the British in 1940. They smashed the enemy forces and drove them off the continent, after all.
We hold people accountable for actions instead of outcomes, since outcomes (even profit) can be gamed at the overall detriment of the organization.
We talk about the outcome we want, look at the levers that will get the outcome, and then agree to the actions that we are going to take.
If the actions dont result in the forecasted outcome then the underlying assumptions are wrong. The assumptions are wrong if 1) people arent doing the tasks properly 2) the relationship between the task and the outcome are different than what we thought. If the issue is 1, we provide training. If the issue is 2, we use the revised assumption for future forecasts.
We dont use the word target anymore, we use the word forecast.
Without dates and metrics you can’t measure progress. Like mile markers along the road (back before GPS / Smartphones). But without continuous, high trust, collaborative conversation you can’t actually make progress. That’s the gasoline powering you down the road. The goal should be Disneyland (shouldn’t it always be Disneyland?), not the next mile marker.
This is also demonstrated quite well in machine learning with the test set. The target is test error, but you don't let algorithms optimize that directly and instead they optimize against training error. Goodhart's law is a manifestation of over-fitting in social systems.
The same principle applies to attributes and qualities which mark successful entrepreneurs. The same principle applies to attributes and qualities which mark good developers. The same principle applies to attributes and qualities which mark good employees. Good people. Good politicians. Activists. Good pundits. Intellectuals. Top tier school degrees.
Hacker News karma.
Shouldn't we all be looking out for the "targeting" and be trying to find the next measure?
Reminds me of all those computer architecture papers that optimize for IPC to the detriment of overall performance. Or the CPU frequency wars which led to ever deeper pipelines which were completely obliterated with branch mispredicts. Or the current trend of increasing core count without actually being able to do any useful work on them...
yep, seen several idiots whose work habits are destructive be promoted for gaming stats
seen stats make people discourage/delay income/work to avoid anomalies/spikes in stats because if there's a spike it makes it look like you are slacking the next month, or makes a manager think you should be able to constantly hit the spike
TLDR of my post:
The vanity metric paradox - every metric, sufficiently optimized becomes a vanity metric, as it stops being the make-or-break qualifier for a company.
I always felt that agile processes were a means to give non-answers to performance measurement in order to allay the consequences of that measurement and allow developers to get on with the business of making software.
How big is the task; 10 story points
How long will that take; depends on our velocity
Can it be done by this date; we're not allowed to plan that far ahead. You can put it in the 'icebox'. We might get to it eventually.
If (1) everyone is highly effective in getting tasks done, and (2) working on tasks that are reasonably well prioritized by both technical risks and business value, why exactly do you need to know more?
There are legitimate reasons that a business may need a date. But making sure people are working harder than hard by beating them over the head with a date coughed out by a gantt chart is not one of the legitimate reasons.
Kind of we started optimizing for points and started to be smart about it. Because that what people above wanted. What happened we started communicating to PO more often, like: you want more points burned take this story out, close this and create an improvement.
Of course that was not childish silly sneaking and turned out we have as a team a lot better partnership with business. We deliver what is needed and can be finished.
I understand not everyone has luck to end up in such environment but it confirms there is no silver bullet. Only having right people is real silver bullet.
You shouldn't optimize at all but instead pick multiple, 'distantly related' measures and satisfice over them.
That's sort of what humans do to have a robust objective function. Sufficient food, water, physical safety, love, social interaction, meaningful work, spiritual fulfillment—fulfill each of them and humans generally move on to the next 'unfulfilled' goal on the list rather than endlessly maximizing something that ceases to improve their life quality.
But then your "one factor" just becomes a combination of various other factors. I don't think the point of Goodhart's Law is related to "over-optimizing for just one thing," rather it's a statement about whether any metric (even a broad, diverse metric that takes into account multiple different things) can retain informativeness once it is set up as an optimization target.
I think you could set up an optimization target for a company that says "be profitable and grow for the next 30 years". You would see quickly that this target is a complex beast with a lot of different factors at play that need to be balanced against each other. I don't think Goodhart's law would apply here.
That just sounds like coordinate gradient descent on a multi-term objective function. Just same old optimization but with some metaparameters or component-wise conditioning.
In fact, I think to argue against optimization, you’d basically have to boil it down to existing philosophical arguments against utilitarianism.
Either way, I’m skeptical if this conclusion is very connected to Goodhart’s Law, because it assumes some type of normative axiom that would have to precede your interpretation of Goodhart’s Law.
My main interest was to pointout that it creates a sort of impossibility theorem situation if you accept Goodhart’s Law (I don’t personally accept it as a general rule, only something that applies to some types of measures and not others).
The impossibility criteria would be something like:
- If one finds a good measure, one should optimize it.
- If a measure is an optimization target, it is not a good measure.
- For a given entity, there exists a set of variables governing how well that entity can meet a goal (e.g. measures can possibly contain relevant information).
Basically you could only choose 2.
- If you pick the first two, it means there are no general variables governing the outcone you want; they are constantly changing and fundamentally unpredictable, so you might get away with optimizing something briefly, but its informativeness immediately disappears. This type of thinking is common in efficient market theory, for example, and could be connected to a fundamental belief about non-determinism or non-stationarity.
- If you choose the first and third, it seems like standard utilitarianism.
- If you choose the latter two, it seems like fatalism or religion — there are quantities that govern achieving desired outcomes, but they cannot be treated as objective optimization criteria and can only be analyzed subjectively or fatalistically.
As well as my more recent paper categorizing the different ways it occurs; https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.04585